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Abstract
Healthcare organisations have struggled to improve safety. Over the last 20 years
rates of patient harm have remained at around 10%, despite implementation of
various improvement initiatives linked to the patient safety movement. This study
identifies key conditions perpetuating this safety ‘implementation gap’: 1) a
hierarchical challenge and 2) second victim phenomenon. Employee voice is adopted
as a sensitising concept. The aim is to identify conditions which moderate the
hierarchical challenge, encouraging the enactment of voice, leading to prevention of
further medical errors. This PhD’s original contribution to knowledge is: second
victims are key actors in attenuating hierarchical barriers through enactment of
positively valenced practices. Adopting a practice-based approach identifying medical
errors as break-downs in professional practice, three cases of serious medical error
at a single NHS Trust are chosen for comparative analysis. Data collection includes
over 100 hours of observations, 50 interviews, and review of 35 documents. Evidence
for a climate of silence was found in each case stemming from: a hierarchical culture,
blame culture, and futility of voice. Acquiescent or defensive silence contributed
directly to each serious medical error. Second victims were found in each case,
generally experiencing guilt, shame, anger, and compassion. The recovery trajectory
of these second victims varied, with one ‘thriving’ while others ‘survived’ or ‘dropped
out’. Positively valenced practice changes, which set the conditions for voice, were
enacted by affectively charged individuals, either the second victim themselves, or
through a process of emotional contagion, their colleagues. These conditions for
voice included: setting expectations for voice, management engendering voice, closer
adherence to policy and standard operating procedures, and a reinvigorated
sentiment of care. These changes led to development of a voice climate encouraging
the enactment of both defensive and prosocial voice. A safety incident model of voice
for second victims was developed and transferability discussed.
16
Abbreviations
AER – After-Event Review
AMA – American Medical Association
BMJ – British Medical Journal
BRI – Bristol Royal Infirmary
BSREC - Biomedical and Scientific Research Ethics Committee
CLAHRC-WM - Collaboration for Leadership in Applied Health Research and Care
West Midlands
CS – Case Study
CUSP – Comprehensive Unit-based Safety Programme
DFCI - Dana-Farber Cancer Institute
GMC - General Medical Council
IOM – Institute of Medicine
MUM - Mum about Undesirable Messages
NHS – National Health Service
NPSA – National Patient Safety Agency
NRLS – National Reporting and Learning System
RCA – Root Cause Analysis
RFO – Retained Foreign Object
SOP – Standard Operating Procedure
SUI – Serious Untoward Incident
17
SECTION I: Introduction, Literature Review and
Methods
Chapter 1: Introduction
18
Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to understand the role second victims of medical error
play in the enactment of positively valenced practices, which moderate the
hierarchical challenge, leading to the enactment of voice, and improved patient safety.
This chapter begins by presenting a general overview of the problem area and study
goals. The catalyst for this researcher’s ambition to pursue a PhD is described. Next,
an overview of the structure of the manuscript is provided.
The context for this PhD is that when medical errors occur, not only are
patients and their families harmed, known as first victims, but healthcare
professionals, known as second victims, are also found to suffer. While the many
negative consequences felt by second victims are well established, there is little
known about what positive actions might result from these experiences.
Further, a prime contributing factor to medical error are failures in
communication between professionals. This ‘hierarchical challenge’, where cultural
barriers between professions inhibit communication, exacerbate the issue,
perpetuating a gap in patient safety. As such, this PhD aims to place second victims
as key actors in moderating hierarchy through establishing the conditions leading to
voice, preventing further errors from occurring.
Problem Area and Study Goals
Despite efforts to improve patient safety, rates of medical harm have not
improved (Landrigan et al., 2010). Implementation of numerous initiatives to address
medical harm began with the rise of the patient safety movement beginning in the
early 2000s. However, despite widespread adoption of methods to improve safety,
hospitals’ have been found to rarely learn from their failures (Nicolini, Waring, &
Mengis, 2011; Tucker & Edmondson, 2003). Subsequently improvements based on
learning from such failures are rarely implemented. This prevailing outcome is
described as an implementation gap.
This study, through review of four historically significant cases of medical
harm, positions the hierarchical challenge (Senot, Chandrasekaran, & Ward, 2016),
and second victim phenomenon (Wu, 2000), as key conditions perpetuating the
implementation gap in patient safety.
To explore how these challenges might be attenuated, employee voice, the
discretionary communication of concerns about work-related issues intended to
improve organisational or unit functioning (Elizabeth Morrison, 2011), is adopted as
a sensitising concept. Specifically, this study aims to explore how the second victims
19
of medical error can potentially moderate the hierarchal challenge, to enact voice,
improving patient safety.
Research Genesis
The genesis for this research stems from this researcher’s pre-PhD career
where he spent 10 years working in healthcare management. During his most recent
post as a hospital risk manager he was responsible for incident reporting, medico-
legal advice, and investigating adverse events using a root cause analysis technique.
It was during this time, investigating safety incidents and developing
recommendations for improvement, that he observed a disturbing trend. There was a
failure to learn from past events, resulting in the re-occurrence of similar serious
safety incidents.
Having met with the family involved in one of these serious incidents on a
maternity ward, to re-assure them safety measures had been put in place, he soon-
after learned of another very similar incident having occurred. This tragic incident
should have been prevented, safety measures were in place, but it slipped through.
Reflecting on these tragic experiences, and how they might be avoided going
forward required a deeper level of thought and analysis than was possible in a day to
day managerial role. As a result, he decided to pursue his PhD to begin to think more
deeply, about analysing these problems, and how they might be overcome, with a
goal to make a broader contribution to the field of patient safety.
Embarking on the PhD has been a journey, and development of theoretical
ideas occurred iteratively as he progressed towards his goal. Initially, ‘unlearning’, the
discarding of obsolete organisational practices to make room for new learning, was
chosen as a theoretical base for this study (Rushmer & Davies, 2004). Unlearning
resonated with this researcher given his professional background, and experience
implementing safety recommendations, which often require healthcare professionals
to abandon obsolete or unsafe practices, replacing them with safer ones. However,
after preliminary data analysis was conducted, themes related to professionals’
affective experiences, and positive changes which they enacted (i.e. voice), began to
emerge. As such, the researcher was guided by the data, to explore theoretical
themes of greater relevance.
Thus, the focus of theoretical concern shifted to second victims, their affective
experiences, and the enactment of practices which established the conditions for
voice. If readers of this thesis are interested to learn more about unlearning, the
original literature review for this PhD was published as a book chapter ‘Unlearning
and Patient Safety’ (Richmond, 2018).
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Structure of Thesis
This thesis is structured across three sections, consisting of ten chapters, an
overview of each is described next.
Section I: Introduction, Literature Review & Methods:
Chapter 2 Literature Review Part I: A State of the Art Review of the Patient
Safety Movement
Chapter 2 sets the foundation for this thesis with a state of the art review of
the patient safety literature. This includes identification of the patient safety
implementation gap which is found to be perpetuated by second victim phenomenon
and hierarchical challenge. Historically significant cases of medical error, including
American cases: the story of Betsy Lehman at the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute in
Boston, Josie King at Johns Hopkins Children’s Centre, and United Kingdom cases:
the Bristol Royal infirmary and Mid Staffordshire, are described to draw out the
organisational and professional consequences of medical error. These historical
cases highlight the problematic barriers to communication that result from cultural and
hierarchical differences between professions, and the traumatic negative affective
impact medical errors are known to have. Further, these cases are credited,
particularly Betsy Lehman’s drug overdose in America, as influencing the broader
patient safety movement.
With the emergence of the patient safety movement in the late 1990s, came
the adoption of numerous safety improvement methodologies, including the widely
adopted root cause analysis (RCA) investigative technique. An overview of RCA
methodology is provided, along with a discussion of the benefits and limitations of this
approach. Further a summary of RCA is provided and ideas for how it might be
improved are included.
Chapter 2 concludes by identifying a need to draw upon the organisational
behaviour field, specifically employee voice, to explore how the challenges identified
in chapter 2 might be moderated.
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Chapter 3 Literature Review Part II: Employee Voice: Organisational
Dynamics and Psychological Processes.
Continuing the literature review which began in chapter 2, chapter 3
introduces the theoretical construct of employee voice (Morrison, 2011). First context
is provided in the form of examples from other safety sensitive industries where
individuals were silenced, leading to serious safety incidents. Employee voice is
described by a cognitive process where individuals must decide 1) whether it is safe
to speak up and 2) whether speaking up will be effective. Further, emotions are found
to play a role in this process as well. Additional influences include hierarchy & status,
team leaders and psychological safety, and consideration of one’s motive for voice.
Chapter 3 is structured to explain voice as influenced by both organisational
dynamics and psychological processes. Organisation dynamics relevant in this
context include: professional organisation of doctors and nurses, multi-professional
action teams, and the ‘turbulent’ nature of the healthcare work environment.
Psychological Processes include a detailed look at healthcare professionals as
second victim, emphasising the negative affective consequences they are known to
experience. Power, specifically that which exists between hierarchically arranged
professions, is explained as influencing subordinates decision to voice concerns or
remain silent. Group voice climate is introduced, with a climate of silence (Morrison &
Milliken, 2000) explaining the conditions which render individuals silent vs. a climate
which encourages voice, the latter drawing on the concept of psychological safety
(Edmondson, 1999).
Chapter 4 Research Strategy: Methods, Design, and Data
In Chapter 4 an overarching research design is described for the study. This
includes researching the hierarchical challenge through identification of breakdowns
in practice (Nicolini, 2013; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011) and classifying the affective
experiences of second victims. Affective experiences, such as guilt, common to
second victims are listed, and compared with Lazarus (1991) and Lazarus and
Cohen-Charash’s (2001) core-relational themes for emotional appraisal, to guide the
researcher’s classification of affective experiences which arose from the study’s data.
An abductive case research method (Voss, Johnson, & Godsell, 2016)
including sampling controls and selection criteria is explained. The access provided
for this study was in-depth, with the researcher being appointed as an honorary
research fellow at the NHS trust where data collection was completed. Observations
included trust wide governance quality committees, as well as more micro-level
departmental interactions with staff. Trust risk management provided the researcher
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with access to departments where serious medical errors had recently occurred, root
cause investigation had been carried out, and recommendations for improvement put
in place, or were in progress. Chapter 4 provides an overview of data sources for the
study, including over 100 hours of observations, 50 interviews, and 35 document
reviews.
An in-depth look at how data was analysed for the study is provided. Raw
data was compiled into a qualitative database using NVIVO software and analysed
using an inductive coding method (Pratt, 2009). Descriptions of how first order codes
were collapsed into second order categories, and eventually into themes, is provided.
Section II: Empirical Findings
Chapter 5 Overview of Cases
Chapter 5 introduces each of the three empirical cases. Given the complex
nature of each case, including both human and system factors implicated in each
serious safety incident, an overview necessitated its own chapter, prior to the full
exploration of findings in chapters 6, 7, and 8. Chapter 5 starts by summarising the
study’s cases, providing a rationale for them, and highlights from each. Full
descriptions of each case including the departmental context, the incident, and the
findings of the RCA investigation are provided, setting the stage for the findings
presented in the next chapters.
Chapters 6, 7, and 8 Case Findings
Chapter’s 6 Surgery, 7 Maternity, and 8 Urology and Ward x, provide the
findings for the study. Each chapter follows a similar layout including first, evidencing
the conditions for silence which lead to each serious safety incident. Second, an
overview of key second victims and their affective experiences are described with an
emphasis on the role these experiences play in enacting positively valenced changes
to practice. Third, evidence for these recommended or emergent practice changes,
which create the conditions for voice, are described. Fourth, evidence for the specific
type of voice found is shown. Fifth, a summary of each cases’ findings is provided in
a tabular format.
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Section III: Discussion and Conclusion
Chapter 9 Discussion
Following presentation of the study’s findings in chapters 6, 7, and 8, they are
discussed in a comparative, cross-case analysis, in chapter 9. First the concept of
group climate is reintroduced to provide a foundation for the chapter, which shows
the “painful journey” the healthcare professionals in each case went through, as they
traversed from a climate of silence, to a voice climate. The conditions for a climate of
silence from each case are compared, leading to two forms of silence, acquiescent
and defensive, with direct attribution to the serious safety incidents.
Following the occurrence of serious safety incidents numerous second victims
were identified from each case. These individuals are classified along a recovery
trajectory (Scott et al., 2009) with some ‘thriving’, while others ‘survive’, or ‘drop out’.
The positive practices enacted by these second victims, and their colleagues through
a process of emotional contagion, setting the conditions for voice, are discussed.
Voice climate across all cases is described, and the conditions from which it
emerged are compared. This climate which encourages speaking-up led to two types
of voice: defensive and prosocial, the consequence of each are discussed and
compared. Rounding out the discussion is presentation of the study’s safety incident
model of voice for second victims. This model is intended to be general and applicable
to other safety sensitive industries.
Chapter 10 Conclusion
Concluding this thesis is a final chapter which reminds readers of the research
gap addressed and to which area of literature this study is contributing. Transferability
of this study’s findings are discussed, and considerations for applicability to other
safety sensitive fields are explained. Practical recommendations are listed with an
aim to harness the affectively charged second victims of medical error for the
enactment of positive change, creating a voice climate, and improving patient safety.
Finally, the study’s limitations are explained with rationale for why they
persisted and ideas for future research discussed.
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Chapter 2: A State of the Art Review of the Patient
Safety Movement
Literature Review Part I
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Introduction
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the empirical context for this study, the
healthcare industry, specifically the UK’s NHS, where this study takes place. Through
an exploration of recent and historical patient safety literature, this chapter provides
an overview of the patient safety movement internationally. Establishing this broader
context sets up the research question posed by the study: how second victims of
medical error can potentially moderate the hierarchical challenge, to enact voice, and
improve patient safety. Key challenges which perpetuate this gap in patient safety are
highlighted as a ‘hierarchical challenge’ (Senot et al., 2016) and second victim
phenomenon (Wu, 2000).
The last few decades have seen major examples of inquiries into quality of
care, negligence on behalf of care providers, and heightened public pressure for
improving patient safety. An overview of these important events, across four cases of
medical error in the USA and UK is provided to establish the background for the
study’s context, and establish the scope of the ‘implementation gap’ which this study
addresses.
Root Cause Analysis (RCA), an internationally adopted tool for accident
investigation, has taken hold in healthcare, and has arguably become the primary
method for investigating patient safety incidents. The history of RCA, an overview, its
benefits and limitations as found in several recent studies, as well as potential next
steps for the practice, are highlighted.
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The Patient Safety Movement
The patient safety movement can trace its origins back to several major
international reports which describe, for the first time in a comprehensive way, the
scale of the patient harm problem (Department of Health, 2000; Kohn, Corrigan, &
Donaldson, 2000). These national level reports, the UK’s ‘an organisation with a
memory’ (2000), and USA’s ‘to err is human’ (2000), explore the nature of medical
error, rates of harm, and highlight human and organisational factors, which have
contributed to a failure to improve practice following medical error. Refer to Table 2.1
Comparison of National Rates of Adverse Events for an overview of the scale of this
problem among Western nations.
The release of these reports prompted healthcare organisations to implement
various initiatives aimed at improving patient safety. While the release of these reports
is associated with an increased number of patient safety publications and research
awards (Stelfox, Palmisani, Scurlock, Orav, & Bates, 2006), unfortunately, there has
been little evidence of widespread safety improvement resulting from this heightened
attention to patient safety (Landrigan et al., 2010; Waring, 2013), and recent
calculations list medical error as the third most common cause of death in the US
(Makary & Daniel, 2016).
Perhaps the most popular of these initiatives to improve safety is Root Cause
Analysis (RCA), a family of bundled methodologies for the structured and
retrospective investigation of near misses, adverse events, and never events
(Nicolini, Mengis, Meacheam, Waring, & Swan, 2016). RCA did not originate in
healthcare, it was adopted, as an “anxiety-reassurance” package, riding in on the
wave of the patient safety movement (Nicolini et al., 2016). RCA stemmed from the
nuclear safety industry, where it grew in popularity among safety engineers following
the 1979 Three Mile Island incident (Nicolini et al., 2016).
Numerous researchers have analysed the initiatives undertaken by healthcare
organisations to learn from incidents and prevent recurrences (Iedema et al., 2006;
Iedema, Jorm, & Braithwaite, 2008; Nicolini et al., 2011; Vincent, 2003; Waring &
Bishop, 2010; Waring & Currie, 2011; Wu, Lipshutz, & Pronovost, 2008).These
studies have tended to emphasise the way in which incidents were analysed using
methods like RCA, identification of risks, and how lessons learned were shared using
reports. It is these RCA reports which are aimed at changing the practices of
healthcare professionals and the systems in which they work, via listing
recommendations for improvement and assigning responsibility for each.
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Table 2.1 Comparison of National Rates of Adverse Events
Country United States Australia United
Kingdom
Canada
Study US Harvard
Medical Practice
Study 1991
(Brennan et al.,
1991)
The Quality in
Australian
Healthcare
Study (Wilson
et al., 1995)
Reducing Error
in Medicine
(Vincent, 2000)
Canadian
adverse
events
study
(Baker et
al., 2004)
Proportion of
inpatient
episodes
leading to
harmful
adverse
events
3.7% 16.6% 10% 7.5%
Proportion of
adverse
events
deemed
preventable
70% (Leape,
1994)
50% Around 50% 37%
Extrapolation
of findings by
Country
44,000 and
perhaps as many
as 98,000 deaths
in US each year.
If these rates are
typical, then the
analogous impact
would be the
equivalent of a
jumbo jet
crashing every 2
days (Leape,
1994)
470,000
adverse
events / year
Approximate
cost of $1
billion.
850,000 adverse
events per year.
Up to £2 billion
direct cost of
additional bed-
days.
185,000
adverse
events
per year.
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The Implementation Gap
Despite widespread adoption of methods to improve safety, we know that
hospitals rarely learn from their failures (Nicolini et al., 2011; Tucker & Edmondson,
2003), subsequently improvements based on learning from such failures are rarely
implemented. This prevailing outcome is hereby referred to as an ‘implementation
gap’.
Figure 2.1 below is the learning circle used by the UK’s Department of Health
(2000) to conceptualize the process of investigating, learning from, and preventing
medical errors. It is shown here as a framework in which the ‘implementation gap’ is
superimposed.
Figure 2.1 The Implementation Gap (Adapted from Department of Health,
2000).
While this inability to implement safer practices has been broadly
hypothesized as the result of barriers including a normalization of deviance among
staff (Vaughan, 1999; Waring, 2005), the promotion of quick fixes and work-arounds
rather than systematic analysis (Tucker & Edmondson, 2003; Waring, Harrison, &
McDonald, 2007), and a predominant culture of blame (Carroll, Rudolph, &
Hatakenaka, 2002; Department of Health, 2000; Waring & Currie, 2011), it is arguably
other challenges, those which professionals’ regularly and directly confront at the
“sharp end” of care (Hollnagel, Braithwaite, & Wears, 2013, p. 228) that perpetuate
*IMPLEMENTATION GAP*
 ‘Hierarchical
Challenge’ (Senot,
et al. 2016)
 Second Victims
(Wu, 2000)
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this ‘implementation gap’.
Chief among these concerns are 1) whether healthcare professionals feel able
to speak up when safety is at risk, and 2) how second victims manage the affective
impact of such errors on their trajectory towards learning, recovery and improvement.
Given nearly 85% of medical errors are caused by faulty communications
(Ayd, 2004), a critical obstacle to addressing this gap in improving practice is arguably
the ‘hierarchical challenge’, a cultural barrier which is found to exist between
healthcare professions (Senot et al., 2016). This barrier inhibits nurses from
respectfully challenging physicians in case of quality issues, reducing collaboration
between physicians and nurses, and contributing to the delivery of lower quality care
(Senot et al., 2016).
While it’s known that a positive relationship exists between emotional
response and the severity of medical error, there is much that is not well understood
about emotional response to medical error (Sirriyeh, Lawton, Gardner, & Armitage,
2010). For example, diminishing empathy among physicians, and high levels of burn
out, were associated with an increased chance of committing a medical error (West
et al., 2016). Thus, experiencing medical errors can result in a loss of compassion
among physicians. This link is suggestive of a “vicious cycle” where physicians are
involved in errors, leading to personal distress, which then contributes to further poor
patient care (West et al., 2016, p. 1075). Professionals involved in errors often
experience the second victim phenomenon (Wu, 2000) which has been known to
impair clinical confidence and performance, resulting from detachment, anxiety, and
depression, for example.
In light of the relationship between medical errors and second victims it is
important to consider what the implications of affective experience might be for
initiatives like RCA aimed at learning from error. Consideration for the role of affect in
organisational learning is highlighted by Dewey (1859-1952) as integral to
understanding the experience of individuals. Dewey understood learning a
transaction between individuals and the environment consisting of more than just
thinking and knowledge, but also including body sensations, intuitions, and emotions
(Dewey, 1980; Dewey, 1981; Dewey, 1987; Dewey, 1988). Further supporting the
importance of consideration for affect in organisational learning is the work of Vince
(2001), who drew upon a psychodynamic tradition that proposes learning as visible
in the organisational dynamics created by the interaction between power relations
and emotion.
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Current approaches to safety and learning are underpinned by a “find and fix”
mind-set (Hollnagel, 2013, p.6), resulting in a narrow focus by healthcare institutions
on the process of investigating incidents and compliance, while skirting the issue of
post-investigation learning and practice change. This emphasis on systems and
practices which have gone wrong is known as a safety-I perspective, while attempting
to consider where things have gone exceptionally well – as a starting point to improve
safety – is known as safety-II perspective.
Root Cause Analysis, which this study explores through cases of medical
error, is firmly rooted in a safety-I type approach, thus as a starting point this study
places emphasis on this “find and fix” approach to safety, in order to understand its
shortcomings in enacting practice improvements which exacerbate the
‘implementation gap’.
Perspective on Safety-I & Safety-II
Negative aspects of safety, i.e incidents, have received greater interest than
the positive. Some have argued (i.e Waring, 2013) the narrow focus of safety
initiatives on what goes wrong, rather than what goes right, has led us to where we
are today with little evidence of sustained safety improvement (Landrigan et al.,
2010). Calls for more thorough reflection on the “problem of patient safety” have been
made (Waring, 2013).
Healthcare is thought to have a 1:10 ratio of harm to care (Reason, Carthey,
& de Leval, 2001). This implies that for every instance we expect that something will
go amiss, there are 9 times where we should expect that things will go right, and lead
to the intended outcome. Despite the higher probability of intended outcomes,
initiatives to improve safety are dominantly associated with harm events (i.e Incident
Reporting and RCA). This focus on harm is explained in psychological literature by
our innate negativity bias, where humans are more attentive to and influenced by
negative emotions and events than by the positive ones (Baumeister, et al., 2001;
Rozin, Royzman, 2001).
Safety-II originated from the resilience-engineering field, which emphasises
‘work as done’ versus ‘work as imagined’ (Hollnagel, Woods, Leveson, 2007). Safety-
II considers a system resilient when it’s able to adjust it’s functioning in response to
changes in conditions. The goal of this approach is to ensure as many successful
outcomes as possible by identifying and learning from good practice. There are
similarities between safety-II and a ‘positive deviance’ approach which looks at
individuals or groups who perform exceptionally well, and identifies and disseminates
best practices to improve wider performance (Lawton, Taylor, Clay-Williams, et al.,
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2014).
Hollnagel (2013, p. 11) suggests a transition to safety-II from safety-I would
require changing our definition of safety “from ‘avoiding that something goes wrong’
to ‘ensuring that everything goes right’ – or more precisely, to the ability to succeed
under varying conditions, so that the number of intended and acceptable outcomes
is as high as possible”.
This transition would alter the basis of safety management to become a
practice of understanding why things go right and emphasise understanding everyday
activities. The aim of safety-II is to develop resilient healthcare systems, a concept
refined through application in air traffic management and nuclear power generation.
A system is thought to be resilient when it possess an intrinsic ability allowing it “to
adjust its functioning prior to, during, or following changes and disturbances, so that
it can sustain required operations under both expected and unexpected conditions”
(Hollnagel, 2013, p. xxv). In other words, resilience is not limited to only dealing with
threats or errors, nor constrained to scenarios where things can go wrong.
Safety-II methodologies are not that common in healthcare (Kelly, Blake, &
Plunkett, 2016). In practical terms, it’s not entirely clear what types of initiatives or
programmes healthcare organisations in pursuit of a safety II strategy might adopt.
An argument could be made that safety-II, with it’s emphasis on understanding the
minutiae of clinical professionals daily work, presents a daunting task for already
cash-strapped healthcare systems, who already made significant investment in
safety-I type approaches driven on by the Patient Safety Movement in early 2000s
(Nicolini, et al, 2016).
One promising example of a safety-II approach that merits review is the
Learning from Excellence (LfE) programme developed at a children’s hospital in the
UK (Kelly, et al., 2016). LfE aims to eliminate the negative emphasis in healthcare
today and accentuate the positive aspects. This is done efficiently by piggybacking
on existing safety-I type initiatives such as incident reporting and serious incident
investigation, to introduce voluntary reporting of episodes of excellent practice. These
incident reports, known as “IR2” forms, are submitted by staff using hospital wide
intranet and are purposefully free style to allow the reporter to apply their own
definition of ‘excellence’.
IR2 reports are reviewed weekly at Improving Resilience, Inspiring Success
(IRIS) meetings, which are reverse of the acronym SIRI, for Serious Incident Report
Investigation meetings. An appreciative inquiry methodology that nurtures a positive
mind-set is used to facilitate group dialogue on each IR2 report. “These hour-long
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informal reviews aim to identify how excellence was achieved, including
‘workarounds’ or innovations employed, and to generate ideas for sharing and
promoting excellence.” (Kelly, et al., 2016, p. 789).
In evaluating the LfE programme via survey, excellence reporting was
correlated with improved staff morale and quality of care. Investigating reports of
excellence was found to be just as valuable as reflecting on individual error, and both
were more valuable than studying specific human errors, which can lead to negative
affective experience and the emergence of ‘second victims’ (Kelly, et al., 2016).
LfE’s relevance to this discussion is it’s potential as a model which melds
safety-I & II approaches. This integration is attractive in terms of it’s ease of
transferability to other hospitals who already invested in safety I approaches, such as
those discussed in this study, but who now seek to improve upon their foundations.
Future approaches to patient safety might integrate safety-I & safety-II perspectives
as part of a broader strategy, which builds upon existing resources, and is mindful of
second-victims, to more equitably balance analysing failures as well as successes in
way that avoids assigning blame or assigning one root cause to any incident.
Reviewing Historically Significant Cases of Medical Error
With so much energy directed towards safety improvement and with continued
failure of such efforts, concerned members of the public, patients, family, clinicians,
and researchers, might be prompted to ask the simple questions ‘how did we get to
this point’? and ‘where do we go from here’ to improve patient safety today?
To answer these questions, a review of international, historically significant
healthcare mistakes, which are known to have acted as a catalyst for the patient
safety movement, is necessary. By understanding the historical events which led to
the adoption of a patient safety movement and its closely related tools and
programmes (i.e. Root Cause Analysis), this chapter highlights areas of concern
which are chief antecedents to, and consequences of, medical errors, mainly 1) the
‘hierarchical challenge’ (Senot et al., 2016), which includes elements of professional
power & culture, and 2) the affective consequences of, and recovery, from medical
error known as the second victim phenomenon (Wu, 2000).
Four historical cases from the United Kingdom, and United States, which
contributed to the development of the patient safety movement in western healthcare,
are reviewed in this section. Elements which contributed to these medical errors will
be highlighted, with emphasis on factors that have gone largely unaddressed in
current mainstream improvement initiatives, namely: professional power and culture
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which vary by hierarchical position, and the emotional consequences of error on
professionals
Dana-Farber Cancer Institute (DFCI) in Boston, the case of Betsy
Lehman, 1994
Perhaps the most well publicised episodes of medical error in the USA is the
tragic case of Betsy Lehman, 39, health columnist for The Boston Globe, who, in
November 1994, died as a result of a medication error. Mrs. Lehman was a patient at
Dana-Farber Cancer Institute (DFCI) in Boston where her husband, a scientist,
worked. She was receiving experimental treatment for an advance case of breast
cancer, along with another patient, who was also injured and later died.
Lehman’s death was the result of a mistake by a physician working as a
research fellow who misinterpreted the study protocol and ordered four times the
intended dose. Nurses caring for the patients administered 6,520 milligram doses of
cyclophosphamide, a chemotherapy drug, each day, for four consecutive days (Brink,
1995). While both patients demonstrated adverse reactions, these were ignored as
reasonable side effects from the ‘pushing the envelope’ chemotherapy doses.
Doctor’s also ignored Lehman’s warnings that something was drastically wrong with
her prior to discharge (Altman, 1995).
The Boston Globe reported "It was a blunder compounded or overlooked by
at least a dozen physicians, nurses and pharmacists, including some of the
institution's senior staff” (Altman, 1995). At least five other doctors, and nurses,
countersigned the order including the leader of the team. It wasn’t until two months
later during a routine data review that a clerk discovered the inappropriate order for
the chemotherapy drug which pushed DFCI to disclose the error.
Organisational Consequences
The DFCI, one of the USA’s premier cancer centres, had its reputation
destroyed after, perhaps, the most widely publicized drug overdose in history (Crane,
2001). The impact of the error shook the organisation, resulting in those in positions
of authority leaving the organisation, including the president, chief medical officer,
financial leaders and numerous department heads.
In an effort to learn from the error and prevent similar events from re-occurring,
massive organisational efforts were undertaken with an initial price tag of $1.3 million
(Brink, 1995). These included creating and maintaining a computerised drug-ordering
system, a state of the art incident reporting system, training staff and undertaking root
cause analysis for every mistake, increasing the number of nurse practitioners and
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physician assistants to 45 from 12, adopting a policy of full disclosure, and creating a
committee consisting of patients to provide input on a range of issues at DFCI (Allen,
2004).
Professional Consequences
The impact on the professionals involved in Lehman’s care was profound, with
major disciplinary action across the board. Physicians involved in the case were
reported to the Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine with several having
clinical privileges suspended, while 16 Nurses, and 3 pharmacists, were all formally
reprimanded.
These tragic events not only devastated the patients’ families, but also the
clinicians who provided the care. As Conway and Weingart (2005) found, DFCI
clinical staff were victims of this medical error, experiencing shame, blame, and
distance from their organisation, colleagues and external regulatory agencies.
The physician research fellow who ordered the lethal dose, felt vilified by
hospital leaders and left the organisation, this professional’s reaction can be
understood through Wu’s second victim terminology (Wu, 2000). Second victims
progress through a post-event trajectory and eventually move along three potential
paths: dropping out, surviving, or thriving (Scott et al., 2009). Those who ‘survive’ their
post-event recovery may get back to performing at expected levels but will remain
disturbed by the error, while those who ‘drop out’, as was the case with the DFCI
research fellow, change roles, for example away from clinical duties, or they leave
the organisation, and/or profession entirely.
"It's an extremely sad time here," Dr. Livingston, then chief-physician, said in
an interview (Altman, 1995). Within a day of learning about the medical error, Dr.
Livingston along with doctors involved in the cases, and other staff directly informed
both families of the error. "Those two meetings, which took place within hours of each
other, were the two saddest individual occurrences I remember. I looked into their
eyes and all I could see was abject grief and misery. It was the kind of misery that
was penetrating." (Altman, 1995). Nurse Judith Prisby expressed a similar view held
by many staff members at the time of the error “it was a pretty public humiliation …
my whole world changed in an instant” (Allen, 2004)
Influencing the Broader Patient Safety Movement
One does not have to look far to see the impact Lehman’s overdose had on
influencing the broader patient safety movement, with reference to her death in the
first line of the Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) report ‘To Err is Human’ (Kohn et al.,
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2000). The IOM’s publication, with its headline-making statistic that as many as
98,000 fatal mistakes occur every year in US healthcare, is cited as a landmark report
(Charles Vincent & Amalberti, 2016), credited with urging investment and launching
major initiatives to improve patient safety in the USA (Landrigan et al., 2010), acting
as a key catalyst for the patient safety movement.
As found by Nicolini et al (2016, p. 10) “the report (IOM) changed the opinion
of a lot of people … from then on people could not say that medical malpractice was
not a serious problem … this served to put the issue of patient safety, which previously
had been invisible, on the radar screen.”
Prior to the IOM report, prevailing beliefs from industries such as aviation, that
a certain amount of injury is inevitable, was still largely accepted in healthcare (Ayd,
2004). This led to hospitals largely examining each error as an isolated incident.
Whereas the IOM report encouraged looking at flaws in how the health care system
itself is organized, to strengthen systems, so the mistakes “they’re (professionals)
bound to make don’t snowball into actual harm” (Ayd, 2004).
A world leading hospital system, Johns Hopkins in Baltimore, MD was right in
the middle of developing plans to address safety gaps identified by the 2000 IOM
report. Making patient safety their number one priority, when a young patient named
Josie King arrived at their Children’s Centre Intensive care unit, with severe burns
from a freak home accident.
Johns Hopkins Children’s Centre, the case of Josie King, 2001
Josie King was 18 months-old in 2001 when she was admitted to the burn
centre at Johns Hopkins for first and second-degree burns she accidentally suffered
in a bath at her Baltimore home. Parents Sorrel and Tony King handed their child’s
life into the care of an organisation considered to be a world leader in medicine.
“These people are a hell of a lot smarter than I am and they know what they’re doing”
said Mrs King (Kalb, 2006). Josie, following a transfer to Hopkin’s paediatric
intensive-care unit, began slowly healing from the treatment of medications and skin
grafts.
It’s at this point that things begin to decline. Only days before she was due to
be discharged from care, Josie’s condition suddenly deteriorated. She appeared to
be dehydrated, thirstily sucking on a washcloth after a bath, when her eyes rolled
back in her head. Mrs. King was reassured that Josie’s vital signs were fine and the
patient was given a dose of methadone as a painkiller. Clinical staff ignored Mrs
King’s concerns about her child’s dehydration. Shortly after, Josie’s heart stopped,
suffering irreversible brain damage, and was later taken off life support.
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This patient’s death was classified as a “Sentinel Event”, an unexpected death
or serious injury that must be investigated. The hospital, who invited Mrs. King to
describe her recollection of events, concluded that Josie was severely dehydrated
and that her mother’s concerns had been repeatedly overlooked (Kalb, 2006). The
final methadone dose was ordered by a doctor as part of a diminishing-dosage
strategy to wean Josie off the drug, and while the drug didn’t cause the cardiac arrest,
Mrs. King is informed there were “complications”.
Hospital administration admits Josie should not have died, and they should
have listened to Mrs. King’s concerns (Landro, 2009). Mrs. King was vocally against
the methadone dose, mentioning she heard a doctor verbally order ‘no further
narcotics’, but the nurse gave it anyway (Landro, 2009). The hospital later concluded
that Josie was severely dehydrated. And one thing was clear: the voice of the mother
had been ignored (Kalb, 2006).
Organisational Consequences
The Josie King case defined and reshaped the culture of safety at Hopkins
(Morath, 2010). The King family reached an out of court settlement with Hopkins and
donated a portion of the funds back to establish the Josie King Patient Safety Program
(Ayd, 2004). Building on existing organisational efforts from the Institute of Medicine
report (Kohn et al., 2000) to improve safety, partnering with the Kings gave a new
sense of urgency to these ideas for safety improvement at Hopkins. “That was one of
the most important catalysts to move us forward” said Beryl Rosenstein, Hopkins
Hospital vice president for medical affairs (Ayd, 2004).
That the Josie King case was a catalyst for organisational change and
improvement is an understatement, a considerable number of initiatives were
spawned to improve patient safety. These initiatives included: establishing the Centre
for Innovation in Quality Patient Care which acts as a learning laboratory for front line
clinicians, instituting executive safety rounds, where corporate executives ‘adopt’ a
medical unit, becoming its advocate, and attending monthly staff meetings. The use
of checklists, similar to the aviation industry, has reduced incidence of bloodstream
infections by more than 50%, and introduction of a daily goals sheets, which among
other factors identify each patient’s greatest safety risk, and promote team work.
Finally, medication errors were targeted with introduction of a phased-in $20 million
information system.
Professional Consequences
Dr. Peter Pronovost, Medical Director of Hopkins Centre for Innovation in
Quality Patient Care, was the first person the King family met following the incident
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who really understood what they were going through. Pronovost, a national expert in
patient safety, had personally experienced an adverse event when his father died
because of an error at a hospital in New England. His work at Hopkins focuses on
ensuring lessons learned from medical error are spread across the organisation, and
most critically addressing an overall “culture of secrecy and blame” among the
medical profession (Ayd, 2004).
"We pay an awfully high price for silence in health care," says Dr. Pronovost
in reference to faulty communications being cited as a cause of nearly 85% of medical
errors (Ayd, 2004). This stems from traditional hierarchy associated with the medical
professions, where nurses may feel hesitant to raise concerns with doctors, residents
lack challenge to second-guess attending physicians, and patients and families’
concerns are overlooked by doctors and nurses (Ayd, 2004).
The lack of this drug dose being checked by, or discussed, among different
professionals in this case, highlights a historical reluctance by physicians, nurses,
and other clinicians to speak openly, as explained by Beryl Rosenstein, Hopkins
Hospital vice president for medical affairs “We’re trained from our earliest days in
school that health professionals don’t make mistakes, and if you do, you don’t talk
about it,” (Ayd, 2004). This has led to encouraging parents as vocal participants in
their children’s care, drug doses being checked multiple times (involving
communication among professions), and introduction of Comprehensive Unit-based
safety program (CUSP) that emphasizes a no-fault approach for reporting errors.
This partnership between a courageous Mrs. King, and Dr. Pronovost, with
his own personal experiences of error, supports continued national efforts at safer
healthcare in the USA, leading to many further partnerships between hospitals,
patients, and their families, and arguably launching the patient safety movement into
the mainstream (Morath, 2010)
The United Kingdom’s Patient Safety Record
The United Kingdom’s NHS is an exemplary case given recent public calls for
improved safety, resulting from several high profile failings in care that resulted in
government led inquiries for improvement. Similar to how healthcare events unfolded
in the USA, matters in the UK began a dramatic turn in the late 1990’s and early 2000s
following another scandal surfacing. An inquiry found catastrophic systemic failures
at the Bristol Royal Infirmary, located in southwest England, which were compounded
by a culture of secrecy and collusion, leading to the preventable death of at least thirty
children.
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Bristol Royal Infirmary, 1991-1995
The tragic events at Bristol Royal Infirmary (BRI) from 1991 to 1995, where
between 30 – 35 babies died needlessly, resulted largely from a behavioural
commitment by surgeons that shaped their interpretation, action, and minimized
cross-specialty communication (Kennedy, 2001; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2003).
Ian Kennedy, a law professor, was tasked with leading the almost three-year
inquiry into the scandal at BRI. At the time, the BRI inquiry was considered the most
detailed and far reaching investigation into the NHS ever undertaken, addressing
critical issues of accountability and clinical safety, professional culture, and the rights
of patients (Butler, 2002). The report ‘Learning from Bristol’ (Kennedy, 2001) found a
system looking after vulnerable and sick children that was “shot through with flaws”
(Dyer, 2001).
BRI was at the bottom of the rankings table for specialist units doing open-
heart surgery on babies, with a death rate twice as high as anywhere else in the NHS.
It was found that the hospital never performed enough heart surgery operations on
children, so that its surgeons, more familiar with adult patients, could become skilled.
Many Surgeons thought they were simply experiencing a “learning curve”, that their
statistics would improve, but this never happened.
Broadly the report found evidence of an “old boys” culture among doctors that
resulted in secrecy around their performance, poor communication with patients, low
priority given to children’s services, a laid back approach to clinical safety, and a lack
of external oversight of performance (Butler, 2002).
This case highlights the importance of “safety culture”, a term which had only
recently emerged in healthcare literature at the time of the BRI inquiry, which
describes a set of practices and assumptions necessary for healthcare organisations
to provide optimal care (Kohn et al., 2000). Culture promotes sustained collective
action by providing individuals with a similarity of priorities, approach, and outlook
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2003).
Yet, as was the case with the BRI, shared assumptions, norms and values
can also be a source of danger when they enforce a ‘culture of entrapment’, a term
used to describe the collective behaviour at BRI: “the process by which people get
locked into lines of action, subsequently justify those lines of action, and search for
confirmation that they are doing what they should be doing.” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2003,
p.73)
Further complicating matters was the existence of professional “tribes” within
the organisation which were loosely coupled, fragmented, and self-contained
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subcultures. The culture at BRI trapped professionals into behavioural commitments
which saw them justify and rationalize poor performance stemming from a supposedly
high volume of unusually complex patient cases, rather than considering their own
failings or systematic issues. Staff at BRI continued to believe that adverse events
were simply an anomaly, rather than resulting from unacceptably poor practice.
Organisational Consequences
The inquiry was divided into two phases, the first of which interrogated the
events of BRI, the second phase emphasized spreading these findings more broadly
to improve care in the future. Specifically the second phase was concerned with how
to “extrapolate from one particular set of circumstances to a whole set of wider
observations … you could generalise from Bristol and use it for making wide-ranging
observations." said Kennedy (Dyer, 2001).
While the inquiry made close to 200 recommendations, the need for openness
is one of the strongest messages. The report calls for a non-punitive reporting system
like those used by airlines, with incentives for staff to report errors so that lessons can
be learned, and possible disciplinary action for those who cover up.
Several other key recommendations for implementation across the NHS
included: greater transparency of consultant performance with mortality rates for
every cardiac surgeon in England being published starting in 2004, reforming the NHS
complaints procedure so that patients become “equal partners” with their healthcare
professionals to make decisions about care and treatment. Children’s health services
will be improved and better led by each NHS organisation appointing a senior member
of staff as head of children’s services. Finally, the NHS established a new council for
the quality of healthcare, and introduced a new contract and mandatory code of
conduct for NHS managers.
Professional Consequences
Two of the main surgeons involved Mr Wiseheart and Mr Dhasmana, along
with former Chief Executive of the United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust, Mr Roylance
were charged with serious professional misconduct under the General Medical
Council (GMC). Mr Wisehart and Mr Roylance were struck off the medical register
and Mr Dhasmana was banned from performing operations on children for four years
by the GMC.
Consultants working at the trust felt that indiscriminate blame had been laid
on “doctors in Bristol” by the Royal College of Surgeons, the Department of Health,
and Managers (Prasad & Butler, 2002).
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Report: An Organisation with a Memory
Simultaneous to the ongoing investigation at Bristol, continuing public outcry
led to an investigation into the overall NHS’s capacity to learn from incidents and
prevent harm. The report “An Organization with a Memory” (Department of Health,
2000), released the same year as USA’s ‘To Err is Human’, found that the NHS
consistently failed to learn from its errors.
A key theme within the report draws upon aviation industry practices and
techniques to emphasize a focus on system factors rather than individual human
factors. Report author, then-Chief NHS Medical Officer, Liam Donaldson explains
"Plane crashes are not usually caused by pilot error per se but by an amalgam of
factors which predispose to human error or worsen its consequences... Experience
and research from other sectors, in particular the airline industry, show the impact of
human error can be reduced." (Harrison, 2010).
“Building a Safer NHS for Patients” was published in 2001 to implement the
recommendations of “Organisation with a Memory”. Report authors identify its
purpose as a “Programme of Implementation” and explained how extensive contact
and discussion between representatives of the UK, USA, and Australia lead to the
adoption and recommendation of several best practices (Department of Health,
2001). Key among these new initiatives include development of the national reporting
and learning system (NRLS) for reporting adverse events, building of expertise within
the NHS in Root Cause Analysis (RCA), a more in-depth approach to investigating
adverse events through identifying causal or system factors. Creation of an
independent body the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) to collect, analyse, and
assimilate information on adverse events across the NHS, and promote patient safety
research which at this time is a young field (Department of Health, 2001). However,
despite introduction of efforts to improve safety, another major episode of poor care
was right around the corner.
Mid Staffordshire, 2005-2009, and beyond
It’s been estimated that 400 patients died because of poor care between
January 2005 and March 2009 at a small hospital in Staffordshire, UK. An
investigation into this scandal was headed by Robert Francis QC. The Francis Inquiry
found the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Board did not listen sufficiently to
its patients and staff, or ensure the correction of deficiencies was brought to their
attention (Francis, 2013). This again highlights the critical role miscommunication
plays as a leading cause of adverse medical events.
Francis’s Inquiry heard evidence from over 900 patients and families who
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spoke of lacking basic elements of care including pain relief, food, and hygiene all
neglected by staff. The care was simply “of appalling standards” and the trust
employed “chaotic systems for looking after patients” (Campbell, 2013).
National Consequences
The Mid Staffordshire scandal was felt throughout the entire English NHS. The
scope of the investigation led by Francis and its recommendations included creating
a more open and transparent national health service, through introducing a statutory
duty of candour for all NHS doctors, nurses, and midwives. These guidelines set
standards for apologizing to, and informing patients of incidents and near misses,
reporting errors as early as possible, and to support colleagues raising concerns
about patient safety (Nursing & Midwifery Council, 2015).
Such was the magnitude of the “hierarchical challenge” (Senot et al., 2016) in
UK healthcare, where certain professional groups felt unable to speak-up about
safety, that Francis (2015) was commissioned a second time, to investigate ongoing
concerns raised by NHS staff about how their NHS organisations dealt with this
sensitive and critical challenge, framed as ‘whistle blowing’. The 2013 NHS staff
survey found that only 72% of respondents were confident that it is safe to raise a
concern. The aim of Francis’s report “Freedom to Speak Up – A review of
whistleblowing in the NHS”, was to provide advice and recommendations to ensure
that NHS staff feel confident that they will be listened to, safe to raise concerns, and
that concerns will be acted upon (Francis, 2015).
Despite the initiatives spawned from these investigations, the gap in learning
from incidents remains an ever-present concern for both the public and government,
as claimed by UK Health Secretary Jeremy Hunt (2015), the NHS records 800
avoidable deaths every month, and ‘wrong site surgery’ incidents occurring twice a
week on average.
In summary, four historical cases have been reviewed which highlight
elements of a ‘hierarchical challenge’ including professional power, culture, and
consideration of emotional affect in relation to medical errors, and their role in
perpetuating the ‘implementation gap’.
The final section of this chapter is dedicated to understanding perhaps the
world’s most popular initiative for investigating safety incidents, Root Cause Analysis
(RCA). While broadly endorsed by healthcare systems worldwide for the investigation
of medical errors, its potential for learning has remained under-realised (Wu et al.,
2008), now is the time for a critical review of this “family of structured methodologies”
for investigating safety incidents (Nicolini et al., 2016).
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Root Cause Analysis (RCA)
As suggested in the Institute of Medicine report (2000), health care is a
decade or more behind many other high-risk industries such as aviation and
aerospace. In an attempt to improve safety it has become increasingly popular for
healthcare institutions across the world to adopt a formalized investigation procedure
known as root cause analysis (RCA) (Department of Health, 2001; Department of
Veteran Affairs, 2008; Incident Analysis Collaborating Parties, 2012).
RCA was first used by engineers in the aviation and aerospace industries to
analyse industrial accidents and built upon a foundation of systems engineering and
human factors knowledge (Carroll, 1998). Since then, important concepts underlying
RCA have evolved slightly and continue to borrow heavily on work from other fields
and industries including James Reason’s Swiss cheese model (2000), and systems
thinking (Incident Analysis Collaborating Parties, 2012). As a result, RCA tends to
focus on ‘latent’ or systemic factors while minimizing ‘active’ or human errors and
strives to identify ‘error chains’, which according to Reason (2000) can condition,
enable or heighten the potential for active error.
While RCA may have developed in other industries, it has recently been
acknowledged that healthcare, due to its dynamic nature, involving interactions
between vulnerable patients, numerous providers, and intricate care processes, is
actually more complex than aviation and other high-risk industries (Vincent, 2010).
Given these findings, one might question whether RCA is the right tool for an
increasingly complex job, and ponder if the practice of RCA can evolve to address
the complicated nature of investigating medical errors. Further weakening RCA’s
usefulness in the complex setting of healthcare is its name, which suggests a singular,
linear cause can tidily be found to explain each investigation (Peerally, Carr, Waring,
& Dixon-Woods, 2016). This has led to at least one country, Canada, to discontinue
use of the term “root cause” analysis (Incident Analysis Collaborating Parties, 2012).
RCA Overview
The US was the first country to import the practice of RCA from manufacturing
into healthcare, through deploying this set of investigative techniques at the Veterans
Affairs chain of hospitals in 1999 (Heget, Bagian, Lee, & Gosbee, 2002; Iedema et
al., 2008). In the UK, RCA was adopted in 2000 by the Department of Health, and
gradually was promoted more widely as the NHS’s primary method for organisational
learning (Nicolini et al., 2011). As of 2006, more than 8,000 NHS staff were trained in
RCA (Nicolini et al., 2011).
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There is consensus among the literature that RCA is a device for both systems
analysis and organisational learning (Iedema et al., 2008). The National Patient
Safety Agency (2004) describes RCA as a structured investigation process which
utilises tools and techniques to identify the true cause of an incident, by understanding
what, why and how a system failed. Analysis of these system failures and true causes
enables targeted actions to be developed and implemented which aim to reduce
likelihood of recurrence. The process is intended to be objective and identifying
specific individuals as responsible for error is not a goal of RCA.
RCA investigations are conducted in stages (see table 2.2 Stages of RCA),
and analyse the underlying causes, and environmental context in which an incident
happened, by looking beyond merely the individuals involved and taking a systems
analysis perspective.
Table 2.2 Stages of RCA (Adapted from National Patient Safety Agency,
2004).
Stages of RCA
1 Identifying which incidents should be investigated;
2 Gathering the information;
3 Mapping the events;
4 Analysing the information;
5 Barrier analysis;
6 Developing solutions and an action plan for implementation;
7 Completing a report.
RCA investigations are retrospective and include bringing together a
multidisciplinary investigation team to identify the sequence of events working
backwards from the time of incident; the goal being to reveal the actual cause(s) of
the incident so that learning can occur and recurrences prevented through
implementation of corrective action and improvements.
As found by Nicolini et al. (2011), in their study investigating how RCA
practices and procedures are undertaken at two hospitals in the NHS, RCA is a ‘tool
box’ of up to 40 techniques for the investigation team to use, rather than a single
method for incident analysis. NPSA (2004) suggests RCA investigation teams focus
on the following techniques “barrier analysis, brainstorming, brain writing, change
analysis, five whys, narrative chronology, nominal group technique, tabular timeline,
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time person grid, and simple timeline” (Nicolini et al., 2011, p. 218).
RCA Benefits
Given the rising prominence of RCA for investigating clinical incidents among
the global healthcare community (Nicolini et al., 2016), one would assume RCA is an
effective tool at improving patient safety. There seems to be a respectable number of
research findings which demonstrate the positive attributes of RCA for healthcare.
As highlighted by Nicolini et al. (2011), RCA aids healthcare professionals in
developing a safety sensitive viewpoint, through enabling a dedicated space for
structured reflection among investigation team members, enabling a time for
reflection on their practices. Another benefit stems from the development of a stronger
commitment to safe practices via the simple act of increasing the number of people,
through forming an investigation team, involved in the direct management of clinical
incidents.
Waring & Currie (2009) learned that following the presentation of RCA
recommendations, a hospital’s risk management committee gained valuable insight
into various risks which helped to bring about worthwhile change. For example, as it
pertained to a trend of patient falls occurring on a ward, the committee learned about
a range of factors influencing this trend and were able to develop new parameters for
the monitoring of these patients.
An analysis of RCA practice in a chemical plant by Carroll, Rudolph &
Hatakenaka (2002) presented a number of interesting findings that are transferrable
to, and could benefit the healthcare industry. First, it was discovered RCA led to a
change in culture that resulted in more trust and openness among staff, and was
found to nurture more disciplined thinking about problems in the organisation.
Second, as a result of this disciplined thinking, RCA team members learned to
acknowledge the relationships between causes of accidents, observe interactions
between different components within the system, and sought more than one cause
when explaining an accident. Third, the formation of a multidisciplinary team, enabled
individuals to become aware of any taken for granted assumptions they might be
hanging onto. Perhaps most importantly, it was found that RCA can facilitate a more
open safety culture (Department of Health, 2001; Leape et al., 1998)
RCA Limitations
Despite the widespread adoption of RCA in healthcare institutions, conclusive
evidence of its effectiveness as an investigative practice for improving the safety of
healthcare has not yet been produced (Iedema et al., 2008). Wu, Lipshutz &
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Pronovost’s (2008) study analysed use of RCA practice in US healthcare and found
that there are fundamental challenges to translate RCA recommendations into real
service change.
Nicolini’s et al. (2011) findings suggest RCA is highly problematic and urged
alternate ways for policy makers and organisations to address RCA’s failure to
contribute to persistent learning or change. Key criticisms included RCA’s tendency
for closure rather than systemic inquiry, lack of orientation towards managing change
following publication of recommendations, and that both analysis of problems and
scope of potential learning were tightly bound to the local level (Nicolini et al., 2011).
This results in RCA becoming too narrowly focused on the facilitation of an
arbitrary process of investigation and recommendations, leading to a lack of
accountability when ensuring the prescribed recommendations lead to service
improvements. It is implied by Nicolini et al. (2011) that this gap results from RCA
supporting a problem-driven view, which is linear and cognitive in nature and does
not consider the organisational, political and emotional challenges to implementing
improvements, such as the ‘hierarchical challenge’ or affective consequences, and
thus falls short.
Iedema, et al. (2008) describe how senior health managers felt RCA
recommendations were a burden to complete, of variable quality resulting in more
work for senior management to revise or replace them, and viewed as having limited
impact on organisational performance. Of the nine managers they interviewed, only
one was positive about having been able to implement the RCA recommendations.
The findings of Carroll’s, et al. (2002) study of RCA in a chemical plant were
not all positive. It was generally felt that overall quality of RCA analysis was
dependent upon information being input into the process, this was found to be
problematic as people by nature choose and interpret data to support certain biases,
opinions and to satisfy certain audiences in the organisation who hold power, in other
words political hijacking (Peerally et al., 2016)
Several recent studies have suggested RCA engenders a culture of blame,
rather than a culture which supports organisational learning (Currie et al., 2014;
Nicolini et al., 2011). A culture of blame, as mentioned in Waring (2005), represents
an environment where, people, due to long standing assumptions they will be
considered at fault, held independently responsible and punished for the incident, are
hesitant to be honest and transparent about their experiences of error.
Unfortunately, a culture of blame, engendered through RCA, would seem to
make employees hesitant to speak-up, out of fear of repercussions. Thus prosocial
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employee voice, beneficial for improvement and learning, is inhibited (Morrison,
2011). Therefore, blame culture might be found as a condition leading to a climate of
silence, where employees feel that speaking up about problems is dangerous or futile
(Morrison & Milliken, 2000). This could have serious implications for the prevention of
further patient safety incidents, particularly where such a climate might harbour
‘defensive silence’ among employees. Defensive silence involves the withholding of
information from those in positions of power, it’s proactive, involving a conscious
decision to withhold opinions, information, and ideas, due to fear of negative
consequences (Pinder & Harlos, 2001).
We might conclude a summary of the limitations of RCA with a quote that
encapsulates several of the problematic areas of RCA: “Pursuing facts and digging
out causes is difficult, confusing, time consuming, annoying, uncertain, and politically
hazardous” (Carroll, et al., 2002, p 268).
RCA Summary and Ideas for Improvement
In light of the critical and largely negative view of RCA seen in recent studies
one could conclude healthcare has adopted a highly problematic bundle of
methodologies. Despite the wide reach of RCA adoption, questions about whether,
and how the practice can improve patient safety are largely unanswered.
Given what is known about RCA, it is easy to question how and why the
practice has become so popular in healthcare today. A large part of the answer stems
from the practice’s framing as an “anxiety-reassurance” package (Nicolini et al.,
2016), which health policy makers in the Western world have acquired, to address
the growing patient safety movements, in their own countries.
In fairness to the practice of RCA, one might wish to step back and place RCA
within the larger context of the healthcare system. The data collected in the studies
of RCA examined are largely provided by managers and clinical hybrid-managers,
who are arguably struggling with rising complexity in their own organisations (Baker,
2001), reflecting an increasingly sensitive publicly and politically charged
environment. As countries like US and the UK struggle under tightening budgets, cuts
to services, changes to healthcare programs are common. One could argue, the
tremors from these changes are felt adversely by managers and clinicians running
our healthcare institutions, and negative feedback, opinions and perspectives on
programs such as RCA, are simply a reflection of broader trends in the system.
Another consideration might be the acknowledgement that RCA, as a
practice, is trying to do too much. Take for example Iedema, et al.’s (2008) description
of the practice: “RCA should lead to horizontalised workplace relationships,
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liberalised scrutiny of clinical expertise, disciplines and practices, and democratised
views of the kinds of recommendations that can be formulated” (p. 573). Given these
idealised outcomes, how can we reasonably ask health system managers, in an
environment of increasing complexity (Baker, 2001), to pursue all of these outcomes
using a practice which has been proven to fail at much of what it sets out to do.
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Conclusion
This chapter drew upon foundational cases from the patient safety field to
frame the implementation gap as perpetuated by two issues which healthcare
professionals must grapple with as they encounter and recover from medical error.
First is the hierarchical challenge, cultural barriers between professions which can
inhibit communication. The cases demonstrated how there is often a lack of voice
enacted between healthcare professionals of varying position, patients, and their
families. Further, the voices of lower-hierarchically professionals may be rendered
futile when concerns are not acted upon by higher-positioned professionals. Next,
resulting from the occurrence of tragic medical errors, the second victim phenomenon
was found, where healthcare professionals are adversely affected by their
involvement in medical error.
Examples from both the UK and US were highlighted as having significantly
contributed to the patient safety movement in their respective countries. This
movement, leading to the adoption of a formalized investigation procedure known as
root cause analysis (RCA) was discussed. The benefits and limitations of this
investigative technique were described, including a summary, and ideas for how RCA
might be improved in the future.
To analyse the hierarchical challenge and second victim phenomenon
identified in this chapter, and frame the study, the next chapter draws upon literature
from the organisational behaviour field, specifically employee voice, as a sensitising
concept to explore how these challenges might be moderated.
In Chapter 3, to understand the intricacies of professional dynamics pertaining
to patient safety, including power, culture, and status which vary by hierarchical
position, this study draws upon employee voice to explore potential contingencies
which might moderate the ‘hierarchical challenge’ and incorporate second victims.
First the employee voice literature is reviewed generically, before specifically
examining it within the context of patient safety and the implementation gap.
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Chapter 3: Employee Voice: Organisational Dynamics
and Psychological Processes
Literature Review Part II
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Introduction
The role of professional power, status, and culture has been highlighted in the
previous chapter through review of historical cases of patient safety failures. The gap
in implementing improvements following medical error and RCA investigation was
framed as a hierarchical challenge between healthcare professions. Given the
emphasis upon barriers in communicating between groups of varying status and
hierarchical position, this study lays a theoretical foundation based on the premise of
employee voice as a means to attenuate this challenge.
Employee voice, defined as the: “discretionary communication of ideas,
suggestions, concerns, or opinions about work-related issues with the intent to
improve organizational or unit functioning.” (Morrison, 2011, p. 375), is a rich
phenomenon of interest in the organisational sciences (Brinsfield, Edwards, &
Greenberg, 2009). Employee voice as a construct is not only about whether
employees speak up, but whether they remain silent.
The goal of this chapter is to advance our understanding of organisational
dynamics and psychological processes which can moderate the ‘hierarchical
challenge’ to promote voice and address the implementation gap. The affective
impact of medical error on healthcare professionals, known as ‘second victims’ (Wu,
2000), is explored as a moderator of formal hierarchy which inhibits voice behaviour.
This chapter is organised in two sections. Section one – Building the
foundation: includes a brief historical review of the voice literature including short
examples from safety sensitive industries other than healthcare. Next, a general
exploration and definition of current conceptualizations of employee voice, including
work on organisational silence and climate, is described. Part one is rounded out by
connecting the relevance of employee voice to the context of patient safety.
Section two expands upon the construct in greater detail, emphasizing
employee voice as a multidimensional construct with numerous antecedents
organised under two main headers: organisational dynamics and psychological
process.
Organisational dynamics include professional organisation of healthcare
workers, team leaders and multi-professional action teams, and work context.
Psychological processes which impact upon voice behaviour include leader and
employee cognition, formal power, the affective impact of medical errors, and
psychological safety.
This chapter concludes with a summary of the topics covered and leads into
chapter 4 research design and methods.
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Section One – Building the foundation
Historical Context
To introduce the historical significance, provide context, and highlight the
relevance of employee voice to safety sensitive environments, consider the following
examples, where voice was not heard, silenced prevailed, and disaster ensued:
 On December 28, 1978 United Airlines flight 173 crashed near Portland,
Oregon in a wooded area, seriously injuring 23 people and killing 10. The
National Transport Safety Board’s investigation found that the plane’s flight
crew had failed to escalate concerns regarding critically low fuel levels to the
captain (NTSB, 1979).
 In April 14, 1994, two US Army Black Hawk helicopters were shot down by US
Air Force F-15s over a Northern Iraq no-fly-zone, in one of the worst air-to-air
friendly fire accidents in military history (Snook, 2002). While no single cause
was identified, hundreds of hours of investigations by different teams identified
over 130 different mistakes as contributors to the friendly fire, including
visually misidentifying the helicopters (Leveson, Allen, & Storey, 2002). The
US military’s tall and complex hierarchical control structure explains the lack
of co-ordination, whereby helicopters and F-15s engaged in separate
communication channels, which only join high up in the hierarchy, at the
commander level, thus the pilots made no efforts to communicate.
 On February 1, 2003, as it re-entered the earth’s atmosphere the Space
Shuttle Challenger broke apart, killing all seven astronauts aboard. The
investigation into this accident found that communication of important
engineering-related concerns had been blocked by NASA’s tall hierarchy and
complex organisational structure which silenced people, overlooked signals,
and kept critical dissenting views and critical information from being heard and
acted upon (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2003).
While these examples demonstrate the extreme effects of silence among
employees, everyday there are instances, albeit less severe, of people who are afraid
to speak up in their place of work. And while less head-line grabbing than instances
of disaster discussed here, the decision to be mute about issues at work can result in
serious negative consequences, for both the employee and their organisation.
To demonstrate how concepts of employee voice and silence originated and
developed over time in organisational research, a brief historical review covering key
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points from this field is presented.
Research into employee voice can be linked back to Hirschman’s (1970) book
Exit, Voice and Loyalty, which focused on customer dissatisfaction in organisations
and how voice was one possible response available to them. Customers could voice
their complaints to management as an active attempt to instigate change.
The MUM affect, proposed by Rosen and Tesser (1970), is another
foundational piece of the early employee voice field. Keeping MUM (Mum about
Undesirable Messages) explains employees’ reluctance to voice negative information
because of the discomfort associated with doing so. This discomfort is thought to
stem from factors such as damaging relationships with the recipient (Morran,
Stockton, and Bond, 1991) and feeling guilty about not sharing the burden with the
recipient (Rosen & Tesser, 1970). This work has kept its relevance in recent times,
identified as one possible explanation for why employees fail to speak up about
problems encountered in the workplace (Milliken, Morrison, & Hewlin, 2003).
Whistle-blowing, another foundational construct, came into significance during
the early 1980s when government and corporate scandals were a pressing topic. This
led researchers to explore how employees make decisions about reporting unethical
behaviour in organisations. This interest coincided with increasing public attention to
the role of ethics in business, and whistle-blower protective legislation in the US
(Brinsfield et al., 2009). While similar distinctions between voice and whistle-blowing
can be made, voice is discretionary communication with an aim to positive change,
while whistleblowing is criticism intended to stop negative, often extreme activity,
defined as disclosure by organisational members of perceived organisational wrong
doing to authorities, who can take action (Near & Miceli, 1985). The increasing
research on whistleblowing found that organisational culture, and the nature of the
perceived wrongdoing, have a greater influence on whistle-blowing than do individual
characteristics (Brinsfield, et al 2009).
This earlier research, specifically whistleblowing, was primarily focused on
speaking-up behaviour, what went unexamined were factors associated with failing
to speak-up. The work of Peirce, Smolinski and Rosen (1998) which explored sexual
harassment complaints in organisations, has been credited (Brinsfield, et al. 2009)
with prompting researchers to evaluate in a more focused way, the factors where
employees remain silent about critical organisational issues.
Since these earlier works, silence has emerged as a burgeoning phenomenon
of interest in the organisational sciences with a special issue of the Journal of
Management Studies (Morrison & Milliken, 2003) focused on this topic. This increase
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in interest reflects the idea that silence has meaningful implications beyond simply
the absence of voice.
Employee Voice a Multi-Dimensional Construct
While some researchers in the past have argued voice and silence are
separate constructs (Brinsfield et al., 2009; Detert & Edmondson, 2011; Kish-
Gephart, Detert, Trevino, & Edmondson, 2009), this research adopts Morrison’s
(2011) argument that voice and silence should be integrated under a single theoretical
construct: employee voice. However, this review does not suggest that voice, the
expression of ideas, is the opposite of silence, the intentional withholding of ideas
(Van Dyne, Ang, & Botero, 2003), as such employee voice is a multi-dimensional
construct.
This distinction is important when considering that silence does not always
mean the absence of voice. To explain further, understanding what an actor’s motive
is for speaking up, vs withholding ideas about work related improvements, is a key
feature that differentiates these behaviours. For example, researchers propose that
employees who withhold information might be doing so out of cooperation, or for
altruistic reasons, describing this as prosocial silence (Van Dyne et al., 2003). Further,
actors might withhold information for self-protective reasons based on fear or keep
quiet based on resignation.
A multi-dimensional perspective on employee voice is justified for this study,
given failures to speak up are a common cause of many medical errors, and
improvements to employee communication are commonly recommended (Toft &
Reynolds, 1997). As such this researcher acknowledges that employee voice is both
an antecedent for medical error (i.e. choosing not to speak-up), and a potential
outcome of medical error (i.e. changing practice to be more assertive).
Morrison and Milliken (2000) introduced the term organisational silence, which
moves beyond individual level motivations for speaking up (such as those covered by
whistleblowing), to consider collective-level phenomenon that help us understand
widespread withholding of information, opinions, or concerns by employees about
work-related issues or problems. The emphasis is not on why employees as a
collective do not choose to speak up, but rather, why they intentionally choose to
remain silent.
Considering collective-level influences upon an actor’s decision to voice or
remain silent, environmental conditions, referred to as group climate, are known to
weigh upon this decision. A ‘climate of silence’ is thought to play a key role in
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sustaining organisational silence, while a ‘favourable voice climate’ encourages
speaking up. Morrison and Milliken (2000, p.78) define climate of silence as:
“widely shared perceptions among employees that speaking up
about problems or issues is futile and/or dangerous. When such a
climate exists, the dominant response within an organization will
be silence, rather than voice”
Thus where a climate of silence is present employees will feel that speaking
up about problems is not worth their effort, and a dangerous activity which can invite
retaliation. As suggested by Morrison and Milliken (2000), the development and
maintenance of a climate of silence stems from organisational and contextual
conditions which include the personal characteristics of employees and managers,
characteristics of senior management teams, communication practices,
organisational structures and policies (Morrison & Milliken, 2000). These conditions
are addressed in greater depth in the next section, defining employee voice. In
Section II, the connection between climate and psychological safety will be
introduced.
Given the shared nature of climate it’s important to consider not only individual
attitudes and perceptions, but also how voice could be shaped by group-level beliefs.
As suggested by Morrison, Wheeler-Smith, and Kamdar (2011), research combining
the individual and group levels of analysis is required for a fuller understanding of
voice, given numerous studies (e.g. Lindell & Brandt, 2000; Naumann & Bennett,
2000) which evidence employee behaviour as shaped by shared perceptions, beliefs
and states, that exist at the group level, and not only individual conditions.
Collective level beliefs have been shown to shape voice within work groups
(Morrison & Milliken, 2000). Employees in work groups engage in more pro voice
behaviour when their group is distinguished by shared beliefs that it is worthwhile,
and safe to communicate concerns, suggestions, and opinions (Morrison et al., 2011).
This is also known as a “favourable voice climate” (Morrison, 2011, p. 388).
Group voice climate has been found to be shaped by shared beliefs about
safety and efficacy developed through 1) social interactions, 2) leadership behaviour
(Detert & Treviño, 2010), and 3) by vicarious learning and salient events in the history
of the group (Milliken et al., 2003).
While Morrison and Milliken (2000) focused on the collective absence of voice,
a climate of silence, there is merit in examining the concept more broadly to include
the full continuum of beliefs about the safety and efficacy of speaking up (Morrison et
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al., 2011). This would include for example those beliefs which promote voice
behaviour.
The Process of Employee Voice
Voice is a prosocial form of constructive employee behaviour intended to help
the organisation or work unit perform more effectively, or to make a positive difference
for the collective (Morrison, 2011). Morrison’s Model of Employee Voice (2011),
Figure 2.2 below, helps to explain why some employees speak up while others remain
silent. This section will define the elements of the employee voice construct outlined
in Figure 2.2 with relevance to this study, including motives for and against, predictors
of, and consequences of voice.
Figure 2.2 Morrison’s Model of Employee Voice (Adapted from Morrison,
2011)
An employee deciding to voice faces a deliberate process whereby they
consider both positive and negative consequences of their decision, based on two
key outcome-related judgements (Ashford, Rothbard, Piderit, & Dutton, 1998; Detert
& Burris, 2007; Morrison & Milliken, 2000). The first is whether speaking up is likely
to be effective, referred to as the perceived efficacy of voice. Second, what are the
possible negative outcomes or risks associated with speaking up, referred to as the
perceived safety of voice. Therefore, voice behaviour relies on “an expectancy like
calculus” (Morrison, 2011, p. 384) of expected success vs relative costs and benefits.
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Voice is more likely as the expected risk of speaking up vs the expected benefits of
doing so, decreases. Voice will also be more likely as the probability that one’s efforts
will be effective in fixing a problem, or bringing about improvement, increases. The
opposite is true for silence, when one perceives that their speaking-up is likely to be
futile, maybe because they have witnessed others who spoke up being ignored, they
are more likely to stay quiet.
The process of deciding whether to voice is not entirely cognitive and
emotions can also play a role. Judgements about negative repercussions can extend
above calculation of risk and could be experienced as fear, which can bypass
deliberate decision making (Detert & Edmondson, 2011; Kish-Gephart et al., 2009;
Morrison & Rothman, 2009). Socially acquired beliefs about the risk of voice in social
hierarchies, such as those that exist between and within healthcare professions, can
also play a role (Detert & Edmondson, 2011).
As shown in Figure 2.2, there are a wide variety of conditions which predict
employee voice behaviour these have been classified as contextual or individual, and
are reviewed briefly below.
Hierarchy & Status
A prime contextual condition for voice is the formal organisational structure.
In particular voice is shown to be restrained by hierarchy. Research has found that
employees are more reluctant to relay negative information to individuals in higher
status positions (Athanassiades, 1973; Roberts & O’Reilly, 1974).
Studies show that employees of lower status or hierarchical position feel they
would be sanctioned for speaking up, that their input would not be taken seriously, or
their voice would be perceived as inappropriate (Detert & Edmondson, 2011; Morrison
& Milliken, 2000; Morrison & Rothman, 2009; Pinder & Harlos, 2001). Healthcare’s
professional hierarchy could be particularly susceptible to this restraint on voice.
Specialist doctors are viewed as having the most power, intra-professionally viewed
as higher status than generalist doctors, and inter-professionally nurses and other
clinically affiliated professions, are seen as subordinate to doctors (Abbott, 1988;
Freidson, 1974, 1988).
Team leaders and Psychological Safety
The behaviour of an employee’s immediate supervisor is one of the most
important predictor of voice behaviour. Supervisors are frequently the target of voice
and often have power over the outcomes (Morrison, 2011). For example, Surgeons
who led cardiac surgery teams, were found to have encouraged voice among team
members (nurses and other doctors) by downplaying power differences and engaging
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in coaching behaviour (Edmondson, 2003).
The way employees perceive their supervisor plays a significant role in
effecting the frequency of voice behaviour. Supervisors and team leaders can create
opportunities for voice through informal and formal voice mechanisms which influence
the employee’s thought process when deciding whether to speak up (Ashford,
Sutcliffe, & Christianson, 2009). The more supportive and open the relationship is
between employee and supervisor the more positive the employee’s perception
becomes that it is safe and worthwhile to speak up, creating a climate of psychological
safety which promotes voice behaviour (Detert & Burris, 2007; Edmondson, 1999,
2003; Morrison, 2011)
Individual Conditions
While there are many individual level conditions that could contribute to voice
behaviour, organisational tenure, work status, and position were found to relate
positively. One study found that employees indicated their lack of tenure at the
organisation, or inexperience, as a reason for keeping silent (Milliken et al., 2003).
Work status relates to whether an employee is full-time or part-time. Full-time
employees could be more likely to voice than part timers, given they view employment
relationships more in social than economic terms, making them more motivated to
engage in discretionary behaviours, and because they often have higher social status
then part-timers (Stamper & Van Dyne, 2001). The relevance of work status is highly
relatable to healthcare environments, where it’s not uncommon to have department
and team rosters consisting of part-time, agency, community, as well as full-time staff.
Content, Target, and Motive of Voice
Rounding out this explanation of figure 2.2, attention must be paid to not only
the possible risks and efficacy of voice, but also looking more holistically to include
the content of what is being voiced, the target of that content, and the motive for
voicing. As suggested by Brinsfield et al. (2009) voice and silence have been
examined from varying perspectives, resulting in different conceptualizations and
definitions, and thus we might attempt to distinguish three key elements to focus and
clarify further research on this topic.
Content relates to trying to understand exactly what is being spoken about or
kept quiet. Few studies involving voice had been specific in their definitions of voice
content. One study (Milliken et al., 2003) explored issues that employees were unable
to raise with their supervisor. These included concerns about the competence, or
performance, of colleagues and supervisors, concerns about pay or pay equity,
personal career issues, ethical or fairness issues, and harassment or abuse.
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Target is important for consideration of who is on the receiving end of voice
behaviour and whether, as is most often the case, that individual is the recipient of
upward communication.
The concern here is understanding the direction of information flow. It is
reasonable to consider an employee’s decision to voice or remain silent influenced in
part by what targets are available to them. Identifying the target of voice, for example,
helped whistle-blowing stand out from more general concerns about inappropriate
behaviours, referring to targets as “parties who may be able to effect action” (Near
and Miceli, 1985, p. 525). Noting the direction of voice is useful and applicable to
hierarchically challenged environments, like healthcare, where lower status
professionals struggle to speak upwards, and lateral inter-professional
communications is often key to sharing sensitive safety information.
Further, as is discussed in next section on organisational dynamics, team
leaders play a significant role in encouraging upwards voice by employees,
suggesting this interaction might be cyclical (Ashford et al., 2009). As explored in the
latter section on psychological processes, affective states of leaders can influence
employee upward voice (Liu, Song, Li, & Liao, 2017).
Motive for speaking up, or keeping quiet, is also important to consider when
attempting to understanding the purpose and intent of one’s voice behaviour. While
the motives underlying voice are complex and varied, especially in the case of silence,
they can be illusive (Milliken & Morrison, 2003). Those researchers who did describe
motive for voice tended to classify it as: forcing a change (Hirschman, 1970),
improving the situation at work (Withey & Cooper, 1989), improve rather than merely
criticizing (Van Dyne & LePine, 1998) and influencing organisational actions
(Banerjee & Somanathan, 2001).
In the context of patient safety, it’s arguably the patient who has the most to
lose from healthcare professionals remaining silent, and thus might play a role in
some fashion, as a motivation for professionals to speak-up.
The Relevance of Voice to Patient Safety
Failures of communication were the leading root cause of serious medical
errors reported to the Joint Commission in the United States of America between
1995 and 2006 (World Health Organization, 2007). During this time, communication
errors were the leading cause of medication errors, delays in treatment, and wrong-
site surgeries. Among Surgeons, lapses in communication were found to be a
significant contributor to adverse patient consequences and inefficiency (Williams et
al., 2007).
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Given the high prevalence of miscommunication as a leading cause of medical
error it might be assumed strong historical links exist between theory of employee
voice and patient safety research, however, this does not appear to be the case.
Recent notable exceptions which integrate these literatures are: Tarrant,
Leslie, Bion, & Dixon-Wood's 2017 study of speaking out about patient safety
concerns in intensive care units and Martin et al.'s 2018 research on whether formal
reporting channels encourage or inhibit voice. While the former explained three forms
of ‘speaking out’ as social controls which helped prevent or address mistakes and
maintain safe practice, it does so at a high level, across many wards, without linking
to more detailed aspects of patient safety including the role medical errors,
investigations, and second victims, might play in stimulating voice behaviour of
professionals.
The later study, while finding formal channels may inhibit staff from speaking
up, similarly avoids addressing these aspects of patient safety including second
victims and affect.
While not specifically linked to theory of employee voice, there are several key
articles from the patient safety oriented ‘speaking up’ literature which are useful for
this discussion. First, Bleakley (2014) revisits the ancient Greek notion of parrhēsia, 
translated as ‘truth speaking’. The parrhesiastical act of speaking one’s mind in the
presence of authority is an act of courage, which seeks to alter relations of power,
and is more than simple assertiveness.
This combines with work by Bleakley, et al. (2013) which found
miscommunications among operating theatre teams resulted from ‘monological’
rather than ‘dialogical’ climate set by the lead surgeon. Dialogical climate facilitated
an exchange between professionals, whereas monological climate tended to support
one-way communication. This work suggested those enacting parrhēsia might be 
frustrated where monologue is the dominate form of communication, however as
climate improves through collaborative teamwork, it can emerge as a strength and
powerful type of communication within an open team.
Next, Maxfield, et al. (2005) explored communication difficulties between
healthcare professionals that could contribute to medical error. Their study of 1,700
respondents found less than one in ten raised issues with their co-workers when
witnessing something concerning. Most of the respondents felt that it was neither their
responsibility to call attention to concerns nor that their intervention would be
effective. Of the around 10% of professionals who did raise an issue they observed
better patient outcomes, were found to work harder, and were more satisfied than
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their peers (Maxfield, et al., 2005).
Two further studies worth noting include, first, Edmondson (2003), who
focused on implementation of new technology in operating rooms, found team leaders
(surgeons) facilitate speaking up, and that ease of speaking up promotes successful
implementation of new practices. Second, Weiss, Kolbe, Grote, Spahn, & Grande
(2016), investigated effects of after-event review (AER) following simulated
scenarios, found nurses were more likely to speak up to higher status team members
after participating in a assertiveness specific AER. No voice studies to the knowledge
of this researcher have focused on medical error, and what influence these traumatic
events, and resulting RCA investigations, might have on healthcare professional’s
decision to voice or remain silent. It is surprising that no study to date has considered
the role of employee voice in relation to patient safety incidents and what role the
corresponding affective aftermath of such might play in influencing voice behaviour.
Despite efforts to improve communication there is evidence showing
healthcare professionals who are aware of problems, remain hesitant to voice their
concerns, and are either ignored, or do not speak up at all (Cosby & Croskerry, 2004;
Pronovost, 2010). This is because they are afraid, want to avoid conveying
unwelcome ideas, and by normative and social pressures which exist in their group
(Okuyama, Wagner, & Bijnen, 2014). Hesitancy or failure to speak up could also be
caused by excessive professional courtesy and disproportionate authority gradients
(Okuyama, et al, 2014).
While explored in-depth in Chapter 2, historically significant healthcare
scandals are highlighted again briefly. The case of Josie King (2001), the Bristol Royal
Infirmary (1981-1995) and Mid Staffordshire (2005-2009), all resulted in inquiries
which found that inadequate communication played a role in medical negligence.
Josie King’s tragic death while in the care of John’s Hopkins Children’s Centre
highlighted that silence in healthcare has a high cost, when medical staff did not listen
to Mrs. King’s concerns about her daughter’s deteriorating condition (Ayd, 2004). In
the case of Bristol, processes of behavioural commitment by surgeons shaped
interpretation, action and minimized cross-specialty communication (Kennedy, 2001;
Weick & Sutcliffe, 2003). The Francis Inquiry found the Mid Staffordshire NHS
Foundation Trust Board did not listen sufficiently to its patients and staff, or ensure
the correction of deficiencies brought to their attention (Francis, 2013).
Given failures in communication are so commonly cited as the cause of
medical error, it’s not surprising to see many recommendations for improvement are
based around improving communication. Research from other fields has shown that
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improving communication, for example, enhancing communication of information
between individuals, departments, and or organisations and the wider public, is one
of five sets of core recommendations common to most disaster inquiries (Toft &
Reynolds, 1997).
However, as examined in chapter 2, recommendations for improvement are
difficult to implement, and hospitals rarely learn from their failures. Thus, by dedicating
this research to build a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of employee
voice behaviour in the context of patient safety, a model was developed (See Chapter
9: Discussion, Figure 9.3) and can be leveraged for further research and practice, to
promote speaking-up in safety sensitive contexts, to prevent errors.
As a next step in reviewing the subject, section 2 of this chapter explores
employee voice as a multi-dimensional construct, describing the details of each
dimension.
Section Two – Organisational Dynamics and Psychological Processes
Both organisational dynamics and psychological processes are involved in
voice and silence in organisations (Greenberg & Edwards, 2009). While the field of
employee voice research is highly fragmented with constructs developing at different
times and rates, resulting in a greater historical emphasis on voice than silence
(Edwards & Greenberg, 2009). This research with its multi-dimensional approach,
aims to bridge this gap by bringing together these related constructs under a single
framework, in line with Morrison’s (2011) call to integrate the field as: employee voice.
This study’s empirical context of healthcare, specifically dealing with patient
safety and medical errors, is a rich setting from which organisational and
psychological conditions that influence employee voice can be observed given the
highly professionalised and hierarchical nature of the work, and strongly correlated
relationship between medical error and affective experience.
Climate, which is shown to influence voice behaviour is thought to be shaped
by both organisational, such as the behaviour of team leaders, and psychological
conditions, such as perceived power, shared beliefs, and affective experiences
resulting from salient events (i.e. medical error) in the history of the group.
In exploring this topic, a review of two major professions: doctors and nurses,
is chosen to explore variances in professional organisation, power dynamics, and
affectivity. A goal of this review is to lay a foundation which integrates how
organisational contextual conditions interact with psychological processes in affect
and cognitions, to influence employee voice behaviour.
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Organisational Dynamics
Organisational dynamics refers to contextual organisational and social
features which weigh upon the deliberate process employees face in their decision to
speak-up. Socially acquired beliefs about the risk of voice in social hierarchies, such
as those that exist between and within healthcare professions are also known to
influence this decision (Detert & Edmondson, 2011). Presented is a review of how
employee voice is influenced by the hierarchy of prominent healthcare professions,
doctors and nurses, which emerges through professional organisation, power, status,
and culture.
Power dynamics exist among the healthcare professions which perpetuate
cultural barriers, and create a hierarchical challenge in communication (Senot et al.,
2016). Specifically, drawing on employee voice literature which emphasizes
constructive challenges (Van Dyne et al., 2003), this review aims to establish that
within a hierarchy of professions, both those at the top and those at the bottom, are
part of an interplay which dictates employee voice behaviour. It is acknowledged that
decisions to speak-up must consider both the professional speaking up, as well as
the target, often vertically of higher power and status, while also considering
horizontal voice within professions.
Next the role of team leaders in facilitating or inhibiting employee voice
behaviour is discussed, with emphasis on doctors as leaders of multi-professional
action teams (Edmondson, 2003; Weiss et al., 2016). We begin this discussion with
an introduction to how two of the dominant healthcare professions, doctors and
nurses, are organised to set the stage about variances in power, status, and culture,
as it relates to employee voice.
Professional Organisation: Doctors and Nurses
Defining oneself as a professional seems to depend on the degree of
occupational autonomy one possesses, and ability to exert control over the labour
process (Freidson, 1974, 1988; Larson, 1977). Professional autonomy and control
have historically depended upon possession of specialised knowledge and an ability
to abide by occupational norms without direct supervision. Professional claims to
autonomy and control in healthcare can become strained when working with others
of varying hierarchical position and status as part of a team. Thus teamwork is found
to heighten occupational status differences, rather than unify them (Finn, 2008)
Because of differences in professional norms and knowledge, doctors and
nurses, interdependent groups, hold different views about patient treatment, illness,
and recovery. This leads to questions about whose judgement is most legitimate. The
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hierarchical position of the professionals, and the nature of their relationships on the
ward, are thought to be most dominant considerations shaping the nature and
outcome of routine negotiations on the hospital floor (Strauss et al., 1963).
Drawing on Apesoa-Varano & Varano's (2014) ethnographic study of a US
hospital, with 110 interviews and 2,700 hours of participant observation, professionals
were found to be identified by three dimensions: knowledge, occupational norms, and
team work. Aspects of these dimensions are explored in the following section for both
doctors and nurses.
Doctors
Doctors are traditionally viewed as having the most power, with specialists
seen as higher status than generalist doctors, while nurses and other clinical
professions are viewed as subordinate to doctors (Abbott, 1988; Freidson, 1970,
1988). While doctors are thought to hold a position of authority in hospitals (Wolinsky,
Howard, & Brune, 1994), the nature of their medical authority has eroded somewhat,
becoming tenuous over time (Rodwin, 1993, 2011). This development stems from
controversies which started in the second half of the twentieth century with physicians
facing criticism for lacking a commitment to common good or ethics (Rodwin, 1993).
Since this time, the public has become increasingly sceptical of the professionalism
of physicians, although there are examples of patients who express confidence in
their personal physicians (Starr, 1982). Thus, the public still holds substantial respect
for physicians, but the ideal of an ‘all mighty doctor’ (Starr, 1982) is increasingly
questioned as seen in continuing demands for second medical opinions.
As found by Apesoa-Varano and Varano (2014), ‘being competent’ and being
a ‘good doctor’ were often equated with professionalism by today’s doctors. The ideal
of a ‘good doctor’ involved not only technical efficacy in translating abstract medical
knowledge into effective interventions, but also being morally competent. This moral
dimension held importance given symbolic power and reputation at stake when this
moral competence is in doubt by other professionals and patients, in the hospital.
A doctor’s moral character could be thought of as part of their occupational
norms which guide their personal conduct and presentation of self. The patient doctor
relationship regularly involves an imbalance of knowledge, power, and vulnerability,
necessitating the need for high moral & ethical standards, and external regulation and
governance. This governance has traditionally been in the form of codes of ethics
such as the Hippocratic Oath sworn by doctors to “Do no Harm”. Over time, and in
large part due to public pressure, governance of healthcare professions has
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transferred to bodies such as the UK’s General Medical Council and US’s American
Medical Association which set forth codes of ethics for their members to abide by.
“It is a fundamental ethical requirement that a physician should at
all times deal honestly and openly with patients. … Concern
regarding legal liability which might result from following truthful
disclosure should not affect the physician’s honesty with a patient”
(AMA Code of Medical Ethics, in, Berlinger, 2005, p. 40)
Doctors’ emotional socialisation is precariously balanced between technical
skills, and medical knowledge that encompass their training. Emotional aspects of
medical work are thought to be internal, private, and separate, from more external,
public, cognitive knowledge and technical skills (Bosk, 1986). As such, terms
“affective neutrality” (Parsons, 1951) and “detached concern” (Fox, 1979) have been
used to describe doctors affectivity (Hafferty, 1988).In one example, medical
students are told ‘cadaver stories’, often involving dark humour, as a means to deal
with “rendering whole and dead human beings into largely unidentifiable pieces of
tissue and bone” (Hafferty, 1988, p. 346). Hafferty (1988) suggests these stories are
part of the process of emotional socialisation for medical students. Use of humour by
doctors was also found by Iedema, Jorm, & Lum (2009) who discovered young
anaesthetists used it to objectify, normalise, and distance themselves from the ‘horror’
of medical error, this example is discussed in greater detail in the upcoming section
on second victims.
Additional normative components common to doctors include: character,
manners, and virtues, specifically maintaining confidence without appearing arrogant.
These occupational norms characterising physicians in Apesoa-Varano and Varano’s
study (2014), were thought to be a way of combatting perceptions of abuses of power
(Wolinsky et al., 1994). Physicians are often reconciling the negative stereotypes of
their conduct, with the characteristic control and autonomy of their high powered
position, with patients and other health professionals (Apesoa-Varano & Varano,
2014).
Lastly, team work was found to be an important part of being a doctor, and
professionals had to find their place “in a web of highly interrelated groups of
practitioners in the hospital” (Apesoa-Varano and Varano, 2014, pp. 24). This is
difficult for doctors who must establish rapport and gain support, build trust with other
professionals in the team, while acknowledging power disparity between them.
Further, doctors are far more protected from the control and reach of others who they
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work alongside, and it’s often up to the physician to self-regulate through exercising
personal self-control, diligence, and composure to measure up to their professional
standard (Gawande, 2007).
Nurses
Since the modest origins of their occupation, nurses have strived towards a
professionalised status by increasing educational requirements and credentials, and
standardising nursing practices (Melia, 1984, 1987; Melosh, 1989; Jacobs et al.,
1998). This quest for recognition has stemmed from misconceptions of nursing as
unskilled work, thus emphasizing the acquisition of formalised knowledge as part of
the profession, rather than, as in the case of physicians, the translating of abstract
medical knowledge into effective interventions (Apesoa-Varano & Varano, 2014).
This contrasts with other work which suggests nurses employ a discourse of
caring that emphasises “soft skills”, invoking the image of Florence Nightingale, over
biomedical skills (Nelson & Gordon, 2006). Thus, nurses hang on to an ideal of
emotive caring as part of their profession, while also demonstrating their medical skills
and knowledge in treating patients (Nelson and Gordon, 2006).
As it pertains to occupational norms, similarly to doctors, nurses are bound by
professional codes of conduct, for example the UK’s Nursing and Midwifery Council
provides a code which covers standards of practice and behaviour. Apesoa-Varano
and Varano (2014, p. 30) found that ethics were very important for nurses, but it meant
something different than for doctors, specifically being ethical is about a selfless
commitment to others, suggesting professional nurses must “put [themselves] aside
for the job. You put yourself aside for the patient”.
These findings align with contemporary nursing ideology which supports an
image of nursing work established on an uninterrupted emotionally intimate
relationship with the patient (Parse, 1981; Watson, 1988). However, contrary to these
traditional images of nursing work, Allen (Allen, 2004) found in her review of nursing
field studies over a 10 year period, that the core nursing contribution is that of
healthcare mediator. Specifically, it is their role as information broker, which is of
relevance here, in consideration of organisational dynamics influencing voice
behaviour.
Allen (2004) highlights the importance of nurses co-ordinating role among
multi-professional team members (Kneafsey & Long, 2002). Managing information
flows came in the form of passing information to other professionals, making
telephone calls, and building relationships with patient’s families (Kneafsey & Long,
2002). Nurses were found to hold a key role in monitoring and assessing patient
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needs, which were communicated to influence the work of other team members.
Nurses skill at assessing, interpreting, and communicating relevant patient
information to doctors, so that they can make a diagnosis, is another major aspect of
their role as information broker (Kneafsey & Long, 2002; Porter, 1995; Wicks, 1998).
Further, nurses play a key role in the categorisation, and creation of patient identities,
which is involved in circulating patients, to keep patient throughput in ‘good shape’
(Sbaih, 2002), and prioritising care and rationing resources.
Despite how nurses manage information flows among team members, some
evidence suggests that doctors will receive information from nurses, and use it to
make a diagnosis, but they will do so without acknowledgment of the nursing skills
involved, leaving nurses out of further diagnostic discussions (Wicks, 1998). This is a
theme which continues throughout the literature, suggesting power imbalances make
it difficult for nurses to directly influence medical decision making.
Coomb’s (2003) study of a UK intensive care unit found that while doctors
seemed to appreciate nurses’ detailed knowledge of a patient’s condition, they did
not value this in making decisions. Further, Savage (1995) described how nurses felt
as if their knowledge counted for nothing when shared with doctors.
Anspach (1993) suggests it is because of the nurses’ position within the social
organisation of healthcare work, and the information this makes readily available to
them, that disagreements can develop with different professional groups, whose
position might give them access to different information flows.
Multi-Professional Action Teams and Work Context
As suggested, professional claims of control and autonomy over one’s labour
tend to fit awkwardly with the notion of teams, which are hierarchically structured with
professionals of varying status. The result in healthcare, is a professional hierarchy
based on first, the ability to claim the most legitimate judgement, and second, the
development of relationships within the hospital, leading to the dominance of certain
professions in patient treatment decisions (Strauss et al., 1963).
This review draws upon Edmondson’s (2003) work on speaking up in
interdisciplinary action teams and Weiss et al’s (2016) study of voice behaviour in
multi-professional action teams. In comparing these two studies, it was understood
their descriptive titles were intended to represent the same thing, as such this study
refers to action teams as multi-professional rather than interdisciplinary, given the
emphasis here on professions: doctors and nurses.
Adopting the term multi-professional action team for this study is an
acknowledgement that healthcare professionals work in a high reliability environment,
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characterised by multiple teams whose members have specialised skills, must
coordinate, and improvise their actions, in intense, unpredictable situations, to solve
ambiguous problems (Klein, Ziegert, Knight, & Xiao, 2006; Sundstrom, De Meuse, &
Futrell, 1990; Vashdi, Bamberger, & Erez, 2013).
According to Allen (1997), the unpredictable and ‘turbulent’ nature (Melia,
1979) of hospital work reflects the centrality of the patient, making medical work
structurally non-rationalisable (Strauss, Fagerhaugh, & Suczet, 1985). It is among this
setting, work fluctuates at a highly variable pace, and where emergencies are always
possible, that delivery of patient care happens (Allen, 1997). Further patient care is
situated among a revolving, around the clock schedule, that considers often
conflicting internal and external timetables (Zerubavel, 1979). Thus, unpredictable
needs of patients, along with complex temporal structures of the hospital must be
considered in team work. As discussed earlier, hospital staff come from a wide range
of professional groups, each with their culture, hierarchies, and career structures,
further exacerbating the challenge of co-ordination.
To ground this study in practicality and improve its generalisability, employee
voice is conceptualised within the context of multi-professional action teams, given
their prevalence in healthcare. This action-team context enables a greater focus on
team leaders, known influencers of employee voice, as an organisational dynamic.
While many action teams, such as those in professional sports teams, or
airline pilots, have similar training, other action teams like those found, for example,
in hospital operating theatres are interdisciplinary in nature (Edmondson, 2003).
Team composition in healthcare is temporally unstable with major changes in
procedures, equipment, context and members common (Weiss et al., 2016). These
multiple hierarchically organised groups, or action teams, respond in a coordinated
way to unexpected events, necessitating open and free transfer of information to
support real-time, reciprocal coordination of action (Edmondson, 2003).
As suggested, professional differences in training, status, and norms can
negatively impact team communication such as speaking-up behaviour.
Communication problems result from professional differences in specialised training,
terminology, and in taken for granted assumptions by professions from certain
specialties (Dougherty, 1992). It’s up to the team leader to help team members create
shared meaning about the scenarios they encounter, as a means to see the big
picture and understand how different sources of expertise fit together (Clark &
Wheelwright, 1995).
It’s through these shared beliefs and team leadership behaviour that group
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climate develops, either positively in the form of a favourable voice climate, which is
psychologically safe enough to encourage those with lower status to speak up across
hierarchical barriers, or negatively, as a climate of silence, where silence prevails,
because of fear of negative sanctions from those with higher status.
Psychological Processes
Psychological processes which underlie employee voice behaviour include
cognitive and emotional components (Edwards & Greenberg, 2009). Cognitively,
employees face a deliberate process whereby they consider both positive and
negative consequences of their decision to speak up, based on whether it is safe and
whether it will be effective (Ashford et al., 1998; Detert & Burris, 2007; Morrison &
Milliken, 2000).
However, the judgements made by employees in deciding whether to voice is
not entirely cognitive and can be short-circuited by affective experiences, such as fear
(Detert & Edmondson, 2011; Kish-Gephart et al., 2009; Morrison & Rothman, 2009).
As discussed in Chapter 2, when healthcare professionals are involved in
medical errors they can potentially become second victims (Wu, 2000), who
experience an affective reaction that is positively correlated with severity of error
(Sirriyeh et al., 2010). Thus it’s anticipated that medical error as a salient, traumatic
affective experience, with long term consequences for professionals and their
colleagues, will influence employee voice behaviour. Emotional contagion, an implicit
“automatic affective transfer process” (Kelly & Barsade, 2001, p.101), helps to explain
how emotions and moods of individuals spread to those nearby.
Further, there is evidence to suggest those in positions of power, like team
leaders, impacts not only organisational dynamics, but exerts onto psychological
processes of employees when it comes to inhibiting or encouraging voice.
Edmondson (1999, 2003) found team leaders can encourage speaking up by creating
a climate of psychological safety in which people feel comfortable raising problems
through motivating others and removing status barriers. The affective reach of those
in power is further still, with leaders’ affective states shown to influence upward voice
(Liu et al., 2017). The dominant affective, cognitive, and behavioural tendencies of
those in positions of high power, and their openness, is thought to influence
subordinates decisions to remain silent about important work issues (Morrison &
Rothman, 2009).
This discussion is expanded on, at the end of this section, through an
evaluation of how a team’s voice climate is shaped by beliefs about safety and
efficacy of speaking up, developed through social interactions, leadership behaviour
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(Detert & Treviño, 2010), and salient events in the history of the group (Milliken et al.,
2003).
Healthcare Professionals as Second Victims
While medical error has negative consequences for patients and their families,
the emotional impact on healthcare professionals, the second victims (Wu, 2000), are
well documented (Croskerry, Abbass, & Wu, 2010; R. Harrison, Lawton, & Stewart,
2014; Heyhoe et al., 2016; Iedema, Jorm, & Lum, 2009; Scott et al., 2009; Sirriyeh et
al., 2010). One survey of 1,463 doctors in the UK who experienced an adverse event
or near miss found they reported: stress (74%), anxiety (68%), sleep disturbance
(60%), lower professional confidence (63%), and 81% became anxious about the
potential for future errors (Harrison, et al. 2014).
The narrative below was shared one year after killing a patient, by an
anonymous doctor in the British Medical Journal, illustrating how emotionally
devastating medical error can be.
“As I write this, the memory still makes my hands shake. The
emotions are always there. But … I can function and still be an
effective doctor. I no longer need the forgiveness I craved at first. I
can live with my fallibility … But now I truly understand the
consequences of failure.” - (Anonymous, 2000)
The above narrative highlights emotional response to error doesn’t just
happen in the moment, it stays with the professional, and changes over time. This
can be understood in terms of a post-event trajectory which second victims progress
through, consisting of six stages: “(1) chaos and accident response, (2) intrusive
reflections, (3) restoring personal integrity, (4) enduring the inquisition, (5) obtaining
emotional first aid and (6) moving on” (Scott, et al., 2009, p. 326). The period it takes
a professional to move on from the event can differ, and for some the error may stay
with them forever.
Once a professional reaches the moving on phase there are three potential
paths: dropping out, surviving, or thriving (Scott, et al., 2009). Those who ‘survive’
their post-event recovery may get back to performing at expected levels but will
remain disturbed by the error, while those who ‘drop out’ change roles, for example
away from clinical duties, or they leave the organisation, and/or profession entirely.
What’s not so well understood is why some professionals go on to ‘thrive’ in
recovery from error, and experience increased performance through improved
practices (Scott, et al., 2009). Bewtra (2002), a Pathologist who admitted her
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“shameful error” (Bewtra, 2002, p. 22), arguably went on to ‘thrive’, by making amends
for her mistake through successfully researching atypical medical presentations, and
educating her peers (Bewtra, 2002). This example highlights that experiencing
emotions, like shame, can potentially lead to increased performance via positive
improvements in practice, which could, arguably, help establish conditions for voice.
As pointed out by Barsade, Brief and Spataro (2003), there has been little
work on the positive effect of emotions in organisations, and especially, combined
with a lack of consideration of possible positive affective outcomes of medical error
(Sirriyeh et al., 2010). This study, with its intent to place traumatic affective experience
as a catalyst to employee voice behaviour, can redress this gap by considering the
possible positive affective outcomes of these negative traumatic events.
Generally, feelings of self-doubt, fear, anxiety, shame, and guilt are reported
following medical error (Sirriyeh et al., 2010). While the extent to which the impact of
medical error varies as a function of professional group, and clinical setting is not yet
clear (Sirriyeh et al., 2010), with a greater proportion of studies focused on doctors,
and trainees, compared to nurses, differences by occupational groups have begun to
emerge.
As found by Sirriyeh et al (2010), medical errors were found to have an
influence over the way nurses felt about themselves and how they work, stemming
from their reflective nature in such situations. Nurses, consistently felt a personal
responsibility for error, and demonstrated a commitment to reporting incidents
regardless of whether they would be blamed. Doctors were consistently found to
display an increased focus on the tasks necessary to manage clinical outcome of the
error and professional repercussions.
One study found that specialist doctors, a group of young anaesthetists, dealt
with medical error on a personal level, which enabled them to become alert to threats
to patient safety at a collective level, by negotiating the affect through shared
narratives (Iedema et al., 2009). Talking with their peers allowed the anaesthetists to
objectify, normalize, and distance the ‘horror’ of medical error by associating it with
humour, expressing it as a metaphor, and forcing closure on it by portraying it as a
fact of everyday life, an inevitable part of professional life and identity.
While it’s positive to see some professionals have access to supports, in the
form of peers, enabling them to cope with the emotional impact of adverse events
and generate vigilance against threats, however it is frequently reported that support
following error is lacking (Sirriyeh, et al, 2010).
This lack of support in the workplace leads to limited self and organisational
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learning (Sirriyeh, et al, 2010). Negative attitudes towards error in the culture of
medicine, threat of professional loss, and lack of available institutional support were
all noted as barriers that prevent professionals from receiving necessary support
(Sirriyeh, et al, 2010). Harrison, et al.’s (2014) survey of UK doctors found only 5.5%
reported having a formal mentor, 87% said they would contact a mentor following
medical error if they had one and 83% had supported a colleague affected by an
adverse event. Most of the doctors (67%) surveyed did not believe their healthcare
organisations adequately supported doctors in addressing the stress related to
adverse events.
Power and Voice Behaviour
In the turbulent, and unpredictable, hospital work environment, upwards
communication from employees about potential problems and opportunities is critical.
Those of higher status and power, the leaders of multi-professional teams, need
information from team members, often of lower status than themselves, to respond
appropriately in a high-reliability environment, and correct problems before they
escalate. Unfortunately, studies show that employees sharing concerns and
suggestions with those in positions of power are often disinclined from doing so,
resulting in silence (Milliken et al., 2003; Pinder & Harlos, 2001).
As proposed by Morrison and Rothman (2009) silence results from a
reluctance by those in positions of relative low power to convey information to a
person with relatively high power, suggesting a fuller understanding of employee
voice behaviour can be gained by identifying and considering the effects of power on
employee emotions (and conversely the effect of emotions on power), cognitions,
behaviour, and social interactions. The aim of incorporating this understanding of
power is to bridge past works which have looked in isolation at either the actions of
employees who keep silent (Glauser, 1984), or the attitudes, and behaviours, of
managers and supervisors (Morrison & Milliken, 2000), to understand the interplay
between them.
While power is traditionally defined as the ability to influence others (Keltner,
Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977), rooted in the assumed and
actual resources and punishments that the power-holder can deliver to others
(Emerson, 1962; French & Raven, 1959), the emphasis for this study is on formal
power resulting from hierarchical position. Legitimate authority to allocate desirable
and undesirable outcomes to others, and to control and use organisational resources
are hallmarks of formal power which stems from one’s position in a hierarchy (Astley
& Sachdeva, 1984; French & Raven, 1959).
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Social relationships and social structure are key to understanding power
(French & Raven, 1959), as such individuals of high hierarchical position are not
‘powerful’ in an absolute sense, but acknowledge that they have power over others
based on the interdependencies between them (Emerson, 1962, Salancik & Pfeffer,
1977).
While power is a social construct, it has strong effects on those who possess
it, as a result it’s useful to understand its conceptualisation as a psychological state
(Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003). Psychologists argue, that within a social
context, having power generates a psychological state of powerfulness associated
with a variety of predictable affective, cognitive, and behavioural outcomes (Keltner
et al., 2003). Thus, those who feel powerful have been found to feel differently, to
process information differently, and to behave differently than those who do not feel
powerful (Keltner et al., 2003). The opposite holds true for those who do not have
much power in a given social context.
Thus, an attempt can be made to describe the interaction between high and
low power individuals. As explained by Morrison and Rothman (2009), those who are
powerful are less focused on risks and sanctions, and more focused on rewards,
because they tend to exist in environments of abundant rewards (Keltner, et al.,
2003). Less powerful individuals are more likely to be cautious because of their limited
access to material and social resources (Domhoff, 1998). Further, those with high
power feel they have latitude in their actions, and can behave without interference,
stemming from their independence from others (Hecht & LaFrance, 1998). Whereas
the evaluations and constraints of others are more keenly felt by less powerful
individuals (Fiske, 1993; Steele & Aronson, 1995). Individuals in high-power positions
perceive themselves as being more competent than do people in low-power positions,
and it’s been found, when things go wrong, these individuals are less likely to attribute
responsibility to themselves (Lee & Tiedens, 2001).
Thus given their state of psychological power, high power individuals do not
often appear open to input from subordinates. This can be explained by research
which has shown that individuals who feel highly powerful experience more positive
emotions than negative emotions (Berdahl & Martorana, 2006), and are shown to
experience more positive emotions than those who feel less powerful (Berdahl &
Martorana, 2006), making them less attentive to risks and threats, and more focused
on rewards and opportunities. As suggested by Morrison and Rothman (2009, p. 118)
those individuals with high power can be over-confident and will be likely to feel that
“all is well”, and “will be disinclined to see value in, to seek out, or to listen to negative
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feedback. That is, they will be unlikely to convey the openness that subordinates need
to feel comfortable voicing their concerns”. So how is it that subordinates, those in
lower positions of power, respond to these behaviours associated with individuals
possessing higher power?
Subordinates experience a sense of futility when it comes to voicing their
concerns if their supervisors are unsupportive and unapproachable. This results from
their low position of power, which biases them towards seeing the situation as
uncontrollable and threatening, making them more likely to experience negative
emotional states such as fear and anxiety (Keltner et al., 2003). As such, less
powerful individuals observing their superiors to judge whether speaking up is
worthwhile, will be inclined to underestimate the likelihood that speaking up will be
effective, because they overemphasise the potential risks, resulting in feelings that
voice is futile (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Athanassiades, 1973). Further, the
negative emotions they can experience, like sadness, tend to be associated with
feelings of helplessness (Keltner et al., 2003). As such both parties are involved in
an interplay with influences voice behaviour.
Psychological Safety and Group Voice Climate
As proposed by Schneider, Ehrhart, & Macey (2013), organisational climate
refers to the shared perceptions of, and the meaning attached to the procedures,
practices, and policies employees experience, and the behaviours they witness being
rewarded, supported, and expected (Ostroff, Kinicki, & Tamkins, 2003; Schneider,
Ehrhart, & Macey, 2011; Benjamin Schneider & Reichers, 1983).
Group voice climate has been found to be shaped by shared beliefs about
safety and efficacy developed through 1) social interactions, 2) leadership behaviour
(Detert & Treviño, 2010), and 3) by vicarious learning and salient events (such as
medical errors) in the history of the group (Milliken et al., 2003).
As previously mentioned, employees considering whether to voice consider
two dimensions, which make up group voice climate, first, whether speaking up is
safe (i.e. group voice safety), and second, whether it will be effective (i.e. group voice
efficacy).
Psychological Safety, introduced at a team level by Edmondson (1999, p.
354), is “a shared belief that the team is safe for interpersonal risk taking” which
suggests “neither a careless sense of permissiveness, nor an unrelentingly positive
affect but, rather, a sense of confidence that the team will not embarrass, reject, or
punish someone for speaking up. This confidence stems from mutual respect and
trust among team members.”. This belief is thought to be tacit by team members and
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is included here as synonymous with the idea of group voice climate.
As described by Edmondson (1999), a group climate in which people are
comfortable being themselves and characterised by mutual respect and interpersonal
trust is said to be psychologically safe. Further, to be considered psychologically safe
at a group level, team members must hold similar perceptions, rather than only
individual members. These beliefs are thought to converge in a team because team
members are implicated by the same set of shared influences, and because these
perceptions develop out of salient shared experiences. Team leaders who
downplayed power differences and who were perceived as open were found to create
enhanced feelings of psychological safety (Detert & Burris, 2007; Edmondson, 2003).
Building on this definition, we can revisit employee voice as a multi-
dimensional construct discussed earlier in this chapter, to propose that teams
characterised as psychologically safe fit into Morrison et al’s (2011) definition of a
favourable voice climate, while those teams which are psychologically unsafe are
more likely to fit Morrison & Milliken’s (2000) definition of a climate of silence. As such
this review identifies two very different climates, a climate of silence, where
employees perceive that speaking up is futile and/or dangerous, and a favourable
voice climate in which employees perceive it is safe and worthwhile to speak up.
Literature Review Conclusion
This concludes section I of the thesis, providing a transition to the empirical
part of the study, by summarising the literature, reviewing the gaps identified, and
highlighting why these gaps are important and how they will be studied in this thesis.
Further, the expected contribution of this thesis, an emerging model that
describes the role of second victims in the establishment of conditions leading to the
enactment of voice is introduced.
Chapter 2 provided a state of the art review of the patient safety movement.
This includes discussion of key international reports which highlight both human and
system factors implicit in error. Next the rise, and proliferation, of root cause analysis
(RCA) as an investigative technique for learning from medical error was described.
An implementation gap in learning from error using RCA was identified, chief causal
factors were highlighted through examination of historical cases as 1) hierarchical
challenge and 2) second victims phenomenon. Further, current paradigms in patient
safety, described in the literature as safety-I and safety-II were explored, and a recent
successful example which integrates both was reviewed.
The patient safety movement arose in the late 1990s in response to key
international reports that identified the scale of patient harm in hospitals, often cited
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as 10% of admissions. As an ‘anxiety reassurance’ tool, western countries adopted
RCA to improve safety and respond to an increasingly concerned public.
Unfortunately, despite efforts at improvement using RCA and other tools, rates of
harm have remained stagnant.
This review identifies two key challenges that perpetuate this ‘implementation
gap’ in learning from error, the hierarchical challenge between professionals of
varying status and power, and the second victim phenomena. Using historical
examples, evidence of hierarchical challenge surfaced to include futility of voice by
both staff and patients, and identification of cultures that did not permit individuals of
lower status to challenge higher-ups. Second victims were also identified, who, in the
case of Betsy Lehman’s overdose felt blamed and shamed, leaving the organisation.
The occurrence of a serious medical error seems linked to professionals
becoming a ‘second victim’, particularly given the positive relationship between
severity of error and degree of affective impact. Thus, second victims are potentially
inseparable from the process of learning from medical error. Much is known about
what negative impacts these experiences can have on professionals, where they
might ‘survive’ an experience, or ‘drop out’ due to shame and guilt, however, a gap
exists in understanding what positively valenced outcomes might emerge from these
individuals, particularly those that go on to ‘thrive’.
As such a gap exists to explore what role second victims might play in the
enactment of positive practices, particularly those which may attenuate the
hierarchical barriers between professions – lessening the hierarchical challenge.
Arguably, those individuals involved in the most severe errors will go on to experience
the strongest affective impact, as either negatively and/or positively valenced
changes to both their affective state and practice. This gap is particularly relevant
given the seeming inseparability between medical errors and emergence of second
victims among healthcare professionals. Further, attempts at improvement, in line
with a safety-I ‘find and fix’ approach have largely failed, a new approach is warranted
to leverage and explore existing organisational resources, such as second victims, in
light of an incremental shift towards safety-II. An approach to patient safety which
builds upon safety-I, while making consideration for positive practices that emerge
from second victims, is warranted and will help bridge the safety-I & II paradigms.
The theory of employee voice was introduced in chapter 3 as a sensitising
concept and framework for the researcher to explore the identified gap in patient
safety. Specifically the relevance of employee voices as an important structuring
concept for this thesis arose following identification of the hierarchical challenge as a
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chief barrier to the prevention of medical error. This theoretical foundation provides a
lens from which the nuances of hierarchical interactions between healthcare
professionals can be rationalised for analysis.
Specifically, organisational and psychological conditions that drive voice
behaviour are highlighted to better understand how these challenges might be
overcome. The historical development of employee voice was described, including its
origins and applications from other safety sensitive fields including aviation, military,
and aerospace.
Employee voice is as a multi-dimensional construct whereby silence and voice
are not thought to be opposites, meaning silence is not merely the absence of voice,
and that consideration for an individual’s motive is a key feature that differentiates
these behaviours.
Organisational factors relevant to this context and thought to weigh upon
employee voice behaviour including dynamics which exist between medical
professionals, specifically doctors and nurses, their differing professional
organisation, and consideration of their work context in multi-professional action
teams.
Psychological processes in this context that influence employee voice include
consideration of negative affective experiences by second victims of medical error,
power dynamics between professions, and the influencing conditions of a
psychologically safe group climate.
Incorporating the gaps identified in the patient safety literature and building
upon theory of employee voice as a foundation, this thesis will contribute by
presenting an emerging model. This model describes how the practice changes of
second victims in this study help overcome hierarchy through establishing the
conditions leading to the enactment of voice among their teams. Furthermore,
conditions that lead to silence, a chief cause of medical error, are identified in the
model, and linkage between medical error and ‘second victims’ described.
In the next section, Chapter 4 Research Strategy: Methods, Design, and Data,
an overarching research design is described for the study. In order to study the gap
identified, empirical cases of medical error were selected, and healthcare
professionals involved in error identified and interviewed. Using qualitative research
methods involving cross-case analysis, the experiences of 50 healthcare
professionals across three cases were analysed using an inductive coding method.
The research design described next necessitated the identification of breakdowns in
practice (i.e medical error) and application of a methodological approach to assess
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the affective experiences of second victims. An overview of data sources for the study
is presented and explanation is provided for the analysis of data and coding strategy
adopted.
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Chapter 4: Research Strategy: Methods, Design, and
Data
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Overarching Research Design
The goal of this research is to make a theoretical contribution that is of
practical relevance to healthcare professionals. This study addresses the
implementation gap in patient safety which results from the hierarchical challenge and
second victim phenomenon. Employee voice, driven by both organisational and
psychological elements, was introduced in Chapter 3 as a sensitising concept, to
explore the hierarchical challenge. The affective experience of medical error, while
known for causing negative impacts in second victims, has the potential to spur
positively valenced changes in practice, such as encouraging speaking-up.
Consideration of both organisational dynamics and psychological processes
inform the design of this study, necessitating methodological tools to evidence these
contingent factors. A practice based approach, which targets breakdowns in
organisational practices (i.e. when medical errors occur), is adopted, to explore the
hierarchical challenge; while a methodological approach for classifying affective
experiences in second victims, linked to possible changes in practice, is also
incorporated into the overall design.
These two design elements, practice breakdowns and affective experiences,
converge in the analysis of data, setting the stage for development of theory which
fills theoretical gaps addressing barriers in collaboration and communication between
professionals of varying hierarchical position (Senot et al., 2016), and the role
traumatic affective experiences have on these interactions, including consideration
for potential positive practice changes (Sirriyeh et al. 2010).
An inductive coding method (Pratt, 2009) is used to analyse the study’s data,
creating a foundation of first order codes and second order categories which are
stored in a NVIVO database. From this structured data-set advanced queries were
run and analysis conducted. In section II of this thesis, the findings are written up in
chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8. Discussion of these findings is found in chapter 9.
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Research Question
As identified at the end of the literature review, the key gap identified centres
around second victims of medical error. Specifically, little is known about what
positive implications might exist for these professionals, and what positively
valenced practices might emerge as they recover.
A strong link seems to exist between serious medical errors and
professionals becoming a ‘second victim’, particularly given the positive relationship
between severity of error and degree of affective impact.
This study addresses the implementation gap in patient safety, which results
from the hierarchical challenge and second victim phenomenon. A gap in
knowledge exists to explore what role second victims might play in the enactment of
positive practices, particularly those which may attenuate the hierarchical barriers
between professions. This thesis seeks to answer the following research question:
 How can second victims moderate the hierarchical challenge through the
enactment of positive practices, which establish the conditions for voice, and
improve patient safety?
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Research Methods
Researching the Hierarchical Challenge through Breakdowns in Practice
This methodological design adopts a practice-based approach, which targets
breakdowns in professional practice to explore the hierarchical challenge between
healthcare professions, namely doctors and nurses.
This design enables access to healthcare professionals’ ‘logic of practice’, by
‘zooming in’ on breakdowns in practice, specifically medical errors, to view the
relational whole of the professionals, colleagues, and tools implicated when things
don’t go as planned (Nicolini, 2013; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011). This approach will
allow the researcher to evidence all practices that arise from these breakdowns, with
a specific focus on those which influence employee voice behaviour (i.e. setting
expectations for voice).
Breakdowns occur when things don’t go as planned and one’s flow of practice
is temporarily halted and “the relational whole of sociomaterial practice is momentarily
brought into view” (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011, p. 344). Breakdowns allow
professionals to articulate the significance of taken for granted distinctions which is
impossible while immersed in a state of “absorbed coping” (Dreyfus, 1995, p. 69), our
primary mode of engagement with the world. In this state we spontaneously respond
to developing situations at hand, without demonstrating awareness of involvement in
it.
This design necessitates appropriate methodological choices which 1) search
for and focus on breakdowns in professional practice and 2) evaluate those
breakdowns through an interview method known as critical incident analysis.
Given the study’s empirical context, it’s pragmatic to search for breakdowns
where professionals’ expectations have been thwarted. That is, when a practice is
disrupted because of unintended consequences or unmet standards of excellence
(Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011), the inner workings of how professionals respond, their
practice, become observable. These breakdowns might also be found through an
awareness of differences in practice between professionals directly involved in error,
who are potentially second victims, in contrast to departmental colleagues on the
periphery.
Critical incident analysis (Chell, 2004; Kemppainen, 2000) is the interview
method selected for this study as a means to access professionals’ logic of practice’.
This approach enables the researcher to evaluate the professional’s frame of
reference, thought processes, and feelings about a preselected medical error of
significance for them (Chell, 2004). Drawing on work from the military field involving
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friendly fire, it’s possible to identify the “practical drift” (Snook, 2002) that occurs
during such incidents. This “practical drift” resulted when local practices drifted, and
no longer conformed to formal procedures (Snook, 2002).
This approach requires awareness on behalf of the researcher of the potential
for causing ‘second-order’ breakdowns through involvement in the research process
by “merely asking detailed and concrete questions about what practitioners do and
how they accomplish their work temporarily disrupts practitioners’ absorbed coping
and throws them into a mode of deliberation.” (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011, p. 350).
Thus, the research demands a degree of reflexivity on behalf of the researcher,
particularly given his background in hospital risk management.
Abductive Case Research
Serving the goal of this research to develop theoretical contributions of
practical relevance to healthcare professionals, this study aims to understand how
groups of different healthcare professionals respond to medical errors, RCA
investigations, and recommendations for practice change.
A pilot study was undertaken in a pathology department which had
experienced a trend of adverse events related to systematic delays. A draft interview
guide (See final guide in Appendix, A.5 Interview Guide) was tested during this pilot
phase. This department was chosen for pragmatic reasons, enabling early access to
the NHS trust, setting context for the main PhD study, and allowing for the
development of relationships with key stakeholders. While useful for the reasons
identified above, the pilot study is not included in the findings of this PhD. Further
justification of this decision is explained in the introduction to empirical findings
section of this PhD.
Following the pilot, three cases were selected which connect directly to
achieving the study aims, each revolves around a serious medical error where root
cause analysis (RCA) investigation was completed, and recommendations for
improvement were implemented or in progress. The rationale behind case selection
is discussed later in this section.
This PhD is based on case research, a scientific method (Ketokivi & Choi,
2014), which uses case studies as its unit of analysis. Three cases, which contain
different clinical and professional contexts, from one organisation are compared,
using cross-case analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994).
As per Meredith (1998), the strengths of case research are: 1) the
phenomenon is studied in its natural setting allowing the observing and understanding
of actual practice, and actors, in their native environment, leading to development of
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relevant, meaningful theory; and 2) the case method supports exploratory
investigations, where the variables are not all known and phenomenon not
understood. This researcher tested the theoretical framework and interview guide in
a pilot case, which helped inform an iterative process of research design for
subsequent cases and theory development.
This abductive case research design, see figure 4.1, supports theory
elaboration whereby the goal is to refine and extend existing theory related to second
victims and employee voice, in the context of professionals and patient safety, where
application has been limited. This process is iterative with analysis going from
theoretical, to empirical, and back again, leading to new propositions and extension
to existing theory (Cunliffe & Eriksen, 2011; Voss et al., 2016).
An abductive approach is useful to develop an understanding of phenomena
found in practice for which theory needs refining. For example, exploring what
positively valenced practice changes, such as speaking-up, might result from
negative affective experiences like medical error, refines our understanding of second
victims and employee voice. Ultimately, this abductive approach enables an
elaboration of employee voice, an organisational theory, in a context where it’s had
limited exposure, leading to development of refined and more practically relevant
theory.
Figure 4.1 Abductive Process in Case Research (Adapted from Voss et
al., 2016)
Case Rationale
As mentioned, a pilot study in a pathology department was selected to test a
draft interview guide. Following refinement of study protocol, three embedded cases
(Yin, 1994) were selected in different clinical settings throughout the single
organisation. A multiple case design was selected to augment external validity, limit
observer bias, and to manage the risk of misjudging a single event in one specific
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organisational context, by spreading the analysis across the organisation (Voss et al.,
2016).
Following the works of Eisenhardt, (1989) and Yin, (1994) cases were
selected for study according to specific selection criteria. Case selection was based
on the principle of replication logic whereby each case was selected so that it either
predicts similar results, or produces contrary results, but for predictable reasons
(Voss, et al, 2016). The sampling criteria for case selection can be seen in Table 4.1
Case Sampling Criteria Controls.
Defining case selection controls allowed particular factors to be ‘held constant’
while others are left free to vary as they would naturally (Meredith, 1998). The main
overriding factors held constant are that each case includes healthcare professionals
who are impacted by medical error, a department where RCA investigation has
occurred, and recommendations for practice change are implemented or in progress.
Further, the medical error must be relatively recent (within 3 years of the date of the
data collection), and more than one type of healthcare profession represented (i.e.
both Doctors and Nurses).
While several factors vary naturally across the cases including the types of
healthcare professionals involved, and clinical settings (i.e. inpatient ward vs surgical
theatre), the variable factors controlled for sampling are the proximity of the patient to
the professionals in the department, and whether the error was primarily found to be
the result of human or system factors. The former factor is relevant to professional
organisation, a topic discussed in Chapter 2, given certain professions studied, such
as Laboratory Pathologists, have less patient contact in comparison to, for example,
Nurses on a busy inpatient ward, it’s anticipated their reaction to such an event might
vary.
System factors vs human factors as a variable factor, are an acknowledgment
of the importance of lessons drawn from other disciplines, like psychology of error,
and industries such as aviation, in learning from errors. Leape (1994) and Reason's
(1993) discussion of medical errors, as precipitated by a wide range of factors beyond
the control of an individual, at a systems level, was novel at the time of their
publication, influencing future safety investigations. The introduction of these
concepts led to changes in investigations, such as the Bristol Royal Infirmary (BRI),
which adopted a systems approach, finding poor performance as the result of mal-
functioning systems rather than the result of any individuals’ conduct (Kennedy,
2001).
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Table 4.1 Case Sampling Criteria Controls
Constant Factors Variable Factors
1) Serious Untoward Incident / Never
Event having occurred
1) Distance from patient
2) RCA Investigation with
recommendations to improve
practice
2) Root Cause: System Factors vs
Human Factors
3) Incident having occurred recently
4) More than one group of
professionals represented
Figure 4.2 Case Selection Matrix
The application of the selection criteria to the NHS trust studied in this PhD is
shown in Figure 4.2 case selection matrix. The rationale for selecting each of the
study’s three main cases are described below in the following sub-sections. In-depth
descriptions of these cases are found in Section II Empirical Findings.
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Surgery Case Rationale
Surgeons work in very close proximity to their patients, not only in the
operating theatre, but also when consulting before and after surgery. Such was the
situation in this case, where the never event, a retained surgical swab, was identified
at the patient’s follow-up appointment with lead surgeon. Further, the professionals
involved represented an ideal composition to develop understanding of barriers
associated with the hierarchical challenge, which are thought to be worsened by
power imbalances, which exist between specialist doctors and nurses. While human
factors played a role in the error, where some nurses felt silenced, and others spoke
up and were ignored, there was a degree of system related gaps, which also
contributed. The policy on swab counts was not followed and there was a general
lack of awareness of the limitations of fluoroscopy.
Maternity Case Rationale
This incident is primarily the result of human errors. First, the coordinator
assigned a midwife to the patient, who was not experienced in dealing with high-risk
mothers. Second, the obstetrician missed an opportunity for emergency caesarean
delivery by incorrectly deciding to review the patient after four hours, rather than one.
While the absence of protective system factors, such as a midwife shortage, and
visible information about the appropriate skillset of available midwives, played a
lesser role, it was largely the decisions made by two healthcare professionals which
contributed to delivery of a still-born baby. Obstetricians work in very close proximity
to their patients, building a relationship with them from early stages of pregnancy until
delivery. Midwives operate in a busy hospital maternity unit, thus are also very close
in proximity to their patients. As such, it makes for an interesting case to understand
what changes might occur in these individuals given their close proximity to their
patients.
Ward X & Urology Case Rationale
Healthcare professionals on ward X work in very close proximity to their
patients. These patients are often in precarious health, recovering from procedures
and undergoing follow-up testing to determine fitness for discharge. The busy nurses
are assigned to a bay of patients and remain with those patients for the duration of
their shift, while doctors, often urologists, and junior doctors on educational rotations,
see patients throughout the ward, evaluating them, and ordering additional tests. This
case results from a blend of human and system factors. The former with regards to
one nurse, CS412, and her lack of knowledge around blood results, and
assertiveness with doctors; while the later regarding absence of protective factors:
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standard operating procedures in the event blood results are phoned through to the
ward, and mechanisms for ensuring doctors are notified of tests they order. The
interplay of these professional groups, combination of human and system root
causes, on a busy inpatient ward, make for an interesting setting to evaluate response
to the death of a patient.
Data Collection Procedures and Practicality
This section aims to provide clarity on the data collections procedure and
practicalities relating to it. Given the identified gap in patient safety on what positive
outcomes might emerge through second victims, this researcher sought cases (and
a pilot case) where healthcare professionals were involved in medical error. Given
the linkage between error severity and potential affective impact, cases of the highest
severity, either a never event, or involving a patient expiring were selected and the
case sampling rationale discussed previously was applied.
This section begins by describing the researchers journey, next provides an
overview of all data sources collected including meeting observations, interviews, and
documentation review. Ways in which the researcher was reflexive and applied critical
analysis to the interviews and materials collected is discussed. Following collection
of data and initial analysis, validation meetings were held, these are discussed briefly
before an overview of the cross-case analysis methodology is provided.
A visual representation of key events during the researcher’s journey to collect
data, analyse, and later write-up the thesis is shown in figure 4.3. A complete
chronological list of all visits to the Trust for conducting research interviews and
observations are listed below in table 4.2 Interview & Meeting schedule.
Figure 4.3 Researcher’s Journey
In November 2014 the researcher was introduced to Dr. C, his sponsor at the
English NHS Trust where the PhD research was conducted. Dr. C was the Deputy
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Medical Director and Director of Strategy at the Trust. An initial meeting was held at
Warwick Medical School with Dr. C to discuss the project at a conceptual level. In
January 2015 the researcher was invited by Dr. C to meet with senior Medical Safety
and Risk Management personnel at the Trust, to propose the research study.
Following this meeting applications for Research Ethics were submitted to both
University of Warwick Biomedical and Scientific Research Ethics Committee
(BSREC) and the Trust research department. In March 2015 a letter of access was
obtained from the NHS, as well as an honorary research contract signed with the
Trust in July 2015, and in August 2015, the researcher’s PhD study ethics were
approved by BSREC (Reference # REGO-2015-1642).
Beginning in September 2015 the researcher was an observer on the Quality
& Risk Committee for four consecutive months. This opportunity allowed for the
gathering of contextual information at the Trust by observing exchanges of
information and reviewing numerous Trust documents and policies. Of specific
interest was how departmental leaders (Associate Medical Directors) attended to
provide an update and overview of their directorates quality and safety improvements.
These leaders were held accountable at the committee, which owned responsibility
for monitoring the implementation of service improvements stemming from safety
investigations across the trust. Implementation of Duty of Candour in the Trust was
also taking place during this time, with auditing and monitoring programmes taking
place on a monthly basis. As mentioned earlier, after attending four sessions the
committee was disbanded due to a change in leadership at the Trust.
The pilot study was initiated in November 2015, with an introductory email
from Dr. C to leadership of the pathology department introducing the researcher and
his study. Laboratory tours and Interviews were scheduled in December 2015. It
should be noted that one senior member of Pathology leadership cancelled all
interviews one week before they were scheduled. He felt that this trend of medical
errors had already been investigated extensively by the Trust and there was nothing
more to be learned. The researcher, with the help of Dr. C, was able to schedule an
hour-long meeting with this individual to listen to his concerns. After addressing his
concerns by explaining the purpose of the confidential PhD research, and how this
was not another governance investigation into his department, access was granted
and interviews continued the following week.
Following completion of this pilot case in December 2015, three cases were
selected for the PhD study based on the rationale described in this chapter. The
researcher discussed with Dr. C that he would pursue the data collection for
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remaining case studies in parallel, rather than sequentially. In February 2016, Dr. C
sent emails to the heads of the remaining departments: Surgery, Maternity, and
Urology and Ward X. The process followed was similar to that of the pilot case, with
an introductory meeting between the researcher and departmental leadership, a site
tour, and contextual discussions, before scheduling participants for interviews.
The scheduling of participants was usually completed with the aid of
assistants and receptionists within each department. Many phone calls and emails
were exchanged to maintain an interview schedule, this was particularly difficult for
extremely busy individuals such as Surgeons. One tactic the researcher chose was
to arrive early in the morning and wait in a spare office, or the manager’s office, with
an interview sign-up sheet on the door, and meet and recruit participants as they
walked by, or took a break. The interview phase was completed in May 2016 with a
total of 50 interviews completed.
Table 4.2 Interview & Meeting schedules
Date Department(s)/Position(s) Purpose Hours
spent at
hospital
November 6th
2014
Strategy & Transformation Introductory
meeting to discuss
research study.
1
January 16th,
2015
Director of Medical Safety
and Risk Management
Introductory
meeting to provide
overview of
proposed research
study and discuss
possible cases for
study.
1
May 7th, 2015 Trust X Research, Warwick
Business School, Warwick
Medical School, ,CLAHRC-
WM faculty.
CLAHRC-WM
Research
Showcase.
Presented
proposed research
study and received
feedback
2
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Date Department(s)/Position(s) Purpose Hours
spent at
hospital
May 20th, 2015 Risk Management, Legal,
and Investigations
Discussed
possible RCA
cases for study.
1
May 20th, 2015 Strategy & Transformation Discussed
Honorary
Research Fellow
research contract.
1
November 13th,
2015
Strategy & Transformation
and Risk Management,
Legal and Investigations.
Discussed cases
provided by Trust
for PhD research
and developed
plan to contact
departments
1
November 20th,
2015
Pathology (pilot study) Lab tour and work
observation
2
December 10th,
2015
Pathology (pilot study) Meeting with Lab
Senior Leadership
1
December 15th,
2015
Pathology (pilot study) Interviews and
Observations
8 (full
day)
December 16th,
2015
Pathology (pilot study) Interviews and
Observations
8 (full
day)
February 22nd,
2016
Strategy & Transformation Research Planning 1
March 7th, 2016 Operations Lead, Surgery
Department
Site tour,
preliminary case
discussion
1
91
Date Department(s)/Position(s) Purpose Hours
spent at
hospital
March 16th, 2016 Lead Investigator, Surgery
Department
preliminary case
discussion and
interview
1
March 18th, 2016 Clinical Director, Obstetrics Site tour,
preliminary case
discussion
1
April 7th, 2016 Surgery Interviews 8 (full
day)
April 8th, 2016 Surgery Interviews 8 (full
day)
April 11th, 2016 Clinical Director, Urology Preliminary case
discussion
1
April 14th, 2016 Obstetrics Interviews 8 (full
day)
April 18th, 2016 Women & Children’s
Services
Site tour,
preliminary case
discussion
1
April 20th, 2016 Consultant Clinical
Scientist, Head of
biochemistry, immunology
and toxicology
Interview 1
April 21st, 2016 Women & Children’s
Services
Interviews 2
April 25th, 2016 Urology Interview 1
April 26st, 2016 Urology Group Interview 2
April 27th, 2016 Operating Theatre Interviews 8 (full
day)
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Date Department(s)/Position(s) Purpose Hours
spent at
hospital
May 5th, 2016 Urology, Inpatient Ward X Site tour,
preliminary case
discussion,
interviews
8 (full
day)
May 6th, 2016 Urology, Inpatient Ward X Site tour,
preliminary case
discussion,
interviews
4
May 17th, 2016 Surgery Interview 1
May 24th, 2016 Obstetrics Interview 1
TOTAL 86
hours
Overview of Data Sources
The data for this study, as outlined in Table 4.3, was found in three primary
data sources: 50 interviews, 104 hours of observations, and 35 document reviews.
As Yin has argued (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007), case studies are rich, empirical
descriptions of particular instances of a phenomenon that are typically based on a
variety of data sources.
Table 4.3 Overview of Data sources
Cases / Committees
/ Meetings
Interviews
(~1 hour each)
Observations*
*includes time spent
in department
interviewing
Documentation
Review
(# documents)
Pilot 10 interviews 19 hours 2
Surgery 15 interviews 28 hours 6
Maternity 13 interviews 14 hours 5
93
Urology 12 interviews 17 hours 7
Quality and Risk
Committee
- 8 hours 15
General - 8 hours -
Validation & Follow-
up Meetings
- 10 hours -
Totals 50 interviews 104 hours 35 documents
Reflexivity and Critical Analysis of Data Sources
Given this researchers previous professional experience in hospital risk
management, he was aware of the need for additional critical thinking about the
data collected during this study. Further, the notions he held about the political
nature of medical error investigations, particularly those using RCA was reinforced
by the literature in this area, see Peerally et al., (2016) for a recent review. RCA is
vulnerable to political hijacking and RCA reports are written to satisfy certain
audiences in the organisation who hold power (Carroll, et al., 2002). This required
an awareness of behalf of the researcher to compile his analysis based on multiple
data sources, for example the RCA investigative document itself, interviews with the
RCA investigators, and triangulating those with what was said by healthcare
professionals directly involved in errors, and their managers.
This researcher’s professional background in this field may have made it
more difficult to be reflexive, however he understood the importance of leaving
behind preconceived notions and biases on entering the field. He made an active
effort to mentally leave behind his role as a manager and become a researcher.
Being reflex is said to involve “interpretation of interpretation and the launching of a
critical self-exploration of one’s own interpretations…a consideration of the
perceptual, cognitive, theoretical, linguistic, (inter)textual, political and cultural
circumstances that form the backdrop to – as well as impregnate- the
interpretations” (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2009).
To that end, this researcher attempted to situate himself contextually and
frame the inquiry along several lines including: inquiry focus context, location
context, the broader context, and most difficult, the relationship context (Patton,
2015). In consideration of why the study was being done it was useful to remember
how important this work was to the researcher himself and broader safety
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community, having been confronted with many instances of safety failures in his
career, four years of his life had been set aside to study the problem.
Because patient safety is located within the well tread medical and nursing
academic literature, there was a degree of reflection on what is known about
professional organisation, hierarchical challenges, and second victims today, in light
of this researcher’s personal experience with, and knowledge of these subjects.
Writing the literature review for this thesis helped to provide focus about the specific
nature of this inquiry, and the context in which it is situated.
Consideration for the study’s location was important, this researcher was
entering hospitals were professionals worked and asked them about highly sensitive
events of significance, which had career defining implications for some of them.
Furthermore, this study was completed in the UK, a country where this researcher
had no previous experience, making him not only an outsider as a researcher, but
also a foreigner. The location may have helped reflexivity because he was less
comfortable and more self-conscious in this setting.
While the broader context was important, the study was focused at a micro-
level, the front line professionals, as such details of the broader context were largely
left untouched. However, there were issues of context that did arise such as a
recent high profile and publicised case of medical error, and large scale
organisational changes occurring at the trust due to financial difficulty. It was
important that this researcher present himself not as another ‘investigator’ but as a
researcher whose work was confidential and intended to improve and advance the
field of patient safety more generally.
Most importantly, this researcher was attentive of the need to be reflexive
when it came to his relationship with participants in the study, given they were
healthcare professionals and he was a former hospital risk manager. This required
mindfulness of his professional voice as a risk manager, wondering whether
participants would hold back or reveal more based on this identity. It became
apparent individuals were trusting and candid in their responses; this was
particularly evident where some participants began to cry or curse about their
experiences. In thinking about these responses, this researcher felt perhaps his
familiarity with, and experience in hospital policies on confidentiality and sensitivity
may have enhanced the data collected because individuals seemed confident their
responses would remain confidential.
In consideration of these contextual lenses, being reflexive allowed the
researcher to be more open and prepared for challenges that arose during the field
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work, and contributed to the overall success of the thesis.
In concluding this commentary on reflexivity, it is important to consider that
certain limitations may exist in the data set. Specifically, these limitations relate first
to the politically ‘produced’ nature of RCA documentation. Second, how a minority of
interviewees, primarily those in the maternity department, might have been
attempting to present themselves in the best light, to protect themselves from a
blame culture. As such, the findings presented should be read in consideration of
the reflexive commentary and limitations mentioned.
Data Collection: Interviews, Observations, and Documentation Review
Interviews
Each case represents a department which had recently experienced a
medical error and root cause analysis investigation. Employees from these
departments were invited to participate in this study and interviewed using a semi-
structured, critical incident technique (Kemppainen, 2000). Interviews were chosen
as a method for this study because of their ability to make accessible an individual’s
lived experience by acting as a pipeline for transmitting knowledge to the researcher
(Rapley, 2001).
Employees were broadly divided into professional categories: doctors, nurses,
management, assistants, and scientists. Whether the participants’ role was front-line,
management, or they were a hybrid-manager was noted. Further, which case
participants belonged: Surgery, Maternity, or Urology & Ward X, was also included.
A data classification table was created based on these categories and imported to
the NVIVO database, to enable effective queries to be run during the analysis phase.
These employee groupings were selected due to their roles and
responsibilities in their respective departments for the implementation of
recommendations following RCA. For example, if the recommendations for
improvement pertain to the maternity ward, the participants include members of the
directorate management team including Head of Midwifery, and Obstetrics Clinical
Lead, to ensure both Midwife and Obstetrician management is represented. Front-
line staff would include Consultant Obstetricians and Midwifes who work directly on
the ward.
A critical incident technique (Kemppainen, 2000) which analysed three-
components was used in each interview: 1) the event and circumstances, 2) the
process, and 3) outcomes and consequences. A copy of the interview guide can be
found in the Appendix of this thesis, in table A.5 Interview Guide. This technique
allowed the researcher to look at specific incidents and activities which participants
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perceive as significant, it is known as a useful technique for exploring events which
individuals may experience as difficult (Kemppainen, 2000)
Interviews with employees lasted roughly an hour each and took place in a
room near the employee’s department. Interviews were audio recorded using an iPad
and written consent was obtained for each. Each case had between 10 – 15
participant interviews. A complete anonymized list of the 50 study participants can be
found in Table 4.4 Overview of Study Participants. Interviews were transcribed by MB
Secretarial Services, Sheffield, UK. Follow-up emails and telephone calls were made
with several participants, namely Ward Matrons and Clinical Directors, to clarify
findings.
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Table 4.4 Overview of Study Participants
CASE Participant
ID
Title Profession Classification
Pilot CS101 Head Biomedical
Scientist
Scientist Management
Pilot CS102 Biomedical
Scientist,
Advanced
Specimen
Dissector and
Dissector Manager
Scientist Management
Pilot CS103 Clinical Director
Laboratory
Medicine,
Associate Medical
Director for
Division of Clinical
Support Services
Doctor Management
Pilot CS104 Medical Lab
Assistant
Assistant Front Line
Pilot CS105 Consultant
Histopathologist
Doctor Front Line
Pilot CS106 Biomedical
Scientist
Scientist Front Line
Pilot CS107 Biomedical
Scientist
Scientist Front Line
Pilot CS108 Biomedical
Scientist
Scientist Front Line
Pilot CS109 Consultant
Histopathologist
Doctor Front Line
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CASE Participant
ID
Title Profession Classification
Pilot CS110 Consultant
Histopathologist,
Clinical Lead
Doctor Front Line
Surgery CS201 Consultant
Anaesthetist
Doctor Front Line
Surgery CS202 Sister 6 Nurse Front Line
Surgery CS203 Senior Sister 7 Nurse Management
Surgery CS204 Senior Staff nurse,
theatre practitioner
Nurse Front Line
Surgery CS205 Theatre Matron Nurse Management
Surgery CS206 Healthcare
assistant in
Theatre
Assistant Front Line
Surgery CS207 Senior Sister 7 Nurse Front Line
Surgery CS208 General Manager
for Theatres
Manager Management
Surgery CS209 Operating
Department
Practitioner
ODP Front Line
Surgery CS210 Sister 6 Nurse Front Line
Surgery CS211 Locum Consultant,
Senior
Microvascular
Fellow
Doctor Front Line
Surgery CS212 Consultant
Radiologist
Doctor Front Line
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CASE Participant
ID
Title Profession Classification
Surgery CS213 Consultant on call
plastic Surgeon
Doctor Front Line
Surgery CS214 Consultant
Associate
Specialist Breast
Surgery
Doctor Front Line
Surgery CS215 Consultant
Surgeon, Clinical
Director of General
Surgery &
Gastroenterology
Doctor Management
Maternity CS301 Consultant
Anaesthetist Spec.
Obstetrics
Doctor Front Line
Maternity CS302 Consultant
Obstetrics
Doctor Front Line
Maternity CS303 Consultant
Obstetrics and
Clinical Director
Obstetrics
Doctor Management
Maternity CS304 Assoc. Head of
Women’s Services
for Nursing and
Midwifery
Nurse Management
Maternity CS305 Head of Midwifery,
Governance and
Quality Clinical
Dean
Nurse Management
100
CASE Participant
ID
Title Profession Classification
Maternity CS306 Matron of Clinical
Quality and Safety
for Obstetrics
Nurse Management
Maternity CS307 Clinical Midwifery
Manager Delivery
Suite (was Co-
ordinator)
Nurse Management
Maternity CS308 Midwife Band 5 Nurse Front Line
Maternity CS309 Midwife Ward
Manager
Nurse Management
Maternity CS310 Lead Midwife for
Quality &
Governance,
Woman &
Children’s
Services
Nurse Management
Maternity CS311 Midwife Band 6 Nurse Front Line
Maternity CS312 Midwife Band 5 Nurse Front Line
Maternity CS313 Consultant
Obstetrics, labour
ward lead
Doctor Front Line
Urology CS401 Consultant
Urologist, Clinical
Director Urology
Doctor Management
Urology CS402 Consultant Clinical
Scientist, Head of
department
(biochemistry,
Scientist Front Line
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CASE Participant
ID
Title Profession Classification
immunology and
toxicology)
Urology CS403 Senior Sister 7 Nurse Management
Urology CS404 Consultant
Urologist,
Education Lead
Doctor Front Line
Urology CS405 Consultant
Urologist
Doctor Front Line
Urology CS406 Consultant
Urologist
Doctor Front Line
Urology CS407 Consultant
Urologist
Doctor Front Line
Urology CS408 Healthcare
Assistant Band 2
Assistant Front Line
Urology CS409 Band 5 Staff Nurse Nurse Front Line
Urology CS410 Band 5 Staff Nurse Nurse Front Line
Urology CS411 Matron, Urology,
Thoracic, and
Vascular
Manager Management
Urology CS412 Band 5 Staff Nurse Nurse Front Line
Meeting Observations
Meetings related to patient safety were observed and detailed notes about the
meetings, issues discussed, exchange of ideas, and contextual information were
recorded. Initially the researcher attended the Quality and Risk Committee before it
was disbanded due to changes in Trust leadership, rolling the accountability of this
committee up to the executive level (See Table 4.5 Quality and Risk Committee
Observations). The emphasis was on understanding how the recommendations for
improvement stemming from RCA investigations were discussed, and service
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improvements set in motion and monitored. The researcher maintained a field journal
during all observations and interviews.
As shown in Table 4.3 over 100 hours were spent on-site at the hospital.
Almost half of this time was spent carrying out interviews, the remainder was in direct
observations of committees, meetings, and observing staff carry out managerial or
clerical functions. Further, during down-time between interviews there were
opportunities to log into the NHS computer system to read Trust emails and bulletins,
read wall-boards, and have informal chats with staff members in their offices or in the
hallways.
Table 4.5 Quality and Risk Committee Observations
Date Department Hours
September 18th, 2015 Quality and Risk
Committee
2
October 16th, 2015 Quality and Risk
Committee
2
November 20th, 2015 Quality and Risk
Committee
2
December 18th, 2015 Quality and Risk
Committee
2
TOTAL 8
Document Reviews
Documentation created by the Trust resulting from the RCA process was
reviewed for each case, this includes investigative documents, meeting minutes,
sequence of events, incident reports, reports of recommendation, and policies. These
documents are listed in Table 4.6 Documents Reviewed by Case. Of particular focus
were the Serious Untoward Incident Reports which correspond to each case where
RCA investigations were carried out. These reports, 23 pages on average, contain a
highly detailed sequence of events leading to the medical error, findings of the
investigation (i.e. root causes), and recommendations for improvement. These
reports allowed the researcher to acquire context for each department and incident
prior to observing and interviewing staff. By understanding these reports, the
researcher was able to follow interview responses more accurately, ask more detailed
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questions, and validate whether the stated recommendations had been implemented.
Table 4.6 Documents Reviewed by Case
Reports (*bolded), Minutes,
Other
Policies
Quality & Risk
Committee
Agendas, Meeting Minutes,
Care Quality Commission (CQC)
Report into Trust X,
Committee Terms of Reference,
Risk Management Strategy,
Trust Risk Profile,
Directorate Quality & Safety
Reports,
Safety Situation Reports, and
SIRIUS Reports.
Complaints and
Concerns Policy and
Procedure,
Incident Reporting and
Management Policy
and Procedure,
Learning Development
Policy,
Risk Management
Policy and Procedure,
Serious Untoward
Incident Policy and
Procedure v3.0, and
Root Cause Analysis
Tool.
Pilot Case Serious Untoward Incident
Report into Delays in
Histopathology Reporting in
2013,
Pathology Quality & Governance
Reports.
Surgery Case Serious Untoward Incident
Report of Mrs X,
Theatres Quality & Governance
Reports, Surgery Risk Profile.
SUI at a Glance
Report,
Accounting for Swabs,
Packs, Sharps and
Instruments During
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Reports (*bolded), Minutes,
Other
Policies
Sterile Procedures
Policy, and
WHO Safer Surgery
Checklist.
Maternity Case Serious Untoward Incident
Report into the care of Ms X,
Obstetrical and Gynaecology
Risk Management Strategy,
Obstetrics and Gynaecology
Quality & Governance Reports,
and
Women and Children’s Risk
Profile.
SUI at a Glance
Report.
Urology Case Serious Untoward Incident
Report into the care of Mr X,
Urology Quality & Governance
Reports.
SUI at a Glance
Report,
Standard Operating
Procedure for Taking
Blood Results Over the
Phone,
Normal Blood Results
(laminated card),
AS Telephoning
Results and Abnormal
Phone Limits Policy,
and
Ward x learning sheet.
Validation Follow-up Meetings
A series of follow-up meetings and group presentations were scheduled with
participating departments to present, ask for feedback, and validate initial study
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findings (see Appendix, tables A.1 to A.4 Impact Summaries for preliminary findings).
Although the Pathology department from the pilot study was invited to participate in
follow-up meetings they did not respond. The validation meeting schedule is
summarized below in Table 4.7 Validation Follow-up Meetings.
Table 4.7 Validation Follow-up Meetings
Date Department(s)/Position(s) Purpose Hours
May 11th 2017 Surgery: Theatres
Management Team
Maternity: Clinical Director,
Obstetrics
Validation
and Follow-
up
2
May 16th 2017 Maternity: Maternity
Department (senior
midwives)
Validation
and Follow-
up
2
June 6th, 2017 Urology: Senior Urologists
Ward X Senior Sister
Validation
and Follow-
up
2
June 10th, 2017 Surgery: Study Day,
Surgical Department
Validation
and Follow-
up
2
June 16th, 2017 Maternity: Forward
Together, Maternity
Department
Validation
and Follow-
up
2
TOTAL 10
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Overview of Cross-Case Analysis Methodology
Table 4.8 provides an overview of the methodological framework set-out for
this study involving cross-case analysis.
Table 4.8 Overview of Cross-Case Analysis Methodology
Data Analysis
This study’s data sources: transcribed interviews, meeting observations, and
documentation reviews, were compiled into a qualitative database using NVIVO
software, and analysed using an inductive coding method (Pratt, 2009). While the
main focus of interest in coding was to understand what practice changes
professionals made, and whether they were affectively impacted by medical error, a
large number of contextual codes were also created.
From this coding process, 198 initial, first order codes were generated (see
table A.6 First Order Codes in the Appendix, for a complete breakdown of all
categories by individual level codes).
Each code was reviewed for how they might be related to larger, more
inclusive concepts resulting in the collapsing of 198 first order codes into 6 second
order categories shown below (See Table 4.9 Coding Categories). In Table 4.9,
sources refer to the number of data sources coded (i.e. participants, observations,
documents), while reference refers to the number of times a citation was coded, in
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each category.
Table 4.10 Sub-Codes within Category: Practical Response, and Table 4.11
Sub-Codes within Category: Affective Response included coded data from across all
cases, and list all the sub-codes assigned to these categories.
Table 4.9 Coding Categories
Table 4.10 Sub-Codes within Category: Practical Response (all cases)
Table 4.11 Sub-Codes within Category: Affective Response (all cases)
Once all first order codes had been categorized into second order concepts,
the process of initial coding was completed.
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Running Matrix Queries
The NVIVO database could now be queried to provide answers about the
items of interest, namely practice changes and affective experience following medical
error.
To analyse the categories within the specific context of each case, a
multidimensional query known as a matrix was run. Each matrix looked at how the
practical and affective responses of professionals (doctors, nurses, assistants, and
managers) varied by case (Surgery, Maternity, Urology). An example of how each
matrix query was run using NVIVO is shown on the next page in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4 Running a Matrix Query
Step 2: Select the
Case, in this
example, Surgery.
Run Query, Save
Step 3: Select the
Query results for
Surgery, and run a
second query based
on Profession.
Step 1: Select the
Category, in this
example, Affective
Response.
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The matrix query output for affective responses found in surgery case is below
in table 4.12. This specific table will be discussed in-depth in chapter 6, which
describes the findings for the surgery case.
Table 4.12 Matrix Query Example: Surgery Case Affective Response by
Profession
Surgery Case
Affective Response Doctor (n=5) Assistant (n=2) Nurse (n=4) Manager (n=1)
Compassion 9 3 9 1
Anger 7 3 4 1
Shame 7 3
Coding Reference
Conditional formatting, shown as shaded bars in the query output table,
graphically represent the number of references assigned to each individual sub-code.
Within NVIVO these tables are interactive allowing the researcher to click on each
reference cell, bringing up the quotes coded to each.
This data analysis process was repeated for all of cases: Surgery, Maternity,
and Urology. In total 6 matrix queries were run, including practical and affective
responses for each case. The output of these queries established a foundation for
the researcher to complete data analysis, and write-up professionals’ practical and
affective responses for each case. Given the data set was coded to 198 codes, the
researcher utilized a degree of pragmatism with regards to focusing specifically on
practical and affective responses. However, when it was warranted, extra queries
were created, and run to explore additional related areas of the data set. For example,
analysing contextual information pertaining to quality and safety investigations helped
evidence a blame culture in Maternity.
Classifying Affective Experiences in Second Victims
It’s well documented that medical error impacts upon the psychological well-
being of healthcare professionals, eliciting a variety of affective responses (Scott et
al., 2009; Sirriyeh et al., 2010; Wu, 2000; Wu & Steckelberg, 2012). Therefore, this
study incorporates a methodological design influenced by Lazarus’s core relational
themes (Lazarus, 1991; Lazarus, 1993) for the classification and appraisal of affective
experiences, given the likelihood of their discovery in this study’s findings, and
relevance for influencing changes in the practices of professionals following medical
error (Sirriyeh et al., 2010). Evidence of a similar methodological approach can be
found in Huy, Corley, & Kraatz's (2014) study that identified emotional reactions,
aggregated as positive or negative, as facilitators and amplifiers in the implementation
of change initiatives.
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For clarity, the goal of this design is to enhance our understanding of the role
of affect following medical error. Affect is an umbrella term, defined broadly as a
“subjective feeling state” (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995, p.99), which ranges from
intense emotions to diffuse moods (Elfenbein, 2007).
An emotional state is a “transient reaction to specific encounters with the
environment, one that comes and goes depending on particular conditions” and are
“generated and controlled by the personal implications for well-being conveyed by
relationships (social) with the environment” (Lazarus, 1991, p. 47).
Researching affect is challenging, primarily because many of the variables
that analysis depends upon are non-observable. However, as urged by Lazarus
(1991, p.44), emphasis added, to “speak of an emotion is to make a theoretical
judgement about a highly complicated hypothetical construct, an organized
configuration consisting of many variables and processes”. Thus, to form an
understanding, this researcher must make judgements by applying a combination of
rational and empirical analysis as outlined next.
In consideration of this study’s empirical setting, and data collection methods
which include: observations, in-depth interviews, and documentation review, the
design considers what observable variables relevant to affective experiences might
be present. Lazarus (1991, p.43) defines these source variables as: actions, what
people say, and environmental events and context, for detail see Table 4.13.
Physiological reactions, such as autonomic nervous system activity, are not included
in this design given the degree of participant intrusiveness, lack of scientific
instruments, and ethical and scientific guidance.
Table 4.13 Observable Variables Relevant to Emotion (Lazarus, 1991, p.
43)
“Actions: such as body postures, facial expressions, weeping,
avoidance, or attacking. Acknowledging some actions might be
performed to create a social effect, whereas others are
involuntary. Suggesting actions are motivated, or expressive, or
that they indicate or result from an emotional process requires
interpretation by the researcher.”
“What people say: are a valuable resource of information
about emotion because they sometimes tell us what we cannot
evidence from other sources. Examples include explaining the
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conditions which generate an experienced emotion, or the
beliefs that underlie a reaction. While individuals can distort
their meaning, by choosing to present themselves in a light,
these reports will be treated as observables and interpreted in
the context of other available data.”
“Environmental events and context: relate to the physical,
social, and cultural events under which an emotion occurs and
require interpretative inference and theory.” The
appropriateness of this source variable relates to the common
experiences of medical error which all study participants have
experienced. Thus, if an individual was angered by an event,
we can collate the reactions and viewpoints of all participants
who experienced the same event to interpret the appropriate
classification.
Based upon the observable variables outlined above, the design aims to
evaluate the person-environment relationship, an idea that affect cannot be
understood from only the standpoint of the environment or the person as separate
units. The concept which defines these relationships is known as core relational
themes, which define the key relational benefit or harm of each emotional category,
negative and positive, and each specific emotion within each category (Lazarus,
1991, 1993; Lazarus & Cohen-Charash, 2001)
Whether an affective experience is thought to be positive or negative reflects
whether something of relevance has occurred to an individual’s well-being. This is
called the motivation principle which states “the things people care about – that is,
their goal commitments – define what is harmful and beneficial for them, and therefore
what is apt to generate positive and negative emotions in their encounters with the
environment” (Lazarus, 1991, p. 433). For example, a physician harming a patient in
the case of medical error, would be goal incongruent with the Hippocratic Oath to “Do
no Harm”, and likely elicit a negative affective state.
The core relational themes (Figure 4.5) depend upon the idea there is a
central relational harm or benefit which underlies each specific kind of emotion. Thus,
positive and negative emotions are “in a sense, opposite sides of the same coin”
(Lazarus, 1991, p. 124).
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Figure 4.5 The Core-Relational Themes (Lazarus, 1991; Lazarus &
Cohen-Charash, 2001)
Evaluating the medical second victims literature (Scott et al., 2009; Sirriyeh et
al., 2010; Wu, 2000; Wu & Steckelberg, 2012) has identified the following affective
states: anger, shame, guilt, fear, panic, shock, humiliation, anxiety, depression,
frustration, sadness, grief, and remorse.
Several of these categories were compared with core relational themes, to
understand how they could be reliably categorized and appraised by Lazarus (1991;
1993) & Lazarus & Cohen-Charash (2001). See Table 4.14 Anger, Table 4.15
Compassion, Table 4.16 Guilt, and Table 4.17 Shame, for appraisal components by
affective experience. By thusly preparing the design ensures the researcher is
prepared for analysis of data, so that reliable and valid categorisations of affective
states can be made, based upon observable variables.
Following data collection and analysis (refer to table 4.11 discussed earlier),
several categorisations of affective experience were found, primarily relating to anger,
compassion, guilt, and shame. During follow-up and validation meetings with
participating departments, preliminary findings (see Tables A.1 to A.4 Impact
Summaries in appendix to this thesis) were fed back to participants and consensus
reached that affective experiences had been captured in a reliable way.
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Table 4.14 Appraisal for Anger (Lazarus & Cohen-Charash, 2001;
Lazarus, 1991, p. 226)
Category Primary
Appraisal
Component
Secondary
Appraisal
Component
Example from Study
Data
Anger – “a
demeaning
offense against
me and mine”
“If there is goal
incongruence,
then only
negative
emotions are
possible,
including anger.
If the type of
involvement is
to preserve or
enhance the
self- or social-
esteem aspect
of one’s self,
then emotion
possibilities
include anger,
anxiety and
pride.”
“If there is blame,
which derives
from the
knowledge that
someone is
accountable for
the harmful
actions, and they
could have been
controlled, then
anger occurs.”
Context: Nurses CS202
and CS204 speaking-up
to a Surgeon about a
retained swab in the
patient. They attribute
blame to the Surgeon.
“I insisted that we were
using the wrong x-ray
device, but I was told
“No, no, it’s alright,” and
I said “No, it’s not!” –
Nurse 204
“You know, I’m sure we
should be doing a plain
x-ray. I don’t know why
they’ve brought that,”
and the surgeon said
“No, it’s alright. It’s
alright, it’ll be fine. We’ll
see it.” – Nurse 202
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Table 4.15 Appraisal for Compassion (Lazarus & Cohen-Charash, 2001;
Lazarus, 1991, p.290)
Category Primary
Appraisal
Component
Secondary
Appraisal
Component
Example from Study
Data
Compassion
– “an altruistic
concern for
another’s
suffering and
the desire to
alleviate it”
“If there is a
goal relevance,
either because
of enlightened
self-interest,
altruism, or a
moral value that
threatens us
with guilt, then
any emotion is
possible,
including
compassion.
If there is a goal
incongruence in
regard to
another
person’s plight,
then the
emotion
possibilities are
limited to anger,
anxiety, guilt,
shame, disgust,
and
compassion”
“if there is self-
directed blame,
then the probability
of guilt is
increased; if blame
is directed at the
victim, then the
probability of anger
is increased; if
there is no blame,
then compassion is
likely.”
“in my clinical practice
I’m probably more
focused on patients’
experiences than I used
to be… it was probably
that conversation with
the patient and the
relative to actually say
I’ve got an obligation to
do that.” -CS201
Consultant Anaesthetist,
Lead Investigator
“you come into the
profession because you
want to look after people
and you care about
people, you want to do
your best” -CS311
Midwife
“once an event has
happened, our very first
thought is for the patient
and it is for the family” -
CS301 Consultant
Anaesthetist Spec.
Obstetrics, Lead
Investigator
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Table 4.16 Appraisal for Guilt (Lazarus & Cohen-Charash, 2001;
Lazarus, 1991, p. 242)
Category Primary
Appraisal
Component
Secondary
Appraisal
Component
Example from Study Data
Guilt – having
transgressed
a moral
imperative.
“Guilt is when
we believe we
have acted in
a morally
deficient way,
all the more
so if in so
doing we
have wronged
or harmed an
innocent
other.”
“If there is goal
relevance, then
any emotion is
possible,
including guilt.
If there is goal
incongruence,
then only
negative
emotions are
possible,
including guilt.
If the type of
involvement is
to manage a
moral
transgression,
then emotion
possibilities
narrow to
anger, anxiety,
guilt, and
disgust”
“If blame is to
oneself, then
emotion
possibilities
narrow to
guilt.”
“it is called a root cause
analysis, I felt like the root of
the problem and it just is soul
destroying…It really was tough
to know that you were partly
responsible for somebody’s
death. [crying]. It’s very tough”-
Staff Nurse CS412
“I just took it very personally …
I actually had this chance to
make a difference because I’d
seen her (patient). I had
examined her myself, so there
was no question of relying on
someone else’s findings …
I’ve always thought… I mean I
think I’m a good clinician” –
Doctor S (CS302 Consultant
Obstetrician)
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Table 4.17 Appraisal for Shame (Lazarus & Cohen-Charash, 2001;
Lazarus, 1991, p.243)
Category
Primary
Appraisal
Component
Secondary
Appraisal
Component
Example from Study Data
Shame –
“failure to
live up to
an ideal.
failure to
conform to
our
idealized
identity.”
“If there is goal
relevance, then
any emotion is
possible,
including
shame.
If there is goal
incongruence,
only negative
emotions are
possible,
including
shame.
If the type of
involvement is
to manage a
failure to live up
to an ideal, then
the possible
emotions
narrow to
anger, anxiety,
shame, and
disgust”
“If blame is
to oneself,
then the
possible
emotions
narrow to
shame.”
“the coroner, was reviewing my
practice and potentially I hadn’t
actually… I don’t know how to put it.
Potentially I had sort of not been up
to the mark.” – Doctor S (CS302
Consultant Obstetrician)
“We were always very focused on
achieving the best results for our
patients and that’s why we were all
very disappointed or upset by this
incident … it was such a bitter pill to
swallow that this had happened. If it
had happened elsewhere I wouldn’t
be necessarily as disappointed or as
surprised, but the fact that it
happened here was a very personal,
negative experience” –CS211
Locum Consultant, Senior
Microvascular Fellow
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Analysis and Writing-up
As shown in the researcher’s journey, figure 4.3, writing the thesis began in
the summer of 2016. While work on the literature review had started prior to
November 2014, during the PhD proposal phase, it evolved over the course of the
research journey. It became clear through preliminary analysis of findings, that codes
related to voice were beginning to emerge. This necessitated the inclusion of
employee voice literature to frame the study, in addition to the patient safety literature
which highlighted the hierarchical challenge and second victims. Further, as codes
relating to affective experience were found, the researcher spent several months
researching how to best interpret and make sense of this data, eventually deciding
on the core-relational themes as most suitable for analysing the type of qualitative
data collected.
Throughout the writing-up process there was continuous analysis, involving
writing many drafts of findings from each case, the presentation of themes in various
ways, and regular feedback from supervisors. This ongoing analysis and regular
feedback informed the writing up process. Findings were continuously questioned,
contextual information was stripped down, reducing the total number of codes, to
enable a clear focus for writing-up. The focal point of the thesis became narrower,
shaped by literature and analysis of findings to: understand the role second victims
of medical error play in moderating the hierarchical challenge, encouraging the
enactment of employee voice.
Upon completion of case findings chapters, the researcher embarked on the
discussion chapter where findings were compared across cases and literature was
re-integrated to help explain what was discovered. In writing the conclusion for the
thesis, the researcher reflected upon his experiences conducting the research,
discussed transferability, limitations, and ideas for future research.
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Conclusion
This chapter has explained the overarching research design for this PhD
study. Drawing upon methodological elements including a focus on breakdowns in
practice, and classification of affective experiences, this design supports the study’s
aims to understand practice change, focusing on employee voice, and affective
experience, following medical error.
Given the gap in what’s known about second victims, an abductive case
research design was chosen that involved an iterative process of reviewing theory
before entering the field, collecting data from a pilot study, and re-visiting theory in
consideration of what was been collected, to influence further data collection and
analysis.
A rationale was provided for case selection based upon the principle of
replication logic. Case selection controls were put in place which enforced constant
factors as well as variable factors to determine which cases were chosen for the
study. A series of interviews, observations, and documentation reviews were
conducted for each case.
The researcher’s experience of conducting the research was detailed,
beginning with a pilot case study and finishing with conducting validation and follow-
up meetings. The core-relational themes were introduced as a means to evaluate the
affective experience of second victims.
The process of data analysis using NVIVO, involved inductive coding of all
data into first order codes and second order categories, and running matrix queries.
Examples of query output were provided. The NVIVO database, and specifically these
query output provided a foundation for the researcher to analyse and write-up findings
for each case, which are presented in full beginning in section II of this thesis.
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SECTION II: Empirical Findings
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Introduction to Empirical Findings Section
Section II, of this thesis includes chapters 5,6,7, and 8, providing the empirical
findings for the study. An overview of cases is found in chapter 5, first presenting a
pictorial trajectory of cases by degree of voice and affect, before summarized case
descriptions and highlights are presented. Next full descriptions for each of the cases
are provided. This includes an overview of each department, professional groups
involved, the sequence of events for the incident, findings from each root cause
analysis investigation, and recommendations for improvement, and whether they
were found to be implemented.
While the pilot study completed in a pathology department allowed the
researcher to test the interview schedule and decide on the selection of three cases,
it has not been included in the findings. The reason is that due to the large distance
between patients and professionals in that department, and the medical errors
resulting primarily from system, rather than human factors, no specific individual was
responsible, as a result there was a complete absence of affectivity and no second
victims were found. Thus, while the pilot study was useful for establishing context,
particularly regarding the inner workings of a pathology lab which was important for
the urology and ward x case, it lacked key features for theoretical development,
namely second victims and affective experiences. Further, pathology did not
participate in validation and follow-up meetings.
Next, Chapter 6 deals with surgery, chapter 7 focuses on maternity, while
chapter 8 covers urology and ward x. In all cases the findings emphasise the practical
and affective response of professionals in relation to the incident, process of
investigation, and formal recommendations. The immediate aftermath of the incidents
is discussed, often involving affective experience, before both emergent and
recommended practice changes are highlighted. A voice summary, ranging from
climates of silence and futility, to those which encourage voice, is described for each
case. Evidence is provided for second victims as facilitators, establishing the
conditions for voice, either through direct involvement or emotional contagion of
colleagues.
Finally, a conclusion to the empirical section is found at the end of chapter 8,
identifying thematic elements which are addressed in chapter 9: discussion.
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Chapter 5: Overview of Cases
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Introduction
Chapter 5 serves as an introduction and overview, to chapters, 6, 7, and 8,
which present the findings of three in-depth case studies at a single NHS trust. Each
case involves a serious medical error, where root cause analysis investigation has
been carried out, and recommendations made for service improvement. Each case’s
findings are presented individually, before thematic similarities and differences,
across cases, are discussed in Chapter 9: Discussion.
Each of the three case studies contains 10 sections, spread over 2 chapters:
Chapter 5 – overview of all cases
1) an overview of each department involved,
2) a description of the incident,
3) the findings of the investigations, and
4) evidence of recommendations implemented.
Chapter 6 – surgery, 7 – maternity, 8 - urology and ward x
5) Next, how professionals responded, in the form of practice changes and
affective experiences, are examined in coding references,
6) Conditions for silence,
7) Second victims and affective experiences,
8) Conditions for and enactment of voice,
9) Voice and silence summary, and
10) Follow-up.
In Chapters 6, 7, and 8, coding reference tables, queried from the NVIVO
database, are used to provide support for findings. Specific attention is paid to
understanding how professionals respond to the ‘hierarchical challenge’, whether
conditions support or discourage employee voice, and exploring the role second
victims and affective experience, might play in influencing healthcare teams and
practice changes.
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Representation of Cases by Voice and Affect
Figure 5.1 is a representation of cases by the number of coding references to
both voice and affect. Coding references for affect and voice are a sum of individual
codes from each case.
Acknowledging this quantitative representation is subjective, based on the
researcher’s interpretation of data sources, it presents an ‘at-a-glance’ look at the
degree of voice exhibited, and affect experienced, by healthcare professionals, in
each case.
On the scale of affective experience, a couple of individuals were affected in
Urology, with more wide-spread affective response found in Maternity, and Surgery
cases. There were varying degrees of voice coded across cases. In Urology the least
number of references for voice was found, with more moderate reference to voice
found in Maternity, while Surgery had the highest number of references for voice.
Figure 5.1 Representation of cases by # of coding references for Voice
and Affect
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Summarised Case Descriptions and Highlights
Surgery Case Quick Summary
Description: Nearing the end of a complex 10-hour multi-site surgery, involving 12
team members, a nurse informs the surgical team leader that a small surgical swab
is missing and might have been retained in the patient. The swab cannot be found
anywhere. A radiologist is called in to take scans of the patient using fluoroscopy, the
wrong imaging device for this type of scan known to miss radio-opaque swabs 15%
of the time. Subsequently a decision was made not to re-open the patient as no swab
could be found. Two months later the patient attended a clinic visit in obvious
discomfort and underwent emergency surgery for the removal of a retained swab.
Highlights: The hierarchical challenge prevented nurses from raising concerns, while
those who did speak-up where ignored. These conditions for silence were 1)
hierarchical culture, 2) fatigue, and 3) futility of voice. Both Surgeons and Nurses had
negative affective experiences. These were characterized as anger and shame.
Compassion for patients was also expressed. The conditions for prosocial voice were
1) ‘thriving’ second victim, Mr. K, the lead surgeon, setting expectations for voice, 2)
closer adherence to policy by nurses, 3) nursing management engendering voice
among staff, and 4) a reinvigorated sentiment of care. The outcome of this team’s
voice climate, is that at least two similar never events were prevented, when members
from this team were involved in surgical procedures at other theatres/hospitals in the
trust. Further, evidence suggests knowledge of his event has been shared to other
trusts in the NHS.
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Maternity Case Quick Summary
Description: A high-risk pregnant mother arrives suddenly to the emergency room
with vaginal bleeding. She is immediately brought into the maternity ward and
assigned to a healthcare team. The primary midwife looking after her is from the
community and not experienced with high-risk pregnancies. The infant’s heart rate is
not monitored effectively. The Obstetrician assigned to the case diagnosed an
abruption, but makes a poor decision to monitor the patient every four hours. An
opportunity for emergency caesarean section is missed and the infant expires.
Highlights: Inappropriate allocation of a community midwife (midwife z) to a high-risk
mother, and lack of escalation by CS302 Doctor S, were the root causes in the birth
of a still-born child. The conditions for defensive silence were 1) punitive
investigations, 2) defensiveness by nurses, and 3) a departmental blame culture.
Doctor S and midwife Z, the second victims, were affectively impacted through direct
involvement in the incident, going on to influence the affective state of their
colleagues. Affective experience was characterized as anger, shame, and guilt.
Compassion for patients was also expressed. The conditions for prosocial voice were
1) clinical director of obstetrics setting expectations for voice, 2) midwifery
management engendering voice among staff, and 3) a reinvigorated sentiment of
care.
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Urology and Ward X Quick Summary
Description: On a busy inpatient ward a newly qualified nurse receives a phone call
from the laboratory informing her of a patient’s elevated potassium levels. The nurse
went to the bedside of the patient and informed the doctors’ caring for that patient of
the elevated results. No action is taken regarding the elevated potassium and the
patient is discharged home later that day. The next day the patient arrives to the
emergency department in cardiac arrest and expires.
Highlights: Nurse CS412 informed doctors about a patient’s abnormal blood results,
and although they listened, no action was taken, leading to futility of voice. Conditions
for silence were 1) hierarchical culture, and 2) futility of voice. CS412 had a negative
affective experience, feeling anger and guilt. Individual affect was felt by other nursing
colleagues, particularly CS403, senior sister, who supported CS412 post event, going
on to implement numerous safety improvements, including introducing a standard
operating procedure (SOP) for taking blood results over the phone. Conditions for
defensive voice were 1) closer adherence to SOP by nurses, 2) Defensiveness, and
3) Nurses setting expectations for voice. While nursing was found to have
implemented recommendations from the RCA investigation, Urology had not
implemented any.
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Full Case Descriptions
Surgery Case Full Description
Case: Surgery, Never Event: Retained Foreign Object (RFO)
Date: February 2013
The Department
This case focuses on an event which occurred in one operating theatre, within
a broader surgical directorate that runs 25 operating theatres across three hospital
sites, with a budget of around £15m. The department has around 350 staff split
between theatre Nurses and Operating Department Practitioners. Consultant
Surgeons and Anaesthetist make up the other professional groups in this department.
The Incident
Never Events are a classification of serious medical errors for which national
safety recommendations and guidance are available, and should be in place for all
healthcare providers. These events have the potential to cause serious patient harm
or death, are wholly preventable, have occurred previously, and are at risk for
recurrence (NHS England, 2015). Two never event classifications relevant to Surgery
include wrong-site surgery and retained foreign objects (RFO). It’s estimated
surgeons operating on bilateral structures (i.e. kidneys) have a 25% lifetime risk of
operating on the wrong-site, while an average-size hospital reports retained objects
occurring at a rate of approximately 1 per year (Thiels et al., 2015).
This case focuses on a retained object never event which occurred in one
operating theatre, within a broader surgical directorate. A team of 12 theatre staff
consisting of 3 plastic surgeons, scrub nurses, operating department practitioners
(ODP), and surgical assistants, were performing a complex multi-site surgery. Their
patient, a middle-aged woman, was undergoing a mastectomy, and reconstruction
known as a DIEP flap where skin from the lower abdomen is transferred to the chest.
The patient’s procedure was part of ongoing treatment for breast cancer following
seven months of chemotherapy. This surgery involved three stages at different sites
on the patient’s body occurring simultaneously, each led by a consultant surgeon and
supported by scrub nurses and ODPs. Total procedure time is between 10 -12 hours.
“You’re looking at in excess of 150 swabs, in excess of 15 people
working together, different sub-specialities, protected operating
time” – Surgeon (cs211)
129
“There’s a grading system for the complexity of surgery and it is
the highest complexity which is what we call CM05, complex
major 5” - Mr K. Lead Consultant on call Plastic Surgeon (cs213)
8 and a half hours into the procedure one of the scrub nurses performed her
final check for the breast operative site and noted that the swab count was incorrect,
informing the lead surgeon immediately. By this time all three surgical incisions had
been closed.
“there’s a lot of people around this one individual and because
there’s such a vast area open, breast and abdomen, surgeons are
taking swabs. Although there’s a clear divide who’s doing the
abdomen and who’s doing the breast, “Is that my swab?” “It might
be your swab.” “Well, why have you taken my swab?” it all got
mixed up because I had already done the mastectomy part, the
removal of the breast, sort of about five hours before. You don’t
tell the surgeon a swab is missing when he’s closing skin. You
start doing your count as soon as they start closing the internal
muscle and whatever else. the first check was correct. The
second check you don’t know if it was correct because everyone
is fighting to finish the case, it’s late at night.” – CS204 Senior
Staff nurse, theatre practitioner
“We used between 200 to 300 swabs. So before we close the
wounds the senior nurse checks the swabs. After you close the
second layer they check it again. Unfortunately, on that day I was
informed that there was a swab missing on the final count.” - Mr K.
Lead Consultant on call Plastic Surgeon (CS213)
After checking extensively in the operating theatre, radiology was contacted
to screen the patient. The radiographer took 20 images of the operative fields using
mobile fluoroscopy. During this time only the lead surgeon and radiographer were
present in the theatre. Outside of the theatre, at least two nurses spoke-up to the
other surgeons that the radiographer was using the incorrect imaging modality,
fluoroscopy, rather than plan film x-ray. Surgeons were dismissive of these concerns.
No swab could be identified on the images. The lead surgeon decided it was too risky
to re-open the incisions to look for the missing swab.
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“it’s up to the surgeon’s discretion to weigh up the pros and cons
of reopening the patient again… If I open this wound again I’m
exposing the mesh and I’m causing devitalisation of tissues and
more dissection which would increase chance of infection. So I
took a decision I’m not opening this patient.” - Mr K. Lead
Consultant on call Plastic Surgeon (cs213)
A decision was made to finish the procedure, wake the patient up and transfer
to recovery area. X-rays were requested at a later stage once the patient was stable
enough to go to the radiology department. These later x-rays did not capture all of the
left chest and soft tissue and thus did not detect a retained swab. Two months
following discharge, the patient attended a clinic in obvious discomfort, the lead
surgeon requested an urgent ultra sound of the left breast, identifying a retained swab
and immediately organised theatre time for surgical removal.
“We declared that the swab was not there in the body, saw the
surroundings again, couldn’t find the swab, so the patient was
sent to recovery. Later on when the patient came to the clinic Mr.
K noticed the wound was a bit infected, so he asked for a CT
scan, ultrasound scan, and they found a swab on the very lateral
extremity of the wound, so then that swab was removed.” -
Consultant Associate Specialist Breast Surgery (CS214)
This incident was categorised as a never event and investigated by the Trust,
under the Department of Health ‘Never Events’ list and healthcare ‘never events’
policy framework.
RCA Investigation Findings
 Following the initial swab counts; a small swab was placed within the breast
operative field and subsequently retained at the time of skin closure by
surgical team.
 There was a lack of awareness (by radiography as well as the surgical team)
of the limitation of fluoroscopy in identifying radio-opaque swabs.
 The surgical and theatre team did not review the Trust policy on swab counts
to ensure that all necessary actions for this situation were completed. If they
had they would have discovered that plain film x-ray should be used if a
missing swab is not identified, as fluoroscopy may miss 10-15% of radio-
opaque swabs.
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 Several nurses identified that they had been informed in the past that
fluoroscopy was not the correct imaging modality for identifying swabs.
Given the length of the operative procedure (10-12 hours), fatigue may have
affected personal/team decision making at the time the incident occurred.
“My view of the root cause was there needed to be a better
standard operating procedure for managing swabs in complex
operations where there is a change in phase of the operation or
change in position.” - Consultant Surgeon, Clinical Director of
General Surgery & Gastroenterology (CS215)
Surgery: RCA Recommendations
The root cause analysis investigator’s recommendations for improvement are
listed in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 Surgery: RCA Recommendations
RCA Recommendations Status
Review of current policy "Accounting for
Swabs, Packs, Sharps and Instruments
During Sterile Procedures Policy version 1".
Completed
Modification of the Trust's IRMER
regulations associated with radiological
imaging requests associated with
management of swab discrepancy and
extent of clinical field to be imaged.
No Evidence
Review of current practice of surgical counts
as detailed in the above policy ensuring a
standardised process within theatres across
the organisation.
Completed
Senior Theatre Management Team and the
Professional Development Team of the
Theatre Directorate should work with the
Trust Simulation Centre to develop an
Emergency Checklist for use in the event of
swab discrepancy during surgical
procedures.
Completed
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RCA Recommendations Status
Senior Theatre Management Team, Breast
Surgery Team and Trust Simulation Centre
team to consider a programme of team
observation of complex surgical procedures
with formal debrief for process improvement.
Partially Completed (see below)
For the Theatre Directorate management
team to consider commissioning the Trust
Simulation Centre team to deliver formal
human factors/teamwork training for all
theatre teams across the organisation.
Partially Completed, some ‘in-
theatre’ training, but lack of
funding for full Simulation Centre
training
Investigating Team to provide an opportunity
for Patient to meet with the Investigating
Team to talk through the findings of the
investigations
Completed
The findings of the Trust’s investigation, and recommendations, are
summarized in Figure 5.2 ‘SUI at a Glance’, a printed poster used throughout the
Trust, to share learning from the SUI.
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Figure 5.2 Surgery SUI at a Glance Poster
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Maternity Case Full Description
Case: Maternity Department: Serious Untoward Incident (SUI) unexpected death of
a neonate
Date: April 2015
The Department
This case focuses on a serious untoward incident (SUI) that occurred on
hospital x’s maternity unit. The women & children’s services are spread across 70
beds at three hospital sites, and deliver about 10,500 babies each year with around
6,500 deliveries happening at hospital x. The infrastructure at hospital x is over 20
years old and was built to handle 3,500 deliveries per year.
Women & children’s services employs about 450 full-time equivalent
midwives, which is close to about 1000 total midwifery and gynaecology staff
(including support staff). There are approximately 25 obstetrical consultants at
hospital X, and another 12 split between the other two sites. Midwifery staff are
encouraged to work as part of a multidisciplinary team with consultant obstetricians.
A recent Care Quality Commission (CQC) report identified staff shortages as a major
concern at hospital x’s women & children’s services, with 22 vacancies identified as
of April 2016.
The population which hospital x’s maternity department services is considered
very high risk for pregnancies. This stems from fluctuations in terms of ethnicity,
poverty, illiteracy, and ability to speak English. Further, the department faces high
number of staff sick days and turnover. These factors combine with aging
infrastructure to create a high-risk environment.
“Because of all the immigration and its poverty. A lot of
nationalities and lack of education and the language. I mean
especially all the refugees, they do come up here first, and then
you’re getting a lot of European migrants also coming up here as
well. Plus compliance is poor here by the patients. And because
of immigration they bring their own problems. For instance, they
wouldn’t know their medical history, and they will just pop up on
the day or at 39 weeks, and just present here. I think it’s one of
the highest risk populations in Britain that we actually see in this
hospital… we have a huge capacity issue. We cannot cope with
the amount of deliveries on this suite. We have staff problems, a
lot of sick leave here, so basically most of the time we are
135
understaffed here and the workload is immense.” - CS313
Consultant Obstetrics, labour ward lead
As of April 2016 Women and Children’s risk management department was
internal, consisting mainly of midwifery staff. This risk management department,
which investigates all incidents in the service, is separate from the Trust’s risk
management department and governance structure. This internal risk management
service was established in response to the high number of patient safety incidents
and litigation claims associated with Maternity and Obstetrical care.
The Incident
Patient x, a 35-year-old woman with history of two previous pregnancies was
booked for delivery at Hospital x in April 2015.
0945 - 1029hrs: Patient X arrived four days ahead of scheduled delivery to
hospital X via ambulance, with ‘frank vaginal blood loss’ as evident by two blood
soaked incontinence pads and abdominal pain since 0700hrs.
The ward was quite busy, 12 midwives were on duty and there were 14 other
patients, one requiring emergency caesarean section, and five others who were
induced for labour. The midwife coordinator on duty assigned: midwife Z, a
community midwife, to care for patient X in the delivery suite.
“The community midwife should not have been put into that
situation. She was a community midwife and she wasn’t used to
looking after intrapartum haemorrhage.” – CS304 Assoc. Head of
Women’s Services for Nursing and Midwifery
“The co-ordinator should never have put that midwife in that
position” – CS305 Head of Midwifery, Governance and Quality
Clinical Dean
Doctor S, the consultant obstetrician on the ward, along with several
midwives, including Z, saw the patient immediately. Doctor S noted 200ml fresh blood
loss, pain becoming stronger and constant, and the patient was rolling on the bed in
pain.
The cardiotocography (CTG) reading showed a normal baseline foetal heart
rate of 130bpm. Doctor S checked patient x’s abdomen and found her uterus was firm
and not relaxing in-between contractions. Doctor S performed a vaginal examination
and noted an antepartum haemorrhage with a possible small abruption. Doctor
S’s plan of care included: Ensuring intravenous access, intravenous fluids, blood sent
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urgently for full blood count. Doctor S ordered half-hourly maternal observations,
continuous CTG recording, analgesia to be administered for pain, and critically,
Doctor S planned to review the patient in four hours’ time at 1400 hours.
“I quickly diagnosed the fact that she had an abruption. I mean
obstetricians will say that sometimes abruptions deliver quite
quickly, so my initial plan was to allow her to labour, have a
normal delivery … I mean I should have gone and reviewed my
decision in half an hour or something like that, rather than waiting
for them to come back to me.” – Doctor S (Consultant
Obstetrician)
There was difficulty continuously monitoring the foetal heart rate, because the
patient found the straps uncomfortable, kept pulling them off, and removed them
when she went to the bathroom.
“She (patient) was uncooperative and, you know, the monitoring
was an issue.” CS302 Doctor S (Consultant Obstetrician)
1029hrs: The CTG recording noted a drop in the baby’s heart rate but this
was not escalated to the obstetric team by midwife Z.
1050hrs: Midwife z asked doctor S what analgesia the patient could have, it
was agreed she would have an epidural so the anaesthetist was called. There was
no mention of the CTG by midwife Z to doctor S at this time.
1103hrs: From 1103 onwards, the CTG machine paper recording kept
showing a “?FHR” (foetal heart rate) symbol, an alert that should prompt the midwife
to ensure which heart rate is being detected and recorded: the mother or the baby.
1140hrs: Patient X was given a loading dose of anaesthetic via epidural
insertion. The epidural appeared to have worked well with the patient becoming
calmer and more settled. The CTG monitoring at this time was recording the mothers
heart rate of 120bpm with the “?FHR” alarm still evident.
1200Hrs: Midwife Z informed the midwife coordinator that she was
uncomfortable looking after the patient as she is a community midwife with limited
experience of epidurals. Midwife Z did not feel competent to carry out the epidural
check, so the midwife coordinator asked another more experienced colleague,
midwife E, to takeover.
1220hrs: Midwife E arrived to the patient’s room to receive handover and
noted patient’s condition had deteriorated, her blood pressure had dropped. Midwife
E immediately laid the bed flat and administered oxygen. Midwife E noticed the CTG
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was picking up the maternal pulse only, and contractions were occurring nine times
in ten minutes. Doctor S was called to review the patient.
“When I went in she (patient) was pale. I was looking at her
thinking “Oh my gosh, is she still alive?” because she’d just
deteriorated.” – Midwife E
1230hrs: Doctor S performed an emergency ultrasound scan, showing the
foetal heart rate was 56bpm, well below normal of around 130bpm at term.
1233hrs: a ‘crash call’ was made for an obstetric and neonatal emergency.
Patient X was taken directly to theatre for an emergency caesarean section.
1247hrs: a baby boy was still born. Resuscitation attempts were
unsuccessful. Concerns were raised with regards to the care that patient X had
received and her treatment and management plan were investigated in line with the
Trust's Serious Untoward Incident Framework.
RCA Investigation Findings
Foetal and maternal wellbeing were not effectively monitored resulting in
missed opportunities to recognize foetal compromise and expedite delivery in a timely
manner.
The patient’s care plan should have been altered at 1029 hours when a
prolonged drop in the baby’s heart rate was noticed. The consultant should have been
called immediately. “On the balance of probabilities” this would have resulted in a
delivery time of no later than 1103 hours, which is more than likely to have resulted
in a live birth.
Two root causes are evident for this incident:
1. The skills mismatch between patient and midwife, which resulted from the
midwife coordinator inappropriately assigning community midwife Z to look
after patient X. Midwife Z was used to looking after low risk mothers, not caring
for high risk mothers, or those with an epidural. Further, midwife Z did not
speak up about her limitations.
“the shift leader inappropriately allocated this patient to the
community midwife. it sort of started off because someone who
didn’t have the right skills to look after a high-risk lady was looking
after this lady.”- Doctor S (Consultant Obstetrician)
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“inappropriate allocation of a high risk patient to a midwife more
used to looking after low risk patients, so the symptoms and signs
weren’t in that particular person’s skill set.” – CS303 Consultant
Obstetrics, Clinical Director
“I felt that as an organisation we’d actually failed in our duty of
care to the community midwife who was allocated to look after the
woman” –CS310 Lead Midwife for Quality & Governance, Woman
& Children’s Services
2. The delay which resulted from doctor s’s plan to review the patient after four
hours. The investigation findings suggest a one-hour review would be been
medically appropriate given the diagnosis of ante partum haemorrhage.
“I should have gone and reviewed my decision in half an hour or
something like that rather than waiting for them to come back to
me.” Doctor S (Consultant Obstetrician)
“The consultant, by saying the patient to be seen in four hours,
not an hour, she sort of flawed the process really because we
should have been seeing the patient sooner, and according to
policy it should have been sooner than that.” – CS305 Head of
Midwifery, Governance and Quality Clinical Dean
“The key time for the management plan to have altered is at 1029
hours where there was a prolonged period of foetal bradycardia. A
consultant review should have occurred at this time” – Serious
Untoward Incident Report into the care of Ms X
Maternity: RCA Recommendations
The Trust’s Root Cause Analysis investigator’s recommendations for
improvement are listed in Table 5.2.
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Table 5.2 Maternity: RCA Recommendations
Recommendation Status
Recommendation 1: The Directorate will arrange simulation training
based upon this incident for all staff. This training will incorporate:
o Communication
o Recognition of the deteriorating patient o Escalation processes
o Staff allocation and consideration of skill mix
o Management plan of ante partum haemorrhage
o CTG interpretation
o Appropriate analgesia
a) Meet with the Centre to discuss the case and ascertain
whether they can set up a simulation training based on this incident.
b) Contact the TRUST Faculty of Education to further assist with
implementing of simulation training
c) Determine how long it will take to train all staff and then
implement the training programme
Partially
Completed,
lack of
funding for
Simulation
Centre.
Recommendation 2: The Directorate will complete a training needs
analysis for all staff involved in this incident and ensure any
shortfalls in training are addressed
a) Midwife trainers to complete a training needs analysis of all
midwives involved in this incident to ensure any shortfalls to
practice are met.
b) Clinical Director & Obstetric Anaesthetic lead to complete a
training needs analysis of all doctors involved in this incident to
ensure any shortfalls to practice are met.
Completed
Recommendation 3: The Directorate will issue a reminder to all staff
regarding the Trust standard for documentation. There will be an
audit of documentation to ensure adherence against the Trust
standards.
Completed
Recommendation 4: Ms X and her partner will be given the
opportunity to meet with the investigation team to discuss the report
and findings.
Completed
Recommendation 5: All staff involved in this investigation will meet
with the investigation team to go through the report and its findings
and recommendations.
Completed
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Recommendation Status
Recommendation 6: The investigation team will produce a SUI @
glance report to ensure that learning from this incident is cascaded
Trust wide.
Completed
The findings of the Trust’s investigation, and recommendations, are
summarized in Figure 5.3 SUI at a glance, a printed poster used throughout the Trust,
to share learning from the SUI.
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Figure 5.3 Maternity SUI at a Glance Poster
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Urology and Ward X Case Full Description
Case: Inpatient Ward X Urology: Patient discharged with elevated potassium levels.
Date: July 2015
The Department
This case focuses on a serious untoward incident that occurred on inpatient
ward X which cares for urology and general surgery patients. The patient population
spread among 26 beds, generally includes those recovering from thyroid, bladder,
kidney, and prostate surgery. These patients, in recovery, remain on the ward from a
couple of days to long stays of up to 20 – 30 days, depending on whether
complications arise post operatively. Patients on the ward generally require regular
testing for various markers, for example testing whether kidneys are functioning
properly and determining fitness for discharge.
Nurses on ward X begin their shift with a handover meeting led by the Senior
Sister to discuss all 26 patients.
“each day, as you saw today, we have a handover and have the
changes from the ward round… We have all the doctors’ rounds
and then we have changes from the ward round, so we let
everybody know what those changes are, and if they need to do
anything, and often (CS403 Senior Sister 7) will pass on any
information while we’re all together” - CS409 Band 5 Staff Nurse
“I’ve had a very good handover this morning which involves
whether a patient’s even been a little bit wobbly on their feet or
what the risks might be for every single patient, and I felt coming
out of handover even though I haven’t seen the person I felt able
to look after them, like to reduce any risks. I felt that the team who
had admitted them were already on it.” - CS412 Band 5 Staff
Nurse
Patients are divided into bays of eight patients, some are in side rooms.
Following handover from the previous shift team, nurses are designated to a bay of
patients and begin attending to them. Each shift is staffed by approximately five
nurses total, four band five nurses and a senior sister (CS403) who is in charge, as
well the ward matron (CS411) who oversees ward X and one other ward. Urology
consultants, and junior doctors as part of their educational rotation, perform rounds
on the ward, following up surgeries, assessing patients, ordering tests, and
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determining the fitness of their patients for discharge.
Ward X relies heavily on the Pathology department for the processing of
patient samples. Once the Urologist, or Junior Doctor, has ordered a particular test,
phlebotomists come to acquire the sample, it is then taken to the laboratory for
processing. Following the samples assessment by a Pathologist, the results are
electronically updated and available via computer terminal for Ward X staff. In the
event of abnormal results, pathology will phone the ward, it is the responsibility of the
Nursing staff to answer the phone, and share these results with the nurse caring for
the patient.
The Incident
An elderly male patient, Mr. X, a type II diabetic who recently underwent
surgery for resection of a bladder tumour, arrived at the hospital emergency
department on 14th July. Mr. X was admitted to Ward X, under care of the urology
team, for urosepsis and treated with antibiotics and IV fluids. Late in the evening of
July 17th a junior doctor (unknown) completed a blood request form and left it for the
phlebotomists.
First thing in the morning on July 18th, a phlebotomist took Mr X’s routine
bloods. Mr X was then seen during rounds by on call consultant, doctor X, and urology
registrar, doctor Y, who planned to discharge the patient that same day.
At 1210 hours on the 18th, Band 5 Staff Nurse (participant CS412) received
Mr. X’s blood results over the phone from the laboratory, his potassium level was
elevated (6.5 mmols, 3.5-5.5 mmols is normal), an increase from blood results on July
16th. This staff nurse claims she interrupted doctors X and Y to show them Mr. X’s
blood results, and they acknowledged it and said ‘OK’. During the investigation, doctor
X did not recall being informed of the blood results. Mr. X was discharged later that
day with an elevated potassium, no discharge checklist was completed by nursing.
The following day, 19th July, Mr. X arrived to the emergency department, this
time in cardiac arrest, staff were unable to resuscitate him, and he sadly died. The
clinical director for urology reviewed Mr. X’s medical records, and in his professional
opinion it was reasonable to assume that elevated potassium level contributed to his
death. As a result, Mr X’s care was investigated under the Trust’s Serious Untoward
Incident Framework.
Investigation Findings
 The root cause of this incident is the breakdown in communication between
clinical staff on the ward resulting in no action being taken regarding the
elevated potassium.
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“That’s what the investigation team said, that it boils down to ‘he
said, she said’” -Staff Nurse CS412
 Band 5 staff nurse (CS412) is newly qualified, having started her career, on
ward x, in May 2015. She had not taken abnormal results over the telephone
from pathology prior to this event. CS412 was unaware which of the results
she had received were abnormal (elevated potassium)
 Staff nurse CS412 recalls showing the blood results to doctor X, however
there is no entry in the medical record, by CS412, to confirm that these blood
results had been noted, or to which doctor they had been shown, nor any
management plan for treating high potassium.
 Doctor X does not recall being shown the results at any time during the ward
round. This conflicts with nurse CS412’s recollection of showing the results to
doctor X. Doctor X claims had he known of the results he would have delayed
the discharge and treated the high potassium.
 Doctor Y did recall being interrupted by Staff Nurses and informed of the
abnormal blood results.
 The presence of doctor X (on call consultant) may have altered the normal
escalation process which normally would involve the staff nurse informing the
nurse caring for Mr. X. Under the circumstances, the staff nurse (CS412)
informed the on call consultant, doctor X, and did not believe it was necessary
to also inform the nurse caring for Mr. X, as she had told the most senior
person on the ward.
“at lunch time I got a phone call from the lab, from microbiology
… I turned around to see if I could see where anybody was and
the consultant was there who the patient was under, so I spoke to
the consultant and there was another doctor there also in scrubs.
So I spoke to him and I said “Excuse me,” because they were
talking, “but is this your patient? and they say yes. So I said “I’ve
had a phone call through from microbiology and these are the
blood results that are listed on there.” Now at this stage I didn’t
realise… the potassium was really, really dangerously high. the
consultant looked at me and I said “It’s the patient in bed two.” I
gave his name because he looked at me as if to say “Pardon?” So
I repeated myself again and I was very explicit. I said “Are you
going to review the patient?” and he said “Yes.” …I don’t think I
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put doctor informed (in the notes) and I just signed it because in
my brain then I’d escalated it to the most senior person that I
knew. -Staff Nurse CS412
Urology and Ward X RCA Recommendations
The Root Cause Analysis investigator’s recommendations for improvement
are listed in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3 Urology and Ward X: RCA Recommendations
Recommendation Status
The Urology Directorate should produce a clear set of guidelines
for their junior doctors which offer rationale for the ordering of
blood tests. There should be a reminder to all junior doctors that
when blood tests are ordered it is to be documented within the
medical records to allow results to be followed up.
Not
Implemented
The Urology Directorate should ensure that there is a robust plan
in place to ensure that when blood tests are ordered there are
clear processes for review and action if required.
Not
Implemented
Ward X should develop a Standard Operating Process which
incorporates the escalation process for communication and
documentation when receiving abnormal blood results by
telephone.
Completed
Consideration should be given to extending the escalation process
to include the nurse in charge being informed of any abnormal
blood results received by the ward.
Completed
There should be an audit of both medical and nursing
documentation to ensure that it complies with the expected Trust
standard.
No Evidence
Ward X should complete a training analysis of all staff with
regards to knowledge and understanding of commonly requested
blood tests.
Completed
Ward X will ensure that the discharge process is clarified and
reinforced to all members of the team.
Completed
The staff involved will meet with the investigation team to go
through the report and findings.
Completed
The investigation team will produce a SUI @ a Glance report to
ensure that learning is cascaded Trust wide.
Completed
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The findings of the Trust’s investigation, and recommendations, are
summarized in Figure 5.4 SUI at a glance, a printed poster used throughout the Trust,
to share learning from the SUI.
Figure 5.4 Urology and Ward X SUI at a Glance Poster
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Conclusion
Chapter 5 introduced Section II: the empirical findings of this thesis. An
overview of the surgery, maternity, and urology & ward x cases was provided. For
each case, descriptions of the departments, incident, and investigation findings were
included to provide contextual information for the remainder of the findings and
discussion.
Evidence for implementation of RCA recommendations were found in each
case. The extent of implementation varied by case, with surgery and maternity having
completed most of their assigned recommendations, while only nursing
recommendations were completed on ward x.
In all cases poor communication was a contributing factor leading to the
serious safety incident. Where individuals did not feel that speaking up would be acted
upon, or that it was unsafe, they remained silent. As seen in surgery, when futility of
voice was witnessed, other staff elected to not speak-up. These conditions for silence
will be explored in greater detail in the coming empirical chapters 6, 7, and 8. Further,
the conditions which promoted voice, arising following these serious safety incidents
will also be described
In the next chapters’ 6 surgery, 7 maternity, and 8 urology & ward x, the
findings of each case are provided using coding reference tables taken from querying
the NVIVO database. These tables group together the responses of participants into
categories and related themes which examine the journey of each department
following the medical error, RCA investigation, and resulting affective and practical
responses of professionals.
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Chapter 6 – Findings for Case Study: Surgery
Department
149
Introduction
Chapter 6 provides the findings for the Surgery case. The overview for this
case, describing the department and full-details of the never event, were previously
outlined in Chapter 5: Surgery Case Full Description.
These findings use coding reference tables taken from the NVIVO database,
to group together the responses of participants into categories, and related themes.
These findings examine the journey of this department, from acquiescent silence and
futility of voice, to the encouragement of prosocial voice, leading to improved patient
safety. When three or more supporting quotes are shown, the primary quote will
appear in the main text, while secondary quotes follow directly in a table.
The presentation of this case’s findings is ordered into 6 sections. First,
responses of professionals and documentation analysis, which evidence the
conditions for silence, including hierarchical culture and fatigue, where futility of voice
was prevalent, leading to the never event, are described.
Second, an overview of key second victims and their affective experiences,
including anger, shame, and compassion, are described with an emphasis on the role
these experiences play in enacting positively valenced changes to practice, which
encourage voice.
Thirdly, responses of professionals or documentation analysis, which
evidence recommended and emergent practice changes, which created the
conditions for voice following the never event, including: setting expectations for
voice, closer adherence to policy, management engendering voice, and a
reinvigorated sentiment of care, are described.
Fourthly, evidence for expression of prosocial voice by professionals
(primarily nursing) is shown.
Fifth, the case findings related to voice and silence are summarised in table
6.12 Surgery Voice and Silence Summary, which, at-a-glance, shows the journey of
this surgical team from a climate of silence to a climate where voice is encouraged
when patient safety is at risk.
Finally, a summary of follow-up and validation meetings with the department
are presented, offering evidence of a sustained voice climate which resulted in the
prevention of further never events.
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1 Conditions for Silence
While several causes were identified as contributing to the never event, a lack
of awareness of the limitations of fluoroscopy to identify radio-opaque swabs among
them, the emphasis here is on the hierarchical barriers to communication between
surgical nurses and surgeons.
Table 6.1 Conditions for Silence
Surgery Case
Conditions for Silence Doctor (n=1) Nurse (n=3) Document (n=1)
Hierarchica l Culture 2 2 1
Fatigue 3 1
Futi l i ty of Voice 3 1
Coding References
There were three barriers to communication as shown in Table 6.1 Conditions
for Silence.
Hierarchical Culture
The first was team hierarchy, where nurses, traditionally subordinate to
surgeons, were silenced because they did not feel safe to speak-up, even where they
knew the proper x-ray guidelines. The team was not psychologically safe enough.
This led them to question their knowledge (of fluoroscopy) and diminished their
confidence that speaking-up would be acted upon.
“Nurses questioned their lack of ability to raise concerns. There
were nurses who recalled being told about use of fluoroscopy, but
felt that they didn’t have the confidence in the environment they
were working in, to raise that as a possibility, because they
weren’t sure about it. So there was a lack of self-belief in their
knowledge, and also a lack of assurance that actually if they
raised that concern it would be taken on board as a possible
issue.” - CS201 Consultant Anaesthetist, Lead Investigator
“Due to team hierarchy they felt unable to raise their concerns to
the surgeons” – Serious Untoward Incident Report of Mrs X
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Fatigue
Second, fatigue, from the 10-hour procedure, was reported to have influenced
both nurses, with regards to assertiveness, and surgeons with regards to receptivity.
“in light of the length of the operative procedure, possible fatigue
within team members may have affected personal/team decision-
making at the time the incident occurred” – Serious Untoward
Incident Report of Mrs X
Table 6.2 Fatigue: Secondary Quotes
Secondary Quotes
“it was a long procedure, a lengthy process, and they were
tired… the surgeon was too tired at closing. They (nurses)
probably weren’t assertive enough to challenge the surgeon at
the time.” -CS205 Theatre Matron
“It was a lengthy procedure and the surgeon could have been
tired at closing. He was too tired.” CS205 Theatre Matron
Futility of Voice
Thirdly, Surgeons ignored concerns that were brought forward by more senior
nurses, CS202 and CS204, who had the confidence to speak-up, leading to futility of
voice. Nurse 204 was angry, assigning blame to one of the surgeons.
“I insisted that we were using the wrong x-ray device, but I was
told “No, no, it’s alright,” and I said “No, it’s not! This is not what
you do when you lose a swab. You need a proper x-ray with a
plate.” – Scrub Nurse (204)
Table 6.3 Futility of Voice: Secondary Quotes
Secondary Quote
“You know, I’m sure we should be doing plain x-ray. I don’t
know why they’ve brought that,” and the surgeon said “No, it’s
alright. It’s alright, it’ll be fine. We’ll see it.” and you just think
“Oh,” and again that was an opportunity for me to have said to
somebody “Let’s get the policy up,” and then we could try and
follow it. A missed opportunity.” - Scrub Nurse (202)
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“It’s like the consultant doctor has spoken, therefore they must
be right” CS208 General Manger for Theatres
2 Second Victims and Affective Experiences
In addition to nurse 204, several other team members had negative affective
experiences. These are summarized (with the addition of compassion, which is
discussed more fully in section 3) in table 6.4 affective response coding references.
Table 6.4 Affective Response Coding References
Surgery Case
Affective Response Doctor (n=5) Assistant (n=2) Nurse (n=4) Manager (n=1)
Compassion 9 3 9 1
Anger 7 3 4 1
Shame 7 3
Coding Reference
Anger
The main second victim is the lead surgeon, CS213 Mr. K, who was extremely
upset over the case, being deeply affectively impacted. Mr. K, and a more junior
surgeon CS211, both internalized the event as a failure, displayed anger by blaming
themselves, and made comparison to the usually high quality of care they provide.
For team leader Mr. K, who completed hundreds of procedures of similar nature over
his lengthy career, this was a first.
“in the last seven and a half years we’ve done 350 microvascular
tissue transfer… of these 350 we had this one retained swab … It
was very, very difficult. This was the first time in my life. I’m now
21 years in this business as a plastic surgeon and since I started
my career I’ve been always involved in complex procedures –
never happened to me. But it happened! And I had to take this
decision on my discretion because everyone was looking up to me
because I’m the most senior member of the team here.” - Mr K.
Lead Surgeon (CS213)
“I was very upset when the SUI happened obviously because you
feel like you’ve let yourself down, and the surgical team, and the
patient most importantly”- CS211 Locum Consultant, Senior
Microvascular Fellow
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Mr. K, explained that he received no emotional support after the event and he
was busy supporting the more junior surgeons involved who were upset.
“No one supported me… I was supporting junior doctors, they
were upset” – CS213 Mr. K, Lead Surgeon
Shame
There was a sense of shame among members of the surgical team involved
in the never event. Surgeons CS211, CS213 (quote on previous page), and
Radiologist CS212, who contrasted the never event with an ideal for their team, and
professions. Junior Surgeon CS211 felt that he, and his team, through the occurrence
of a never event, had failed to live up to the high standards, and compassion for
patients they had previously demonstrated. This surgical team, who routinely
performed complex operations, was known for going above and beyond for patients.
Mr. K who completed hundreds of similar procedures in the past, had to make the
difficult decision to close-up the patient, with swab still missing, took this event hardest
of all.
“We were always very focused on achieving the best results for
our patients and that’s why we were all very disappointed or upset
by this incident. I’ve worked in over 12 different units and this is
the only unit where I’ve genuinely felt that everybody without
exception went above and beyond for our patients…Mr K’s team
and himself as a surgeon by far is the best surgeon that I’ve ever
worked with and for this to happen in our team was very
disappointing and very surprising… it was such a bitter pill to
swallow that this had happened. If it had happened elsewhere I
wouldn’t be necessarily as disappointed or as surprised, but the
fact that it happened here was a very personal, negative
experience” –CS211 Locum Consultant, Senior Microvascular
Fellow
“Once we found out that it was in there, I got upset and I felt, you
know, I wish it had never happened. So I was very upset in my
head it won’t fade because I’ve had a bad experience. I will
remember that for ages” -CS212 Consultant Radiologist
One scrub nurse, CS210, experienced shame. This was due to the nursing
policy ‘Accounting for Swabs, Packs, Sharps and Instruments During Sterile
154
Procedures Policy’ not being followed during the procedure, which would have
pointed to x-ray as the correct imaging modality.
“to this day I’m still devastated by it really and I should think we all
are because in my nursing career of 38 years there’s very few
things happen really and when it does it sticks in your mind … I
didn’t sleep very well when this happened and obviously it’s not a
nice thing. I thought I was doing things properly before, maybe I
wasn’t doing things properly 100 percent, which is why I feel now I
need to refer to the policy to make sure every step of that policy is
followed” -CS210 Sister 6
3 Conditions for Voice
A summary of responses which evidence practice changes, both
recommended as part of the RCA investigation, and emergently, by professionals,
are shown in table 6.5 Conditions for Voice.
The conditions for voice, which enables lower-hierarchically positioned
professionals to speak-up, are discussed below. First, and most strongly, an
emergent practice change by Mr. K, a second victim of the never event, to set
expectations for voice among professionals from the top-down. Second,
recommended practice changes by nurses to follow standard operating procedures.
Third, emergent support from nurse management to engender voice among staff.
Fourthly, an emergent reinvigorated sentiment of care among all professional groups,
which had previously been rendered dormant by a hierarchical culture, resulted from
a build-up of expressions of compassion towards patients.
Table 6.5 Conditions for Voice
Surgery Case
Conditions for Voice Doctor (n=5) Assistant (n=2) Nurse (n=6) Documents (n=2)
Setti ng expectati ons for voice 20 2 1
Clos er a dherence to pol icy 2 1 14 2
Management engendering voice among staff 1 5
Reinvigora ted senti ment of ca re 9 3 9
Coding References
Setting Expectations for Voice
While Mr. K, lead surgeon, played a key role in setting expectations for voice
among team members, this change happened gradually, seeming to occur over two
phases. The first phase, immediately following the never event, saw a sudden knee-
jerk reaction by Surgeons CS211 and CS213 to take over the swab-counting process
going forward in the operating theatre. This change resulted in overlapping
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professional boundaries, where surgeons involved themselves in the swab counting
process (a nursing duty). This change represents, initially, a lack of trust in
colleagues, by no longer relying on them, and was thought to have possible negative
consequences (see CS205 quote below).
“I have received information that it (surgeons taking over swab
counting) could be harmful” CS205 Theatre Matron at Follow-up
Meeting
This initially resulted in some surgeons no longer accepting the division of
responsibilities between operative field and scrub nurses’ table, specifically dictating
to nurses what instruments they want on the tray, and how many swabs should be
present, rather than having the whole tray set-up. Prior to the event it had been
ingrained in practice that nurses were responsible for trolleys and swabs, while
surgeons were responsible for the surgical field.
“I would say that previously the swab counting part was always
seen as part of the scrub nurses’ duty … In a way, me personally
at least, I’ve taken over that part… I no longer accept this division
between operative field and scrub nurses’ table and I no longer
accept this division of responsibilities – that you’re responsible
about the surgical field and that the scrub nurse is responsible
about the trolleys and swabs, which was prior to this event quite
ingrained really” -CS211 Locum Consultant, Senior Microvascular
Fellow
Table 6.6 Setting Expectations for Voice Part I: Secondary Quotes
Secondary Quotes
“more vigilant with the swabs, more vigilant with making sure
that others are attentive for the swabs … before I was not
looking because I know who’s covering my back is taking care
of things. Now, I’m putting myself in every step of the surgery.
That’s why I say more vigilant. It shouldn’t be like this. Maybe
this is just because I don’t want this to happen to me again. I
stopped relying 100% on the team members.” - Mr K, Lead
Consultant on call Plastic Surgeon (cs213)
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Secondary Quotes
“A knee jerk reaction of one junior surgeon (CS211) to take over
the swab counting process of nurses… this has impacted him at
an early stage of his career, he is very sensitive to swab
counting now, will it stay with him? I don’t know, we are working
in a highly stressful environment… now there is a level of trust.”
- Mr K, Lead Consultant on call Plastic Surgeon (cs213) at
follow-up meeting
This form of the emergent change, where surgeons were individually “vigilant”
(CS213), was short lived for CS211 and CS213, eventually evolving into the second
phase, where Mr. K established expectations for voice among multi-disciplinary team
members. Mr. K, was the driving force in creating a more inclusive environment for
inter-professional communication.
“I’ve added more steps to ensure that we are definitely doing
better. I mean mind-wise I’m more vigilant. I’m becoming more
attentive... Vigilant in terms of making sure of the communication
between the team members, your swabs good? your instruments
are good? all together, take a wider angle, rather than a narrow
angle – I’m not just looking at my wound or operative field and just
minding my business, no we used to be like this, but not anymore,
now we take a more comprehensive approach… a change in
mind-set” -Mr K. CS213 Lead Surgeon
While many second victims don’t ‘survive’ the tragedy, resulting in them
leaving the organisation or profession altogether, Mr. K’s performance as a leader
thrived following the affectively charged never event. Having been angry, and feeling
shame for his involvement in the never event, Mr. K, first, as discussed above, took
part in the short-lived change taking over swab counting duties. After having reflected
on the experience, Mr. K, broadened his perspective on the situation, taking a step
back during complex multi-site surgeries (where multiple parts of patients’ bodies are
operated on), and encouraging inclusive communication between surgical site teams
consisting of multiple-professions.
While vigilance can lead to negative outcomes, as was the case here initially,
it appears to have evolved into setting expectations for the type of communication
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required during surgery, which helped set the conditions voice. By setting
expectations for open-communication during procedures, Mr. K, as team leader, is
creating opportunities for voice from all team members, across professions.
“It’s not about being a good surgeon, but being a better surgeon
who has a more comprehensive approach to the whole service…
everything is discussed openly, it’s everyone’s responsibility, no
one is not important enough to be listened too ever” -– Mr. K
CS213 Consultant on call Plastic Surgeon
“I think it has made us more aware from this first-hand experience,
being more vigilant, being more attentive that this can happen
despite the guidelines. So we always need to be aware and we all
need to retrain ourselves …I think people have been more aware,
more influenced by this incident… After this incident, I’m
becoming more vigilant, so I’m more alert, I’m more conscious
about even if you have the system you still can have a problem,
which I didn’t have first-hand experience with before” -Mr K.
CS213 Lead Surgeon
Further evidence by CS214, breast surgeon, speaks to the surgical
perspective of being more inclusive, while, operating department practitioner CS209
(and many of the nursing quotes in the following section on expressions of voice
demonstrate) shows the positive effect this surgeon-led emergent practice change,
has on speaking-up by lower-hierarchically positioned professionals.
“The nurses and doctors are more vigilant now for the swabs…
and a shout is given to the nurses that “I’ve left a swab inside.”
Whether that is for five seconds, but they shout it and it is written
on the board that a swab is inside the body and then they rub it off
when it is retrieved… there’s more sensitivity I would say. There’s
more consciousness now” - CS214 Consultant Associate
Specialist Breast Surgery
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Table 6.7 Setting Expectations for Voice Part II: Secondary Quotes
Secondary Quotes
“You’re part of that environment you have a contribution to that.
So keeping an eye on the environment… If the nurses are
counting, I look towards them, stop for a while and don’t disturb
them … So I give them time and space to fulfil their duties… if
you ask for ‘give me forceps’ and if she’s (nurse) doing
something else she’ll stop that and give you the instrument. So
this creates problems sometimes. If she’s in the middle of
counting, she’ll interrupt that, refocus, go back and so human
errors are more. So be aware of what she’s doing at that time
and don’t interrupt.” – CS214 Consultant Associate Specialist
Breast Surgery
“we all count together. We never used to count together. You
would know where yours were. I won’t do a count unless
someone else is going to do the count as well. If I stop and do
mine I’ll make sure that they stop and do theirs… it just makes
you more aware that everybody in the team has got to be
responsible for it and everyone’s got to be stopping, and
thinking at the same time … know you’ve got to do it as a
whole.” CS209, Operating Department Practitioner
Closer Adherence to Policy
In line with RCA recommendations to review policy ‘Accounting for Swabs,
Packs, Sharps and Instruments During Sterile Procedures’ and ensure a
standardized process within theatres across the organisation, nurses were found to
reference, and more closely adhere to the standard operating procedure (See Figure
6.1) found in this policy, in the event of a swab/instrument count discrepancy. This
recommended practice change saw nurses’ expressing voice, through a more
assertive communication style when dealing with surgeons. In describing assertive
voice behaviour, nurses mentioned how they had followed the SOP, often nurses
would physically reference the policy, pulling it off the wall, or accessing via computer
terminal, and showing it to other team members.
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“One of the recommendations was you have a swab missing and
you’re going through the process. “Actually bring the policy up,”
and this is why I said I went into that theatre, visited and said
“Look, let me just bring the policy up. Let’s just scan it. Let’s read it
through and let’s see,” ... And that’s what we didn’t do on the
never event day.” – CS202 Sister
Table 6.8 Closer Adherence to Policy: Secondary Quotes
Secondary Quotes
“Yeah, the policy gets pulled up each time now. There’s a
printout or it’s up on the computer screen and one person goes
through that point by point now.” -CS209 Operating Department
Practitioner
“A specific change to my practice is look at policies more. If
there’s an issue, to look at the policy and make sure we follow it
and that we’re guided by that, whereas before perhaps I
wouldn’t have done that…… None of us looked at the policy.
We followed most of the policy, but not quite all, so it’s good to
look at it and go through it. I stopped thinking I knew what I
was doing and I was confident in everything I did. I made sure I
read the hospital policy. I made sure I was following policy and
procedure” –CS210 Sister 6
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Figure 6.1 Surgery Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)
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Management Engendering Voice Among Staff
As part of emergent practice changes following the never event, nursing
leaders in response to Mr. K’s call for more inclusive communication, responded from
the bottom-up. Senior nurses CS207 and CS205 directly support their staff to be more
assertive with surgeons when they feel safety is at risk. Examining the changes by
surgeons and nurses collectively an interplay is observable. Nurses increased their
level of assertiveness with surgeons, while surgeons appear to welcome increased
communications during complex multi-site surgery, as a mechanism to prevent further
never events.
“We’re trying to empower the staff to challenge the surgeons and
if they cannot do that ring the on-call manager. Don’t be frightened
to do that or ring your general manager or your matron. Don’t be
frightened to challenge if you’re not sure. The staff are, yeah.” -
CS205, Theatre Matron
“if there was an issue and they haven’t got the confidence to raise
it, like a more junior team member in a team if something like that
happened again, I know that they would be quite happy to come
to me if they hadn’t got the necessary experience or confidence to
raise it and quite often they do… We have had it a couple of times
where we’ve lost a swab and they’ll (nurses) come and report to
you straightaway” -CS207 Senior Sister 7
Reinvigorated Sentiment of Care
The final condition for voice was an emergent reinvigoration of professionals’
sentiment of care towards patients. This sentiment of care developed from
professionals’ first-hand involvement in the never event and its affective impact upon
them. While the event elicited negative affect, in the form of shame and anger
described above, compassion towards patients was also expressed. Professionals
experienced a sense of compassion for the patient which reinvigorated their focus on
caring. Surgeons and Nurses were moved by the patient’s suffering and talked about
wanting to prevent further harm from happening to their patients, while seeming to
maintain sufficient detachment to avoid being overwhelmed with distress. This
affective experience, compassion, led to a common moral grounding among team
members, helping to moderate the hierarchical challenge between professions by
placing emphasis on caring for the patient.
Further, negative affect, in the form of anger, centred around the patient,
162
where both surgeons and nurses blamed themselves (or in the case of Nurse CS204,
blamed a surgeon) for having harmed the patient, also contributed to a renewed
sentiment of care. The below quotes emphasises the sense of compassion
professionals on this team exhibit, putting the patient at the centre of everything they
do.
“We’re not here to harm patients, we’re here to help patients.
That patient was helped but harmed as well and that’s not good,
that’s not what I’m here for… We’re nurses, we’re here to look
after patients and to make sure they’re safe and that’s just my job,
that’s everybody’s job in this department, is to make sure the
patient’s safe.” -CS210 Sister 6
Table 6.9 Reinvigorated Sentiment of Care: Secondary Quotes
Secondary Quotes
“There was a roundtable after the incident where it was
discussed, how we can learn from this event, the patient was
the centre of everything discussed” -CS205 Theatre Matron
“in my clinical practice I’m probably more focused on patients’
experiences than I used to be… it was probably that
conversation with the patient and the relative to actually say I’ve
got an obligation to do that as a professional which I may not
have appreciated beforehand.” -CS201 Consultant
Anaesthetist, Lead Investigator
“Staff had to hear from the patient side how inconvenient it was.
They lost time at work, they lost time coming into hospital and
how stressful it was on them. I think with that face to face with
that patient you try and tell staff you wouldn’t want to be in that
position … you feel like you’re putting that patient in danger and
we’re here to make sure it’s alright. -CS205 Theatre Matron
“So I think another time, another scenario that’s somewhat
similar, or another potential crisis scenario, certainly for a
patient, I’m going to stick to my guns and what I wouldn’t let is
the patient come off the table” - CS202 Sister 6
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Secondary Quotes
“You think more about the impact on patients, about things that
teams can become quite blasé about, something that you do a
hundred times a day, day in, day out. Swab counts, yeah, we
do it every day, but you think well you need to take these things
seriously because when you don’t and you become
lackadaisical or blasé about something that’s when mistakes
happen, the outcome for that patient could be quite detrimental
like that particular lady” -CS207 Senior Sister 7
“You kind of put yourself in the patient’s position, don’t you, and
it’s sort of bloody hell, if that had happened to your mother or
whoever else how would you feel? So yeah, there is emotion
attached to it, but then also it’s kind of “Right, the buck sits with
me”. -CS208 General Manager for Theatres
“We have a duty of care to our patients, so in terms of that I was
a bit concerned that the patient had to suffer” -CS214
Consultant Associate Specialist Breast Surgery
“you just want to make sure it doesn’t happen to anybody else
really. You know, you’re really mindful of the patient and the
patient could be a relative of you somewhere else and have this
happen, so you want to ensure that you’re doing what’s best for
them really”. -CS209 Operating Department Practitioner
4 Expressions of Prosocial Voice
Following the never event, and the emergence of conditions identified above,
there is evidence for increased assertiveness by team members to escalate concerns
and challenge hierarchy when they feel safety is at risk. A summary of prosocial voice
by professional group, primarily exhibited by nursing, are found in table 6.10
expressions of prosocial voice.
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Table 6.10 Expressions of Prosocial Voice
Surgery Case
Expressions of Prosocial Voice Doctor (n=1) Assistant (n=2) Nurse (n=4)
Pros ocia l Voice 2 8 17
Coding References
There has developed a shared sense among team members that speaking up
is supported, and even expected. The conditions described previously are moderating
factors, suppressing (in part) the hierarchical challenge between nurses and doctors.
As shown in the quotes below, nurses and healthcare assistants, demonstrated voice
through increased assertiveness to escalate and challenge hierarchy, specifically
when dealing with Surgeons, when patient safety might be at risk. Nurses, followed
by surgical assistants, were found to exhibit the most expressions of voice post-never
event, given the recommended (SOP) and emergent (i.e. management engendering
voice, reinvigorated sentiment of care) changes in place and top-down receptivity by
surgical team leader, Mr. K.
“I am more assertive in theatre and make sure that policies are
followed. If I’m unhappy with the surgeons rushing I’ll tell them.
I’ll say “You’ll have to wait. You will have to wait. I’m doing a
swab count,” or “You’ll have to wait, I’ve only got one pair of
hands. You’re both asking for things together,” which is always
the case. I’m not afraid to speak up now. So I’m more assertive
for safety reasons.” – Sister 6 CS210
Table 6.11 Expressions of Prosocial Voice: Secondary Quotes
Secondary Quotes
“I feel that I wasn’t listened to in the incident, so I think another
time, another scenario that’s somewhat similar or another
potential crisis scenario certainly for a patient I’m going to stick
to my guns and what I wouldn’t let is the patient come off the
table. That’s the bit I would do and even if half of the hospital
management has to be outside theatre doors, do you know
what I mean, I just would be sort of making such a fuss that
they’d have to investigate and look inside for that swab sort of
thing” - Sister 6 CS202
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Secondary Quotes
“Everybody is more vigilant of what they’re expecting to find and
if there’s an incident people will speak up now. In theatre we
tell them at briefings “If there’s anything troubling you to speak
up.” if there’s a swab or an instrument not accounted for.” –
Healthcare assistant in Theatre CS206
“I think a lot of staff would be more forceful in their
communication I believe. I’m sure the nurse that was involved
in that situation would definitely try and escalate that situation
further at the time before the wound was closed” – Senior Sister
7 CS207
“The surgeons who are adamant saying “No, I’m not going to.
No, it’s fine. It’s fine, it’s not in the patient. I heard it fall on the
floor.” You probably think “Well, I haven’t got the confidence or
the experience to sort of stand up and challenge it,” whereas
now I would challenge anybody for a situation like that
regardless of who they were.” – Senior Sister 7 CS207
“if there was an issue and they haven’t got the confidence to
raise it, like a more junior team member, I know that they would
be quite happy to come to me if they hadn’t got the necessary
experience or confidence to raise it and quite often they do. If
they have a problem in theatre, people will come and escalate
instantly because they know we’ll sort it out.” – Senior Sister 7
CS207
“I have on two occasions questioned the surgeon and told them
“I believe there’s a swab still inside... our breast surgeons
definitely are very good at listening to us now. One consultant
will actually stop his team when we say we’ve got one missing.
He’ll go “Right, everybody stop. Let’s all do a count and let’s
recheck the cavities,” and I think this has spurred that. You
know you’ll be heard and you’ll be listened to because of it.” -
Operating Department Practitioner CS209
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Secondary Quotes
“I am more assertive in theatre and make sure that policies are
followed. If I’m unhappy with the surgeons rushing I’ll tell them.
I’ll say “You’ll have to wait. You will have to wait. I’m doing a
swab count,” or “You’ll have to wait, I’ve only got one pair of
hands. You’re both asking for things together,” which is always
the case. I’m not afraid to speak up now. So I’m a little bit more
assertive perhaps because of it and that’s for a safety reason.”
– Sister 6 CS210
“I’m quite happy to say I’m not happy with this situation. It feels
unsafe” - Sister 6 CS202
“it’s something that they’re working on in theatres, trying to get
the nurses to feel confident about questioning surgeons and
question what’s being done if they’re not happy.” – Consultant
Radiologist CS212
5 Voice and Silence Summary
Table 6.12 Surgery Voice and Silence Summary, provides an overview of this
team’s journey which started with climate of silence, where junior nurses lacked
confidence their concerns would be acted upon due to a hierarchical culture, and
futility of voice, where more senior nurses were ignored when they did speak up,
leading to further silence. This absence of voice contributed to the occurrence of a
never event, which acted as a catalyst for many affective and practical changes,
leading to a voice climate, where enactment of prosocial voice was found, and patient
safety improved.
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Table 6.12 Surgery Voice and Silence Summary
C
lim
ate
Scenario Motive From Message Direction Target Outcome
SILEN
C
E
During Never
Event in
Surgical
Theatre
-Hierarchical
Culture
To
improve
safety
Nurses “they didn’t have the
confidence in the environment
to raise that as a possibility …
there was a lack of assurance
that if they raised a concern it
would be taken on board” –
CS201 Consultant
Anaesthetist, Lead
Investigator
Upward Surgeon Silence
To
improve
safety
“several
team
members”
“Due to team hierarchy they
felt unable to raise their
concerns to the surgeons” –
Investigative Report
Upward Surgeon Silence
During Never
Event in
Surgical
Theatre
To
improve
safety
Sister 6 202
25 years’
experience
“You know, I’m sure we
should be doing plain (XRAY).
I don’t know why they’ve
brought that,” and the surgeon
said “No, it’s alright. It’s
alright, it’ll be fine. We’ll see
it.”
Upward Surgeon Futility of Voice
During Never
Event in
Surgical
Theatre
To
improve
safety
Senior Staff
Nurse 204
“many
years”
experience
“I insisted that we were using
the wrong x-ray device, but I
was told “No, no, it’s alright,”
and I said “No, it’s not!”
Upward Surgeon Futility of Voice
NEVER EVENT
VO
IC
E
Post Never
Event in
Surgical
Theatre
To
improve
safety
Operating
Department
Practitioner
209
“I believe there’s a swab still
inside.”
Upward Surgeon Efficacy of
Voice, error
correction
“And fair play,
they have
looked back in
and found the
swab.”
Post Never
Event in
Surgical
Theatre
To
Improve
Safety
Sister 6 202
25 years
experience
“the other week we had a
retained potential problem … I
went to that theatre and said
to them “I hear you’ve done x-
ray,” and they said yes, they
had. I said “You did do a
plate, didn’t you? It was a
plate x-ray and wasn’t a C-
arm?”
Upward Theatre
Team led
by
Surgeon
Efficacy of
Voice, error
correction
“they
confirmed that
they knew that
they had to do
that”
Post Never
Event in
Surgical
Theatre
To
Improve
Safety
Surgeon
213
21 years
experience
“a couple of months later, … I
was operating in X hospital…
… and they lost a small swab,
they couldn’t find it and
immediately I went through
the guidelines and I said “You
need to get an x-ray.”
Lateral Theatre
Team led
by
Surgeon
Efficacy of
Voice, error
correction
“they
immediately
located it, took
it out”
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6 Follow-up with Surgery Department
There is evidence to suggest recommended and emergent changes have
spread throughout the organisation and been sustained through to current day
(interviews May 2016, follow-up May 2017). The outcome of this surgical team’s
improved conditions for voice is at least two similar never events were prevented,
when individual members from this team were involved in surgical procedures at other
theatres/hospitals in the trust.
“a couple of months later I was operating at another hospital and
next door they were doing a video-assisted thoracoscopic surgery
and they lost a small swab. … Immediately I went through the
guidelines and I said “You need to get an x-ray.” And you
know what? After about 45 minutes trying to find this, they
immediately located it and took it out” – Mr. K CS213
Consultant on call Plastic Surgeon
Table 6.13 Preventing further Never Events: Secondary Quotes
Secondary Quotes
“I know I have something to contribute because they mentioned
that they can’t find it, they have been struggling for 45 minutes
and I was actually operating with my colleague … and I just de-
scrubbed, went to the other theatre, and then started managing
it.” -– Mr. K CS213 Consultant on call Plastic Surgeon
“The surgeon who was involved was at X Hospital probably
about two or three months after the incident and the closure of
the investigation, and he was in the operating theatre suite
when they had a retained swab, and actually advised the team
there and then that we had lost a swab, that they should not use
fluoroscopy.” – CS201 Consultant Anaesthetist
“I’m now a little bit more vigilant to what are other problems that
are happening anywhere else, so that it could be avoided in my
speciality. There was a group meeting to go and discuss
challenges in other specialities and I was very happy to attend
this. I’m very happy to share this with other departments and to
be aware.” Mr. K CS213 Consultant on call Plastic Surgeon
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Further, there is evidence by CS214, which suggests knowledge of this never
event has spread to other trusts in the NHS, this is a result of CS213, Mr. K, going to
speak with groups of other surgeons about this event. Mr. K, as part of his ‘thriving’,
performing above expected levels post event, seems dedicated to spreading
knowledge from this never event so that other healthcare teams can learn from this
‘painful journey’.
These findings are not going to just affect the whole team, this
team is determined for this not to happen again to then, but the
important message is will it happen to someone else? We went
through the journey, the painful journey, will this happen to
another team?” The whole idea is the distribution of this
experience to other teams, I had something to do today but I
cancelled it because I felt this (meeting) was very important… I go
speak to rounds, and share this experience as much as possible” -
Mr. K CS213 Consultant on call Plastic Surgeon
“We’ve learnt the lesson that despite all the risk reducing
management and other things, things can go wrong. The same
lesson about radiology is learnt by other Trusts as well. So I think
it had a major impact on that practice. When I went to the
conference a couple of years ago, somebody else from a London
site knew about this incident” – CS214 Consultant Associate
Specialist Breast Surgery
Surgery Case Conclusion
These findings demonstrate the powerful impact the occurrence of a never
event can have on healthcare professionals, both negatively, in terms of generating
feels of anger and shame, but also positively, with regards to acting as a catalyst for
important professional changes which create the conditions for voice, improving
patient safety.
Leading up to the never event, the surgical team was characterized by a
strong hierarchical culture which silenced employees and led to futility of voice during
a complex multi-site surgery, resulting in the harming of a patient. This incident, and
the negative affective experiences it generated, had a major influence on the practice
of professionals, specifically, lead surgeon, Mr. K, who went on to enacted positively
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valenced change in the form of establishing expectations for voice going forward.
This top-down emergent change helped make the team safer for communication,
which was further strengthened by the engendering of voice from the bottom-up by
nursing managers, and closer adherence to policy, which acted as a reference for
nurses enacting voice. Further nurturing the conditions for voice, the reinvigorated
sentiment of care by team members helped moderate the hierarchical culture through
establishing a common moral grounding, placing emphasis on caring for the patient.
At follow-up with the team, evidence was found for continuing expressions of
voice, and indication that two further never events had been prevented due to the
presence of lead surgeon, Mr. K, who has demonstrably thrived following the ‘painful
journey’ he and his team went through.
The response of these professionals to this tragic event, with specific mention
to Mr. K, has been exemplary, and knowledge transfer of this case to practicing
surgical and other healthcare teams is warranted.
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Chapter 7 – Findings for Case Study: Maternity
Department
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Introduction
Chapter 7 provides the findings for the Maternity case. The overview for this
case, describing the department and full-details of the incident, were previously
outlined in Chapter 5: Maternity Case Full Description.
These findings use coding reference tables taken from the NVIVO database,
to group together the responses of participants into categories, and related themes.
This highlights the journey of the department from a blame culture and defensive
silence, to one which encourages voice, improving patient safety. When three or more
supporting quotes are shown, the primary quote will appear in the main text, while
secondary quotes follow directly in a table.
The presentation of this case’s findings is ordered into 6 sections. First,
responses of professionals which evidence the conditions for silence are described.
This includes how punitive investigations and a blame culture resulted in defensive
silence, contributing to the incident.
Second, an overview of second victims, Doctor S, and Midwife Z, and their
affective experiences of shame and guilt are described, including the trajectory of
their recovery. Through a process of emotional contagion these individuals shared
their negative affective experience with departmental managers, causing them to
express their own negative affect in the form of anger. They blamed themselves for
putting these individuals in a precarious position leading to the incident. These
managers then went on to enact positively valenced changes which encouraged
voice.
Thirdly, responses of professionals which evidence recommended and
emergent practice changes, which created the conditions for voice following the
incident including: setting expectations for voice, management engendering voice,
and a reinvigorated sentiment of care, are described.
Fourthly, evidence of increased prosocial voice behaviour by midwives is
shown.Fifth, the case findings are summarised in the table 7.13, Maternity Voice and
Silence summary, which, at-a-glance, shows the journey of this department from a
climate of silence, to a climate where voice is encouraged when patient safety is at
risk.
Finally, a summary of follow-up and validation meetings with the department
are presented, offering evidence of a sustained voice climate, where ‘respectful
challenge’ is encouraged, and a sentiment of care sustained.
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1 Conditions for Silence
Responses by participants’ evidence three conditions which discouraged
voice in the maternity department, contributing to the incident. These conditions,
shown in table 7.1 Conditions for Silence, are the presence of an embedded risk
management department which investigates incidents in a punitive way. This
contributes to a hierarchical blame culture, and defensiveness, that silenced
individuals from speaking up.
Table 7.1 Conditions for Silence
Maternity Case
Conditions for Silence Doctor (n=2) Midwife (n=7)
Punitive Investigations 3 6
Defensiveness 1 3
Blame Culture 2 13
Coding References
Punitive Investigations leading to Defensive Silence
Several midwives (CS306, CS311), described the process of RCA
investigations to be punitive. This was validated by CS301, an anaesthetist
specialized in obstetrics, who assisted with the investigation, confirming the punitive
and reactive nature of investigations carried out by maternity’s embedded risk
management department.
“There’s quite an emotional impact on the midwives, slightly more,
than the obstetric group, in that there’s more of a personal
implication for them, their role within the unit can change as a
direct consequence of the event. I don’t like to say the word
punitive, but I think it perhaps is.” – CS301 Consultant
Anaesthetist Spec. Obstetrics, Investigator
The way investigations were conducted contributed to defensive silence of
staff in the department, where reporting of patient safety errors is discouraged, largely
because midwives didn’t want to be blamed, or didn’t want themselves to be punished
or blamed by their colleagues. Defensive silence is the withholding of information
based on fear, omitting facts to protect the self.
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Table 7.2 Defensiveness: Secondary Quotes
Secondary Quotes
“it has a very negative impact sometimes. That is probably part
of our problem, particularly on this site, that people feel that it is
all very reactive and that they are being punished when
something’s gone wrong” - CS306 Matron of Clinical Quality
and Safety for Obstetrics
“Keep quiet yea… people are scared of losing their job
essentially because of making a small error, you feel like
someone’s going to jump on top of you for it, and you’re going
to be dragged through the coals about it.” -CS311 Midwife Band
6
The seeming dual nature of Maternity’s risk management investigations,
which focus not only on safety, but also management of personnel, are a key
condition for defensive silence. Investigations in the department have tended to focus
not only on incidents, but also the performance and competency of midwifes’ involved,
commonly leading to disciplinary actions. CS310, the lead midwife for quality, found
the punitive nature of investigations in the department problematic, often resulting in
conflict with the head of midwifery over personnel management outcomes.
“We needed to do an RCA, So, Head of Midwifery came to me
and said “What have you done to the midwife?” and I said “What
do you mean what have I done to the midwife? We’re doing a
RCA investigation and there are individual problems. She said “I
was concerned about the individual’s practice and whether she
should be put in a different role.” I said “but that’s not part of my
RCA investigation” … the whole RCA process was part of the
disciplinary process that was going to happen to the midwife and
that’s very difficult” –CS310 Lead Midwife for Quality &
Governance, Woman & Children’s Services
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Table 7.3 Punitive Investigations: Secondary Quotes
Secondary Quotes
“They’ve done an investigation, a supervision investigation and
management investigation. The one midwife who was the co-
ordinator that day, there’s learning. She’s going to have a
development plan put forward for her” - CS304 Associate Head
of Women’s Services for Nursing and Midwifery
“I believe she’s (Midwife Z) got a [450] hour training plan. She’s
been put through that and she’ll probably have some
disciplinary courses on there as well now” - CS305 Head of
Midwifery, Governance and Quality Clinical Dean
“the co-ordinator’s been taken out of the co-ordinator role for
the last year while the investigation’s been going on.” -CS307
Clinical Midwifery Manager Delivery Suite (former co-ordinator)
Blame Culture
At the time of the incident, an ‘us vs them’ mentality existed between front-line
clinicians (midwives and obstetricians) and maternity’s risk management department.
This embedded risk management department was responsible for the development
of a ‘blame culture’ where midwives feel as though management is reactive to
incidents, investigating individuals, demanding statements, and making them feel as
though they are the root cause. The process of error investigation is focused more on
individuals and less on broader learning. CS313 consultant obstetrics, labour ward
lead, mentioned that both midwives and obstetricians are often trying to hide their
employee pin numbers, as a type of defensive behaviour, so they can’t be blamed.
“There’s huge disengagement between maternity clinical
governance, maternity managers, and working staff… there is
clinical disengagement... it’s creating anger and resentment. Staff
have left and it’s a very, very kind of unfriendly atmosphere.
people are scared. People work on this unit thinking every day
“Will I protect my pin #?” or “Will I protect my GMC #? … So
everything they do they’ll have their pin number at the back of
their mind. That’s how you come in every day… If you have an
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incident, and it gets reported then they will be taken out of the
system – suspended or even struck off.” - CS313 Consultant
Obstetrics, labour ward lead
Table 7.4 Blame Culture: Secondary Quotes
Secondary Quotes
“Nurses always see incidents as a “Oh God, I’m going to be
blamed for something,” and it’s very much a blame sort of
culture.” -CS307 Clinical Midwifery Manager Delivery Suite
(former Co-ordinator)
“There’s quite a strong hierarchy within midwifery and if there is
felt to have been some human error on the side of the midwife,
then they will be taken out immediately. It may even go as far
as a suspension or they may drop a grade and then be
retrained.” – CS301 Consultant Anaesthetist Spec. Obstetrics,
Investigator
“I think the blame culture here is really bad.” – CS311 Midwife
Band 6
“There’s not a positive culture towards safety and I think it’s
because of the processes, the way governance has been
applied and the way the whole investigation process has been
applied. ... think there’s very much a focus on individual practice
and that’s why the culture is very negative... We miss
opportunities to learn at a systems level because there’s such
focus on individual.” – CS310 Lead Midwife for Quality &
Governance, Woman & Children’s Services
“I would say we are reactive, with a high blame culture. I don’t
think the wider scenario is always taken into consideration… it’s
quite a quick reaction to something … It massively reduces
morale because midwives feel like they need to protect
themselves.” -CS311 Midwife Band 6
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2 Second Victims and Affective Experiences
The incident had a profoundly negative affective impact on midwife Z and
doctor S. The former left the profession before she could be interviewed, while the
latter is linked to the affective coding references for guilt and shame, in table 7.5.
Anger was felt by managerial professionals through emotional contagion with, Doctor
S and Midwife Z, specifically those from midwifery who felt angry about the incident,
blaming themselves for having put Midwife Z in a precarious position. A renewed
sentiment of care, discussed more fully in the next section, was found through
expressions of compassion towards patients by both obstetricians and midwifes. The
recovery trajectory of second victims, with Doctor S ‘surviving’, and Midwife Z
‘dropping out’ is also discussed.
Table 7.5 Maternity Affective Response Coding Reference
Maternity Case
Affective Response Doctor (n=3) Midwife (n=4)
Anger 3 4
Compassion 8 4
Shame 6
Guilt 4
Crying (Context) 2 1
Stigmatising (Context) 3
Involving the Soul (Context) 1
Coding References
Shame and Guilt
Doctor S found the process of investigation to be traumatic and felt
stigmatized, singled out from her obstetrical colleagues. The term ‘SUI’, serious
untoward incident, was like a label applied to doctor S, still stuck to her even a year
after the incident had occurred. While the investigation did not name doctor S
specifically, it referred to a ‘consultant’, and she felt all her colleagues knew this
referred to her. Both clinical director (CS303) and doctor S were upset when recalling
the details of this event and aftermath, crying at times during their interviews.
“I think the word SUI is just so stressful and it’s traumatic being
involved in SUI, it’s sort of a title that goes before or after your
name … you have to put it in your appraisal, but how long do you
stick with it? I just find will this ever go away? [crying] I find being
involved in a SUI very stigmatising and, you know, it takes the
whole year [crying] I mean in fact I’m sort of in some ways coming
178
up to the anniversary of this, so I am pretty much on tenterhooks
really” - Doctor S (CS302 Consultant Obstetrician)
The incident was a negative affective experience for doctor S, experiencing
both guilt and shame. Her guilt stemmed from both the incident, where she caused
preventable harm to the innocent patient and child, and the process of investigation,
including the label of ‘SUI’, which led her to question whether she had acted in a
morally deficient way. Because she acted alone in her decision to review the patient
only after four hours, she felt that no one else was to blame for the incident besides
herself, attributing this to poor judgement.
“It was very much emotional because I just took it very personally
in that I felt that I actually had this chance to make a difference
because I’d seen her. I had examined her myself, so there was
no question of relying on someone else’s findings or anything like
that and I’ve always thought… I mean I think I’m a good clinician
and I felt that it was all there… the investigation found that ‘the
patient was seen by a consultant’, which made it very personal.” –
Doctor S (CS302 Consultant Obstetrician)
Doctor S later felt a sense of shame, experiencing negative internal feelings
and humiliation about herself not performing to the ideal of her profession as an
obstetrician. These negative feelings have stayed with her, even a year after the
incident.
“the coroner, was reviewing my practice and potentially I hadn’t
actually… I don’t know how to put it. Potentially I had sort of not
been up to the mark. I could have done better… I took it quite
personally, I wasn’t good enough” – Doctor S (CS302 Consultant
Obstetrician)
Emotional Contagion and Anger
Those professionals affectively impacted through direct involvement in the
incident, Doctor S, and Midwife Z, influenced the affective state of several colleagues,
including their leaders (CS303, CS304, CS306, CS307) through direct verbal contact
and close working proximity.
“when there’s an incident there’s quite an emotional impact on the
people who are involved and the impact often can be felt I think
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perhaps on the others” - CS301 Consultant Anaesthetist Spec.
Obstetrics, Lead Investigator
The affective states of these second victims spread to their colleagues, mainly
leaders, with whom they had interactions with following the incident, during
recommended training and coaching sessions. For CS303, clinical director of
obstetrics, who had repeated direct contact with doctor S following the event, this
transfer of affective experience was physically and verbally evident. CS303 was upset
by the experience of doctor S, wiping tears away several times, before composing
herself and continuing during the research interview (Field Journal Note).
“I was incredibly angry and frustrated and I cried and, you know, I
lost control.” –CS303, Consultant Obstetrics and Clinical Director
Obstetrics
Negative affective experiences among midwifery management, spreading
from midwife Z, were quite common following the incident. This was evident in CS304,
CS306, CS307 who expressed anger, particularly CS307, the co-ordinator at the time
of the incident, blaming herself for putting midwife Z in that position. The anger
experienced by this group centred on blaming themselves as managers, having let
down a member of their team by putting her (Midwife Z) into a precarious position,
where she did not have the appropriate skillset, contributing to the incident. The
severity of the incident, being described as ‘tragic’ and resulting in a death of a new-
born, may also have played a role in the affective reach of the situation.
“I really felt for the woman and the midwife involved in this case. I
felt quite angry that we’d put somebody in that position” -CS306
Matron of Clinical Quality and Safety for Obstetrics
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Table 7.6 Emotional Contagion: Secondary Quotes
Secondary Quotes
“I even cried in this case and that’s very unusual for me now
because I’ve been in it such a long time, but this is a tragic
case” -CS304 Assoc. Head of Women’s Services for Nursing
and Midwifery
“it’s such a tragedy and I think potentially we could have
perhaps had a live baby at the end of the day. It has had an
impact. It’s touched a lot of people” -CS306 Matron of Clinical
Quality and Safety for Obstetrics
“It affects everybody when something like that happens. It
affects the whole team.” -CS307 Clinical Midwifery Manager
Delivery Suite (former Co-ordinator)
Recovery Trajectory of Second Victims.
As per the RCA recommendations, consultant obstetrics, clinical director
(CS303) immediately met with doctor S, the consultant obstetrician (CS302), to
complete a training needs analysis, ensuring any shortfalls in training were
addressed. Doctor S claims she was not lacking in knowledge that would have made
a difference in this case, but admitted she used poor judgement in not reviewing the
patient sooner. The training analysis, and incident, resulted in doctor S changing
practice, becoming more sensitive to vaginal bleeding in her patients. She is more
mindful of these symptoms which could be a sign that urgent caesarean section is
needed, describing her management of such situations now as ‘aggressive’.
“I was involved in debriefing Doctor S (CS302) and doing a
training needs analysis with her. We went through all the notes
and saw what was going on… I’m pretty sure that the debrief and
the discussion with Doctor S has changed her practice… You
assume when somebody’s done their seven years of training that
they should be ready to be a consultant, but you can never
experience all the different situations you’re going to be in” -
CS303 Consultant Obstetrician, Clinical Director
181
Table 7.7 Recovery Trajectory of Second Victims: Secondary Quotes
Secondary Quotes
“One of the actions was that me, and the midwife involved, each
of us had to have a meeting with our line manager respectively
and see if there were any learning or training needs… to identify
if there were any gaps in my learning or understanding of
management of abruptions, ante partum haemorrhage, and also
about CTG interpretation… CS303 asked me “Do you think
there’s anything you feel you don’t know, that you could learn?”
I didn’t think I didn’t know anything about it. It was just sort of
wrong judgement at that time.” -CS302 Doctor S
“If I had said she (patient) needs a caesarean section, then all
of that wouldn’t have happened. So for me every time a lady
comes with vaginal bleeding immediately I want to know. I
mean somebody who doesn’t know this may even say my
management is a little bit aggressive for even small bleeds, so
in some ways that has had an impact on my practice. So
anybody with bleeding for me is something… as a symptom I’m
more mindful of it.” -CS302 Doctor S
Doctor S (CS302 consultant obstetrician) was psychologically impacted by the
incident and investigation, describing it not only as traumatising but also “ingrained in
my soul”. What’s interesting is that although other professionals (midwives and
obstetricians) on this team went on to make practice improvements (see next section),
doctor S, paralysed by ‘shame’ and ‘blame’, is still on her recovery trajectory from the
incident. She only very briefly commented on minor changes to her practice (i.e.
aggressive treatment of vaginal bleeding).
“I was a bit disillusioned with the whole structure of the
investigation process within this department. I just distanced
myself from the whole thing because I felt so unsupported and I
felt that if there was learning I felt it was for me and I didn’t think
anybody within the organisation had anything to contribute to it.” –
Doctor S
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While Doctor S has endured the ‘inquisition’, and obtained emotional first aid,
in moving on from the incident she had neither dropped out, nor thrived post incident,
but simply survived. Doctor S is coping, performing at expected levels, but unable to
move on, and still having intrusive thoughts about the incident.
“So the emotional response was quite profound really because I
just felt that I had this opportunity to make the decision which I
messed up … And then the consequence of that was the stigma
and I felt that all the good that you’ve done in the last seven or
eight years or whatever was just wiped out with a brush and you
were just tainted with being involved in a SUI...I think the
implications or the psychological impact it has on you is far greater
in some ways than the outcome itself, which it shouldn’t be like
this though.” -Doctor S
A lack of a sentiment of caring shown by Doctor S would seem to be driven
by the stigmatising investigative process that she went through, making her feel
labelled by the SUI, and left still questioning how she could have prevented the
incident from happening.
“the case was presented as the patient was seen by a consultant,
which made it very personal, by putting it as “was seen by a
consultant” just made it personal and I knew it was none of the 22
others (obstetricians). I knew it was me and I felt that if I knew it,
everybody else knew it.” – Doctor S
There is evidence to suggest that community midwife Z, has moved on from
the incident, her recovery trajectory ending with her dropping out, leaving her previous
role.
“I know it’s ongoing with the girl still… I know Midwife Z is going a
different way [professionally] at the moment” – CS307 Clinical
Midwifery Manager Delivery Suite (former Co-ordinator)
3 Conditions for Voice
A summary of responses which evidence practice changes, both
recommended as part of the RCA investigation, and emergently, by professionals,
are shown in table 7.8 conditions for voice. Despite history of a blame culture this
case found evidence for prosocial voice behaviour by midwives following the serious
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safety incident. The conditions for voice in this case were driven by professionals who
were affectively influenced by close contact with the incident’s second victims’ doctor
S and midwife Z. This included the obstetrical clinical director who set expectations
for voice from the top-down, and midwife leaders who responded from the bottom-up
to engender voice among front-line staff. Further, having been rendered dormant by
a blame culture and defensiveness, a reinvigorated sentiment of care emerged
through a build-up of expressions of compassion directed at patients.
Table 7.8 Conditions for Voice
Maternity Case
Conditions for Voice Doctor (n=3) Midwife (n=5)
Setting expectations for voice 5 0
Management engendering voice among staff 3 5
Reinvigorated sentiment of care 8 4
Coding References
Setting Expectations for Voice
Since the affective experience of the incident and follow-up with doctor S,
CS303, clinical director of obstetrics, has changed how she communicates with
colleagues. She established informal standards of what’s rewarded, supported, and
expected for inter-department communication. By attempting to shift the overall tone
in the department with respect to communication, she has created a safer
environment for professionals of equal or lower hierarchical position to speak up, with
less fear of reprisal than previously. This top-down emergent behaviour, where
barriers to speaking up have been attenuated, has effectively enabled professionals,
both midwives and obstetricians, to contribute more openly to patient safety.
“My interactions with people are less defensive. I’m more open.
People don’t feel anxious about talking to me because I don’t want
to be a barrier to communication … I say “Look, please tell me
about this. Please tell me about that,” and “I want you (midwife) to
come and tell me this,” and “I’ll come back in this length of time.
Come and find me if I’ve forgotten.” So we’re all in it together and
it’s a shared thing… you just have to behave the same way all the
time. Be open, fair, non-judgemental… If you start ridiculing
people or saying “Why are you asking me about this?” people will
soon know that they don’t want to talk to you. I’m finding ways
that I can communicate with them to make sure we have open
communication… It feels like midwives are more at ease coming
to ask me stuff.” -CS303 Clinical Director Obstetrics
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“Model behaviours that you expect other people to have.
Demonstrate appropriate behaviour and an appropriate way to
communicate… They can’t turn that back on you if you have high
standards.” -CS303 Clinical Director Obstetrics
Midwife leaders, affectively influenced through contact with midwife Z,
responded to the clinical director of obstetrics change with their own emergent
bottom-up shift in practice. They ensure that midwifes involved in incidents receive
training, and are reassured that they can rely upon experienced staff to support them
when they need help escalating concerns. Evidence of this emergent bottom-up
practice is discussed next.
Management Engendering Voice Among Staff
A change which drove increased voice behaviour is midwife management’s
empowering of front-line midwives, encouraging them to ‘respectfully challenge’ their
colleagues, whether obstetrician or fellow midwife. This support seemed particularly
important for junior midwives who might lack the confidence to raise an issue, now
they approach midwife coordinators, or matrons, about concerns, who will advise on
next steps or assist with contacting more senior staff or obstetricians. Part of the
encouragement comes in the form of coaching, where senior midwifes are pro-
actively engaging with junior midwifes, testing how they might respond in certain
situations and what approaches they would choose. Further, managers are teaching
‘respectful challenge’, where midwifes learn how to ask others, like obstetricians,
about the rationale behind their decisions. With a bit of support from their managers,
midwifes can communicate more effectively to professionals of higher-hierarchical
position.
“You know, some of the more senior midwives would feel happy
to do that, but I think with the more junior midwives it’s having the
confidence to come to us as co-ordinators to be able to say “I’m
not happy about this. I’m not happy with this decision,” and its sort
of educating them really as well.” –CS307 Clinical Midwifery
Manager Delivery Suite (was Co-ordinator)
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Table 7.9 Management Engendering Voice among Staff: Secondary
Quotes
Secondary Quotes
“They’ve got to feel powerful enough to go and perhaps
challenge a consultant from all levels of staff, but particularly
when it somebody who is quite senior it can be difficult, so there
have been times when I’ve said “I’ll do that then.” -CS306
Matron of Clinical Quality and Safety for Obstetrics
“Junior midwives come to the band 7 coordinator, to query, ask
advice, and escalate their concerns. The Band 7 could also
respond to the junior midwife by saying, “what would you do in
this situation?” “You might like to try this approach”, there is a
bit of coaching going on … we do try to empower midwives, if
you are still concerned about a decision go above, to your
manager or your coordinator… we are trying to teach respectful
challenge, how to approach colleagues in a respectful way, we
teach juniors to ‘ask about the rationale’ behind consultant’s
decisions” - Matron for Maternity Services (during follow-up
meeting)
Compassion and Reinvigorated Sentiment of Care
While negative affective experiences were common following the incident,
there was also expression of compassion, directed towards patients. Consultants
(CS301, CS303, CS313) and midwifes (CS306, CS311) described a reinvigorated
focus on patients, strengthening their sentiment of care. Obstetricians and midwifes
felt moved by the avoidable harm which had been inflicted on this patient and her
new-born child, expressing a desire to prevent further harmful events in maternity.
The hierarchical barriers between professions were moderated by a mutual desire to
put patients first and care for them safely, encouraging voice.
This reinvigorated sentiment of care is spurred on by several factors,
including: professionalism, which speaks to the disposition and training of people
coming into careers as midwives and obstetricians. A desire to put the needs of the
patient and family first, and analogously treating the patient as though they were a
member of your own family. Mention of this safety incident, or other recent incidents,
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preceded all compassionate expressions, suggesting incidents are a catalyst for
shaping how these professionals feel about patients, specifically a feeling of distress
at the suffering of their patients, and vocalizing a desire to help.
“you come into the profession because you want to look after
people and you care about people, you want to do your best, so if
you’ve learnt something then you will change because you think
that it’s better. I think all midwives do that.” -CS311 Midwife
Table 7.10 Compassion and Reinvigorated Sentiment of Care: Secondary
Quotes
Secondary Quotes
“once an event has happened, our very first thought is…
obviously it is for the patient and it is for the family” - CS301
Consultant Anaesthetist Spec. Obstetrics, Lead Investigator
“when you’re working in things like this it is about what is best for
the woman and her baby... when you have met a family who’ve
had a tragedy you kind of feel like you owe it to them to make it
better.” -CS306 Matron of Clinical Quality and Safety for
Obstetrics
“Take the power completely out. Treat the patient as somebody
who’s like your own family member” -CS313 Consultant
Obstetrics, labour ward lead
4 Expression of Prosocial Voice
Following the incident and the emergence of the conditions identified above,
there is much evidence for increased assertiveness by team members to escalate
concerns and challenge hierarchy when they feel safety is at risk. A summary of
prosocial voice by professional group are found in table 7.11 expressions of prosocial
voice.
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Table 7.11 Expressions of Prosocial Voice
Maternity Case
Expressions of Prosocial Voice Doctor Midwife (n=4)
Prosocial Voice 9
Coding References
With reference to Table 7.11 expressions of prosocial voice, it was found that
midwives have been more likely to escalate concerns and challenge hierarchy in the
department, since the incident. Midwives, and midwifery management, reported that
midwives are more assertive in their communication style when dealing with
supervisors and obstetrical consultants. If they see something that is potentially
concerning, there is less hesitation to flag it up.
“Midwives are getting better at escalating to the right people…
getting better now at going straight to the doctors and getting the
doctors to come… before, if the registrar had come and said “I
think it’s okay,” I probably would have just accepted that, whereas
now I’m going “Well I’m not happy with it,” so going above that
registrar and going to the consultant…having the confidence to
challenge doctors more than anything” –CS308 Midwife
Table 7.12 Expressions of Prosocial Voice: Secondary Quotes
Secondary Quotes
“it’s about being able to question the consultants. I’m quite
vocal, so I will question if I didn’t agree with something. I’m quite
happy to challenge any doctor or consultant decision and sort of
justify and go through policy or procedure and get their opinions
really” – CS307 Clinical Midwifery Manager Delivery Suite
(Former Co-ordinator)
“During a shift on delivery last week, I saw the midwife co-
ordinator respectfully challenge the decision of a consultant.
Resulted in a conversation, which came to the right decision for
the patient, keeping her on the delivery suite, which was looking
to free up beds.” – Matron for Maternity Services (during follow-
up meeting)
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5 Voice and Silence Summary
Table 7.13 Maternity Voice and Silence Summary, highlights the silencing of
midwifes and obstetricians stems from a blame culture, where individuals felt
punitively targeted by departmental level risk management, which investigates
individual practice and imposed managerial sanctions. These conditions led to
reinforcement of defensive behaviours that stymie voice and encouraged defensive
silence. On the contrary, affective experiences, and emergent practical changes
following the incident, and changes in the structure of departmental risk management
(see next section), created the conditions for voice, leading to enactment of prosocial
voice in the form of respectful challenge.
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Table 7.13 Maternity Voice and Silence Summary
C
lim
ate
Scenario Motive From Message Direction Target Outcome
SILEN
C
E
Speaking up,
whistleblowing
, and reporting
of errors on
the Maternity
Ward
Defensive Midwife/
Obstetrician
“it’s a very, very kind of unfriendly
atmosphere. It’s kind of people are
scared. People work on this unit
thinking every day “Will I protect my
pin #?” or “Will I protect my GMC#?”
– CS313 Consultant Obstetrics,
Labour Ward Lead
Upward Supervisor Defensive
Silence
Punitive Midwife “There’s quite a strong hierarchy
within midwifery, if there is felt to
have been human error on the side of
the midwife, then they will be taken
out immediately. It may even go as
far as a suspension or they may drop
a grade” - CS301 Consultant
Anaesthetist Spec. Obstetrics
Upward Supervisor Defensive
Silence
Punitive Midwife “there’s very much a focus on
individual practice and that’s why the
culture is very negative... We miss
opportunities to learn at a systems
level because there’s such focus on
individual” - CS310 Lead Midwife for
Quality & Governance, Woman &
Children’s Services
Upward Supervisor Defensive
Silence
Serious Untoward Incident / Changes to Maternity Risk Management Department
VO
IC
E
On the
Maternity
Ward
To
improve
safety
Midwife “Midwives are getting better at
escalating to the right people…
getting better now at going straight to
the doctors and getting the doctors to
come… now I’m going “Well I’m not
happy with it,” …having the
confidence to challenge doctors more
than anything” –CS308 Midwife
Upward Obstetrician Voice
To
improve
safety
Midwife co-
ordinator
“During a shift on delivery last week, I
saw the midwife co-ordinator
respectfully challenge the decision of
a consultant. Resulted in a
conversation, which came to the right
decision for the patient”– Matron for
Maternity Services
Upward Obstetrician Voice
(Respectful
Challenge)
Coaching Midwife /
Manager/
Coordinator
“there is a bit of coaching going on …
we do try to empower midwives, if
you are still concerned about a
decision, go above, to your manager
or your coordinator… we are trying to
teach respectful challenge, how to
approach colleagues in a respectful
way, we teach juniors to ‘ask about
the rationale’ behind consultant’s
decisions” – Matron for Maternity
Services
Upward Obstetrician Voice
(Respectful
Challenge)
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6 Follow-up with Maternity Department
In follow-up meetings held in June 2017 there was evidence suggesting that
midwife management continue to promote escalation among their midwives, often in
the form of respectfully challenging decision making, or prioritization of patients.
Junior midwives have been approaching coordinators to query, ask for advice and,
when necessary, to escalate their concerns. The term ‘respectful challenge’ was
developed by midwife management after a trend of safety incidents were identified,
where lack of challenge led to a safety risk. It emphasises how to approach
colleagues in a respectful way, and to ask about the rationale behind their decision(s).
This development grew out of ‘appreciative inquiry’ training the department had
received.
Further sustaining a sentiment of care is the practice to give out compassion
cards to staff who are seen delivering compassionate care.
“Touching a patient’s hand, sitting with the family, we call it
‘making a difference’ in midwifery.” – Matron, Follow-up Meeting
June 2017
As of June 2017, the maternity risk management department had been rolled
up to a corporate level, this resulted primarily from a change in leadership at the Trust.
Whereas before investigations were focused on getting statements, it’s now more of
a roundtable, focused on initial debriefing with the staff involved, and diffusion. The
incidents now go directly to the midwife matrons who speak with their staff, rather
than an internal risk management department. This change should result in less
defensive behaviours by staff because investigations feel less intimidating and
punitive, and are dealt with by front-line managers, rather than risk management
investigators, who can follow-up with their staff individually.
“That team wasn’t clinical (former maternity risk management) …
so they just concentrated on administrative investigations. They
were office based. As a manager I was getting frustrated “you
don’t understand what’s going on at the shop floor” … Because
we (Midwife Matrons) are trained in managing people, and
performance management, and capability, the way you approach
things is different ‘Your firm but fair’. We’ve changed the way we
think of things, now staff feel less intimidated and less blamed. We
are taking ownership of our incidents. The incidents used to get
taken by the maternity governance. Now they go right to the
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maternity matrons, go speak to the midwives. Before it was all
about getting statements. Now it’s more of a roundtable, rather
than “I need a statement from you”. We get more mileage from
speaking to that person involved, if an incident happened on the
delivery suite, get the 4-5 people that were involved around the
table. It’s more about getting an initial debrief, a diffusion.” –
Matron for Maternity Services (during follow-up meeting)
Maternity Case Conclusion
This case highlights the tragic consequences of a blame culture, where
professionals practice a form of defensive silence, keeping quiet about patient safety
risks to protect themselves from the inquisition of a risk management investigation.
Such was the high rate of occurrence of similar types of incidents resulting from lack
of challenge in the department that a plan was adopted by midwifes, introducing
‘respectful challenge’ to break-up some of the defensive behaviour and promote
voice.
Many of the features of a hierarchical blame culture are gone with the
dissolving of an embedded risk management program, resulting from a top
management change.
The second victims found in this case, while suffering much negative affective
experience themselves, were part of the catalyst, proving emotionally contagious to
their managerial colleagues, spurring on several positively valenced changes
following the incident and investigation, improving conditions for voice. The clinical
director of obstetrics, having been affectively influenced by what doctor S went
through, led a change from the top-down, setting informal standard of what’s reward,
supported, and expected for communication between professionals. This shift in tone
encouraged voice, allowing all professionals to contribute more openly to patient
safety.
In response, midwifery management responded through engendering voice
among their staff in the form of ‘respectful challenge’. These changes were successful
in breaking down some defensive behaviours, encouraging expressions of voice.
Further driving voice, and moderating hierarchical barriers between professions, was
a mutual desire to put patients first, described as a reinvigorated sentiment of care.
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Chapter 8 – Findings for Case Study: Urology and
Ward X
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Introduction
Chapter 8 provides the findings for the Urology and Ward X case. The
overview for this case, describing the department and full-details of the incident, were
previously outlined in Chapter 5: Urology Case Full Description.
These findings use coding reference tables taken from the NVIVO database,
to group together the responses of participants into categories, and related themes.
These findings examine the journey of professionals in this department from a
hierarchical culture, and futility of voice, to the enactment of defensive voice by
nurses. When three or more supporting quotes are shown, the primary quote will
appear in the main text, while secondary quotes follow directly in a table.
The presentation of this case’s findings is ordered into 6 sections. First,
responses of professionals and document analysis, which evidence the conditions for
silence, weakened by a hierarchical culture, and futility of voice, directly resulting in
the incident, are described.
Second, an overview of second victim: staff nurse CS412, and her affective
experience is described, including the trajectory of her recovery. Through a process
of emotional contagion, she shared her negative affective experience with
departmental manager, senior sister CS403. CS403 then expressed her own
negative affect in the form of anger, blaming the urologist involved for causing the
incident. This manager, senior sister CS403, went on to enact positively valenced
changes which encouraged voice. There was a notable lack of compassion
expressed by professionals towards the patient in this case.
Thirdly, responses of professionals, which evidence recommended and
emergent practice changes creating the conditions for defensive voice are described.
These include: closer adherence to standard operating procedure, defensiveness,
and setting expectations for voice.
Fourthly, evidence for expressions of defensive voice by nurses, a type of
voice that aims to shift focus to others to protect the self, is shown.
Fifth, the case findings related to voice and silence are summarised in table
8.9 Ward X Voice and Silence Summary. This table, at-a-glance, shows the journey
of this department from a climate of silence, and futility of voice, to a voice climate,
where enactment of defensive voice is encouraged.
Finally, a summary of follow-up and validation meetings with ward X and
urologists are presented, offering evidence of a sustained voice climate where
enactment of defensive voice is found.
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1 Conditions for Silence
Responses by participants, and analysis of the investigative report, evidence
two conditions for silence on ward x having directly contributed to the incident. These
are the presence of a hierarchical culture, and evidence of the futility of voice by a
nurse, having dire consequences for the patient in this case.
Table 8.1 Conditions for Silence
Urology Case
Conditions for Silence Doctor (n=1) Nurse (n=1) Document (n=1)
Hierarchical Culture 1 2 2
Futility of Voice 3 2
Coding References
Hierarchical Culture
Differences in the hierarchical-positions of urologists and nurses played a role
to inhibit inter-professional communication on ward X, contributing to the incident.
Specifically, staff nurse CS412 informed doctor X, the most senior person on the
ward, of the patient’s abnormal blood results, and neglected to inform the nurse caring
for the patient as per standard procedure.
“In this circumstance [Staff Nurse] informed [Doctor X] and then
did not believe it was necessary to inform the nurse caring for
[Patient] as she had told the most senior person on the ward.” –
Serious Untoward Incident Report into the care of Mr X
“At interview [Staff Nurse] stated that she assumed that she had
performed the appropriate escalation as she had showed the
blood results to the most senior clinician on present on the ward.”
– Serious Untoward Incident Report into the care of Mr X
Ward X would appear to be a classic example of the hierarchical challenge.
There were clear divides in culture between doctors and nurses, creating a “them and
us” (CS412) scenario, where one side is of lower position and power, resulting in, as
described next, futility of voice.
“There’s still them and us. There’s still this communication
difference between the doctors and nurses… when it comes to
decision making, I think there’s still that divide – there’s them and
us” - CS412, Staff Nurse
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“I think there are two aspects to this … there’s the medical culture
and the nursing culture… I don’t think it’s significantly changed
the medical culture” – CS401 Clinical Director, Urology
Futility of Voice
This case presents an example of the circumstance under which futility of
voice is possible. The staff nurse attempting to inform the urologist of an abnormally
high potassium result demonstrates the struggle of an individual of lower-position to
be heard by someone in a higher-position. Staff nurse CS412 claims to have
interrupted doctors X and Y, showing them the patient’s blood results, in response
doctor X said “OK”. This version of the event is corroborated by doctor Y, who recalled
this interruption and the abnormal blood results.
However, doctor X, the more senior of the two doctors, claimed to not recall
being showed these results at any time during the ward round. Doctor X indicated
had he been aware, he would have delayed the patient’s discharge and treated the
high potassium. It’s possible to see how this scenario would discourage further voice,
silencing other nurses on the ward, who might assume their efforts at communication
would not be listened to, as was the case here.
“Whenever we’re [nurses] voicing an opinion it somehow is
brushed away or feels insignificant” - CS412, Staff Nurse
Table 8.2 Futility of Voice: Secondary Quotes
Secondary Quotes
“Excuse me, is this a patient you’re looking after? I’ve had a
phone call from microbiology with these blood results. Are you
going to review the patient?” – Staff Nurse CS412
“Staff Nurse recalled at interview that she interrupted the
doctors, showed them (patient) blood results, and that (Doctor
X) acknowledged them and said OK” – Serious Untoward
Incident Report into the care of Mr X
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Secondary Quotes
“Doctor X does not recall being showed the results at any time
during the ward round. Doctor X was on the ward with the
urology registrar Doctor Y. Doctor Y does recall being
interrupted by Staff Nurse and informed of the abnormal blood
results.” – Serious Untoward Incident Report into the care of Mr
X
2 Second Victim and Affective Experiences
The impact of this incident was profound for CS412, a newly qualified staff
nurse, and her nursing colleagues, including senior sister CS403, who supported
CS412 through the post event recovery. The affective response in this case centres
on CS412, who felt as though she had been labelled the ‘root cause’ of the incident
by the investigation team. As far as could be observed, there was a total absence of
compassion expressed by both nursing and medical staff. Further, no affective
response at all was found to be expressed by medical staff, the urologists.
Table 8.3 Urology and Ward X Affective Response Coding Reference
Urology Case
Affective Response Doctors Nurses (n=2)
Guilt 5
Anger 4
Crying (Context) 1
Involving the Soul (Context) 1
Stigmatising (Context) 1
Coding References
Anger and Guilt
This incident led staff nurse CS412 to experience anger, where she blamed
herself for the death of the patient, holding herself responsible for the situation. She
blamed her lack of knowledge about blood results as contributing.
“it did affect me personally because I thought had I have done this
[blood results card] then this might not have happened… It really
was tough to know that you were partly responsible for
somebody’s death. [crying]. It’s very tough.” -Staff Nurse CS412
Guilt seemed to arise from the investigation itself, which she interpreted as
having labelled her as the “root of the problem” (CS412), which she described as
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“soul destroying” (CS412). While discussing this matter during the research interview,
she started crying several times (Field Journal Notes). It seemed that she believed
she had acted in a morally deficient way, wrestling with having been, in-part,
responsible, for the death of a patient.
“It really was tough to know that you were partly responsible for
somebody’s death. [crying].” -Staff Nurse CS412
Table 8.4 Guilt: Secondary Quotes
Secondary Quotes
“it is called a root cause analysis, I felt like the root of the
problem and it just is soul destroying, especially whenever
somebody much more senior than I was sort of saying “Actually
no, she didn’t give me the results.” That was so bad.” -Staff
Nurse CS412
“This was a very traumatic experience. It was really, really hard,
when I found out about this it hit me very, very hard.” – Staff
Nurse CS412
Emotional Contagion and Anger
Staff Nurse CS412 brought her individual negative affective experiences to
group interactions. For example, at handover meetings, which led to the spreading of
her individual level affect to other group members.
“I hope that no newly qualified nurse has to go through what I
went through. I spread the word… I’ve been very open and
transparent about it all and I spoke with all the colleagues that I
felt it appropriate to. I even spoke to students about how to avoid
these things.” -CS412 Staff Nurse
The affective experience of CS412 was thus felt by her nursing colleagues. In
particular, senior sister CS403, was affectively impacted through close proximity with
her staff nurse while providing post incident support. This led senior sister 403 to
experience anger, with blame aimed toward the consultant who denied all knowledge
of the incident, and about the situation in general where there was gossip that
portrayed inaccurately the incident details and painted ward x in a negative light.
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Senior sister CS403 was affectively charged as a result, going on to enact positively
valenced practice changes on the unit (See next section on conditions for voice).
“when there’s an incident everyone knows that the nurse is upset.
Everyone understands and we talk about things and learn from
them. It was awful, a man died, so everyone’s shocked and wants
to learn how it happened… I was emotional for the poor nurse
because she was distraught, understandably. And we were cross
that the consultant denied all knowledge. That was quite difficult
we were very cross with the doctor, and found it quite difficult to
work with him for a few weeks.” - CS403 Senior Sister
“Various people were talking about it, and didn’t know the full
story, it’s quite sad really because, you know, you hear someone’ll
make a comment “Ward x discharged a patient with high
potassium and he died,” and that isn’t the full story. That’s really
hard and I say “Actually my nurse did tell the doctor.” - CS403
Senior Sister
Recovery Trajectory of Second Victim
While CS412 spoke to the strength of her direct manager (senior sister 403)
in supporting her emotionally and professionally, ultimately, she was left emotionally
devastated, unable to cope, and opted to drop out, leaving the organisation. She
accepted a nursing role in another country. The researcher interviewed CS412 on her
last day at the Trust.
“I had such a good line manager. You know, in fact I don’t think if
I had her I probably wouldn’t… I don’t know what I would have
done. I don’t think I’d be here today. I wouldn’t have been able to
cope without that support.” -Staff Nurse CS412
3 Conditions for Voice
Changes to nursing practice were closely aligned to the implementation of
recommendations, while Urologists, having not implemented any, still had emergent
practical changes worth noting, in response to this event.
The conditions for voice on ward x, shown in table 8.5, were found to be: first,
the introduction of, and closer adherence to standard operating procedure (Figure
8.2) by nursing management, which is referred to by nurses as influencing their
assertiveness with doctors. Second, emergent defensive behaviours by nurses,
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including always informing the doctor of blood results and tighter documentation, and
third, setting expectations for voice, where both urologists and nurses are checking
for abnormal blood results for patients, leading to a form of inter-professional
collaboration.
Table 8.5 Conditions for Voice
Urology Case
Conditions for Voice Doctors (n=3) Nurses (n=5)
Closer adherence to SOP 0 9
Defensiveness 4 11
Setting expectations for voice 3 9
Coding References
Closer Adherence to Standard Operating Procedure
Immediately following the incident, senior sister 403 implemented several
changes on Ward X, as per the RCA recommendations. This included printing and
laminating small cards that show normal values for common blood tests (see figure
8.1), introducing a standard operating procedure (SOP) for taking blood results over
the phone (see figure 8.2), and training analysis of all staff regarding knowledge of
commonly requested blood tests, discharge process, and audits of nursing
documentation. Senior sister 403 asked all nurses who had read and understood the
SOP to sign a sheet indicating so (Figure 8.3).
Introduction and adherence to the standard operating procedure (SOP)
(Figure 8.2) has encouraged voice behaviour of nurses. Having an SOP to fall back
on has seemed to embolden nurses on ward x, spurring them on to speak-up, and
communicate with doctors when abnormal blood results are received.
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Figure 8.1 – Common Blood Tests (Wallet-sized Laminated Card)
“when you’re busy and you’ve got a hundred tasks, and you’re
trying to prioritise, and you’re taking calls from all over, it’s like a
safeguard. You don’t have to doubt yourself, “Oh, is this the one
out of range?” There’s no room for error if you’ve got it in black
and white. You’ve got it written down (Figure 8.1) and you know
the ranges.” -CS412 Staff Nurse
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Figure 8.2 – Ward X Nursing Standard Operating Procedure
X
202
Figure 8.3 – Learning Sheet
“It’s all about making sure you confirm the results, inform the
nurse looking after the patient of the abnormal results, ensure the
doctor’s informed of the results and document all the results in the
notes etc. etc. and then I got all my staff to sign it (Figure 8.3) to
say that they knew” -CS403 Senior Sister 7
X
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Defensiveness
In contrast to the maternity case, defensive behaviour on ward x saw nurses
more pro-actively speaking-up, in line with the newly introduced standard operating
procedure (Figure 8.2). Consistent documentation in the patient chart, and the
‘informing of doctors’ seems a type of defensive behaviour. This was spurred by the
severe experience of CS412 staff nurse, who did not document in the medical record
who she had given the results to (doctor X), and thus was unable to defend her claims
during investigation.
This defensive behaviour was evidenced through nurses documenting all
blood results in the patient’s record, as well as always notifying the doctor caring for
the patient, and writing the details of such encounter down. For example, ‘spoke to
doctor X at <time> and advised blood results were #’ (Field Journal Notes). This
defensiveness contrasted with the maternity case where individuals wished to remain
silent (defensive silence) for fear of punitive actions, while on ward x nurses’
defensive voice was expressed out of a sense of compliance with SOP and self-
preservation. This shifted focus to others, the urologists, to protect the self, effectively
spreading the risk. Also notable was the absence of compassion by professionals in
this case, thus defensive voice was not driven by a sentiment of caring, but anger and
self-defence.
Although defensive in nature, this change resulted in increased voice
behaviour through nurses following their SOP for taking blood results by always
‘informing the doctor’.
“Inform the doctor and write in the notes the blood results and
who we’ve spoken to. Yeah, time, date and all that lot.” -CS409
Band 5 Staff Nurse
“it’s a learning curve to always do documentation. To be honest,
when I take blood results I always write down the time I’ve
received it from microbiology, who I’ve spoken to and then I bleep
… I mean I look myself to see if they’re abnormal and then I bleep
the doctor anyway... obviously write the doctor’s name who you
spoke to” -CS410 Band 5 Staff Nurse
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Setting Expectations for Voice
A change several Urologists (CS404, CS405) were found to have made to
their practice is being more aware and checking on test results more regularly. These
Urologists commented that nurses are certainly also doing this, collectively
contributing to the safety of this process. This is validated by quotes from nurses who
claim to be checking up results on terminals. While doctors are responsible for
checking results on ward computers, nurses have now added this responsibility to
their workload as well, improving patient safety on the ward. There is some evidence
for greater communication between nurses and urologists who have set expectations
around checking abnormal results a shared responsibility.
“I think people are certainly more aware of checking on results
more regularly… I think the nursing staff have become more
aware of it, so they’re definitely checking more often… the doctors
have become more vigilant in making sure that all the results are
actually reviewed before the patient is discharged” – CS404
Consultant Urologist, Education Lead
Table 8.6 Setting Expectations for Voice: Secondary Quotes
Secondary Quotes
“I think we’re more aware to look at the blood during the ward
round. Most of the blood tests are already written up in the
doctor’s notes. They have a little printout every day like that. I
can see each patient, they get the blood results and we check
that. If there’s no blood result written up, we check it on the
computer. We’re more aware of anything missing in the
process, we need to prevent any sort of tragedies like that” –
CS405, Consultant Urologist
“I do look at results myself if I suspect say a urine sample has
gone off or I think the patient looks a bit pale. I know that’s the
doctors job, but to cover myself I think I need to check.
Because of that incident I think everyone’s more aware now of
the importance of it. It could happen again unless someone is
really cautious and watching. Because we get so much
turnover of new doctors and they might not be used to the
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Secondary Quotes
ward… Definitely most of my colleagues on here are checking” -
CS410 Staff Nurse
While the RCA investigation’s recommendations pertaining to nursing practice
had been implemented, there was little evidence whether the urology directorate had
actioned the recommendations assigned to them.
“I’ve no idea whether that’s been done (the recommendations for
Urology Directorate). As nurses everything is followed up, but I’m
not quite sure about the medical team.” -Senior Sister 403
Absence of Recommended Changes - Urologists.
The clinical director (CS401) of the urology directorate, who initiated the SUI
investigative process, had, by May 2016 had taken no discernible action to implement
recommendations from the October 2015 investigative report. Specifically, two
recommendations stood out which were proving difficult to implement. First,
producing a clear set of guidelines for junior doctors that provide rationale for the
ordering of blood tests, and two, ensuring a robust plan is in place for reviewing and
acting upon blood tests when they are ordered.
“I was left with instructions to develop some policies and, to be
honest, I haven’t done a great deal about it partly because it’s not
just a urology thing, it’s a Trust-wide thing” – Urology Clinical
Director (CS401)
“There was some responsibility given to me to organise that and
it’s something I haven’t specifically done, but it strikes me that it’s
a hospital-wide thing. You know, blood tests are being ordered by
doctors all over the Trust … as far as I know there is no publicised
mechanism for ensuring that doctors have written that they’ve
ordered tests. So that’s something where I’ve probably been
lacking in dealing with this.” – Urology Clinical Director (CS401)
As the clinical director’s (CS401) quote suggest, there is an argument that
accountability for these recommendations do not lie solely within one department, but
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with the entire Trust including professions beyond Urology, making it difficult to
implement. As confirmed by the head scientist of the pathology department (CS402),
there is no hospital wide system for escalating abnormal sample results. This
exacerbates the difficulty in implementing these RCA recommendations, which
require the challenging task of bridging together many departments and professions
within the trust.
“In the hospital it’s left to either individual directors like urology,
haematology to come up with their own system, but there isn’t a
system in the hospital where we can phone abnormal results that
we know they’ll get dealt with” CS402 Head Clinical Scientist,
Pathology Department
4 Expressions of Defensive Voice
Following the incident and the emergence of the conditions identified above
there was increased assertiveness by nurses in the form of defensive voice. Nurses
escalate concerns about blood results to urologists on the ward, shifting focus to
others and protecting themselves by sharing the risk of managing a patient’s
abnormal blood result. These expressions of defensive voice by nurses are found in
table 8.7 expression of defensive voice.
Table 8.7 Expression of Defensive Voice
Urology Case
Expressions of Defensive Voice Doctors Nurses (n=4) Documents (n=1)
Defensive Voice 9 2
Coding References
Increased speaking up by nurses, is connected to introduction of the SOP
(Figure 8.2). This SOP introduced in October 2015 was referenced many times by
nursing staff as influencing their practice as of May 2016. Further, learning from the
traumatic experience of staff nurse CS412 also encouraged defensive voice.
During the June 2017 follow-up meeting, it was clear that nurse assertiveness,
including ‘chasing doctors’, contacting the ward matron, and notification of blood
results, were commonplace. Defensive behaviour was encouraged, if for example the
patient looks very ill, but vital signs have come back ok, nurses are suspicious to
interrogate the patient situation further, and follow-up with doctors again. This
emergent change in practice sees nurses communicating more frequently with
professionals of higher hierarchical-position. Although attempts at communication
might still result in ‘futility’, nurses are protecting themselves by offloading some of
the risk to doctors by notifying them straight away, and documenting who they spoke
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to and when. Defensive voice seems spurred not by compassion for patients, but out
of a sense of compliance, anger, fear and self-preservation.
“you must document the results and you must inform the doctors.
Don’t just put it in the notes. You must ring them straightaway and
act on it and then obviously write the doctor’s name who you
spoke to.” -CS410 Staff Nurse
Table 8.8 Expressions of Defensive Voice: Secondary Quotes
Secondary Quotes
“So it’s (SOP) all about making sure you confirm the results,
inform the nurse looking after the patient of the abnormal
results, ensure the doctor’s informed of the results and
document all the results in the notes etc.” -CS403 Senior Sister
“Inform the doctor and write in the notes the blood results and
who we’ve spoken to.” – CS409 Staff Nurse
5 Voice and Silence Summary
As shown in Table 8.9 ward x voice and silence summary, CS412 staff nurse
did not appear to be discouraged from speaking-up, however the message that she
delivered was not acted upon, leading to futility of voice and reinforcing that attempts
at voice were not effective, a condition for silence. While the practices of nurses have
changed, becoming more defensive, there is no indication of significant changes by
medical staff. As such, the outcome of the incident sees nurses’ speaking-up more
as a defensive behaviour, in line with the newly introduced SOP, complying with their
managers training on such. There is indication that urologists are aware of nurses
overlapping with them to check patient results and seem to welcome this emergent
behaviour which sets expectations for communication.
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Table 8.9 Ward X Voice and Silence Summary
C
lim
ate
Scenario Motive From Message Direction Target Outcome
SILEN
C
E
Nurse
received
abnormal
blood
results over
the phone
To Alert
Consultant
CS412
Band 5
Staff
Nurse
“Excuse me, is this a patient
you’re looking after? I’ve had a
phone call from microbiology with
these blood results. Are you going
to review the patient?”
“Staff Nurse recalled at interview
that she interrupted
the doctors, showed them
(patients) blood results and that
(doctor) acknowledged them and
said OK” – Serious Untoward
Incident Report into the care of Mr
X
Upward Consultant
Urologist
“Yes”
Futility of
Voice – no
action was
taken by
consultant
Hierarchical
culture
Voicing an
opinion
CS412
Band 5
Staff
Nurse
“there’s still them and us. There’s
still this communication difference
between the doctors and nurses…
when it comes to decision making,
I think there’s still that divide –
there’s them and us – and
whenever we’re voicing an opinion
it somehow is brushed away or
feels insignificant” CS412
Upward Consultant
Urologist
Futility of
Voice
“brushed
away or
feels
insignificant
”
Hierarchical
culture
- CS401
Clinical
Director
“I think there are two aspects to
this … there’s the medical culture
and the nursing culture… I don’t
think it’s significantly changed the
medical culture”
- - -
Serious Untoward Incident
VO
IC
E
Checking
Results
- CS404
Urologist
“I think people are certainly more
aware of checking on results more
regularly… I think the nursing staff
have become more aware of it, so
they’re definitely checking more
often…”
- - Setting
Expectation
s for Voice
Informing
the doctor
Defensive
- Follow
SOP
CS403
Senior
Sister 7
“So it’s (SOP) all about making
sure you confirm the results,
inform the nurse looking after the
patient of the abnormal results,
ensure the doctor’s informed of the
results”
Upward Consultant
Urologist
SOP
followed,
Defensive
Voice
Informing
the doctor
Defensive
-Follow
SOP
CS410
Staff
Nurse
“you must inform the doctors.. You
must ring them straightaway”
Upward Consultant
Urologist
SOP
followed,
Defensive
Voice
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6 Follow-up with Urology and Ward X
Evidence for continued defensive voice by nursing staff was found during the
June 2017 follow-up meeting with ward x. The ward manager explained that
“everyone learned their lessons from when this patient died”. She described how
nurses are not afraid to escalate, whereas before the incident and SOP, they had
sometimes doubted escalating concerns to a doctor, fearing they wouldn’t be
supported. Now nursing management is there to offer guidance and advice for
situations when “your not getting along with doctors replying to your concerns – we
can escalate”.
Interestingly, when queried about how doctors have responded to this
increased voice, the ward manager replied “it took a while for them”, suggesting that
while it might have taken some time, receptivity has improved somewhat.
During the initial interview session (May 2016) with three urologists, they were
unsure whether the RCA recommendations for urology had been acted upon, and
said they would raise this as a safety concern at their next directorate meeting.
Directorate meetings were scaled back due to financial constraints and senior
management changes in the trust.
“We haven’t even discussed this broadly and more deeply in the
directorate meeting so that the message is taken to each
consultant and the doctors.” CS405 Consultant Urologist
Table 8.10 Follow-up: secondary quotes
Secondary Quotes
“To my knowledge [Clinical Director, Urology] has
never discussed the recommendations of these in our
directorate meetings to my knowledge… six months
have gone by and none of us can remember that we
have debated this in our directorate meeting….” -
CS406 Consultant urologist
“To be honest, I’m not sure whether they’ve been
implemented or not. I think the best way forward to
know something about this is that we should chase it
up at the next meeting, how far have we gone with this
recommendation… we should have on our directorate
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Secondary Quotes
meeting pencilled a date to say we will check on that
day like in October or in April, how far we’ve got with
this implementation.” -CS407 Consultant Urologist
During the follow-up meeting of June 2017, and subsequent follow-up emails
with CS401 clinical director, urology, it was found that these safety recommendations
have now been discussed at a directorate meeting on more than one occasion, and
also in the Divisional Quality and Safety meeting. While it is positive to learn these
recommendations are being discussed more frequently, there is still no evidence they
are being modified or considered for implementation at a future date.
Urology and Ward X Case Conclusion
The hierarchical culture which existed on ward x at the time of the incident
contributed to staff nurse CS412’s futile efforts to notify doctor x of an abnormal blood
result, and neglecting to notify the nurse on duty because she had notified the ‘most
senior’ person on the ward, with no SOP to follow.
The affective impact, of guilt, and anger, was so severe for the staff nurse that
she found the experience “soul destroying” and, a year later, left the organisation.
This traumatic experience was contagious, influencing her nurse colleagues, and the
senior sister on ward x, who became affectively charged at the experience of her staff
nurse. The senior sister directed anger towards the doctor involved, and enacted
positively valenced practice changes in line with the RCA recommendations, which
would end up establishing the conditions for voice on ward x.
Other nurses on the ward were influenced by the experience of the staff nurse,
and enacted defensive practices, including tighter documentation and following a
SOP which directed them to always notify the doctor, resulting in defensive voice.
This defensiveness contrasted with the maternity case where individuals wished to
remain silent for fear of punitive actions, while on ward x nurses defensive voice was
expressed out of a sense of compliance with SOP and self-preservation, shifting focus
to others to protect the self. Also notable was the absence of compassion by
professionals in this case, thus defensive voice was not driven by a sentiment of
caring, but fear, anger and self-defence.
Further, nurses were found to have set expectations for communication with
urologists, through checking up on patient blood results on terminals, traditionally
something urology would handle. It was found that doctors did take a while to respond
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to these change, suggesting they are now aware and receptivity has improved
somewhat.
Findings Conclusion
These findings provide new insight into overcoming the hierarchical challenge,
a key barrier to the implementation of patient safety improvements following medical
error and root cause analysis investigations. As found in these cases, overcoming
this barrier is possible through establishing the conditions for voice. Those individuals
emotionally affected by medical error, the second victims, play a key role in spurring
on, either directly, or indirectly through emotional contagion, positively valenced
practice changes which create the conditions for voice.
Each case, while different in context, was similar in that conditions for silence
pervaded their environment. This contributed to the medical errors, either through
staff not speaking up, in the case of silence, or futility of voice, where staff spoke up
but were not heard. Defensive silence was found to exist in maternity, when a strong
blame culture, coupled with punitive investigations, saw individuals keeping silent to
protect themselves from the inquisition. Futility of voice, as seen in surgery and ward
x, was possible when a hierarchical culture existed in the department, dividing
professions, when those of low-hierarchical position attempted to communicate with
high-hierarchical positioned individuals, they were not heard.
A climate of silence found in each case played a role in the occurrence of
tragic medical errors. In all cases, patients were either harmed or expired. The
profound affective impact was evident for professionals directly involved, the second
victims, across all cases. Experiencing guilt and shame for one’s direct involvement
was common, often leading to anger, either directing blame at oneself, or other
healthcare professionals for their involvement in the error. Indirectly, the second
victim’s colleagues also experienced affect, often in the form of anger, through
emotional contagion. Compassion for patients, leading to a reinvigorated sentiment
of care which moderates hierarchy, through a common moral grounding, was found
in both surgery and maternity.
Affectively charged individuals who were directly involved, like second victim,
Mr. K, lead surgeon, played key roles in establishing the conditions for voice through
driving many emergent and recommended practice changes. In both maternity and
surgery, physician leaders set expectations for voice among hierarchically varied
professions. Nursing managers, across all cases engendered voice among their front-
line staff through offering coaching and support. These bottom-up changes were
further supported in ward x and surgery, through closer adherence to standard
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operating procedures which specifically directed nurses to contact doctors under
specific situations (i.e. abnormal blood result, missing swab/instrument). On Ward x,
defensive voice (Van Dyne, Ang, Botero, 2003) was expressed out of a sense of
compliance with SOP and self-preservation, shifting focus to others to protect the self.
Also notable was the absence of compassion by professionals in the urology and
ward x case, thus defensive voice was not driven by a sentiment of caring, but fear,
anger and self-defence.
Contrasting defensive voice in ward x, with prosocial voice found in surgery
and maternity, described as pro-social constructive employee behaviour intended to
help the organisation or work unit perform more effectively, or to make a positive
difference for the collective (Morrison, 2011). These later cases show an additional
condition that enabled voice, a reinvigorated sentiment of care, evidencing a motive
driven by compassion for patients and improvement of patient safety.
In chapter 9 discussion, a cross-case analysis is presented covering the
varying conditions for silence and voice discussed in these empirical chapters.
Expanded concepts of climate, including a climate of silence, and psychological
safety to describe a voice climate, are setup to explain the “painful journey” that
occurred in each case as these healthcare professionals transitioned from an
environment where silence pervaded to one which voice was encouraged.
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Section III: Discussion & Conclusion
Chapter 9 Discussion
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Introduction
Findings from the empirical chapters show that a hierarchical culture, blame
culture, and futility of voice, were all conditions leading to silence. These findings
highlight the hierarchical challenge (Senot et al., 2016), cultural barriers between
healthcare professionals inhibiting communication, as a key factor preventing voice,
with dire consequences for patient safety.
However, this hierarchical challenge was moderated in each case, eventually
leading to an increased use of voice. This discussion is structured to explain the
moderating conditions from each case and bring them together in a safety incident
model of voice for second victims. Within each of the following sections evidence from
all cases are compared, and relevant literature included, to provide a comprehensive
discussion.
First the idea of group climate, where silence pervaded, but later shifted,
encouraging voice is reintroduced, setting the stage for this chapter. Attention is
drawn to the conditions for each type of climate, first where silence pervaded, and
later where voice was found to be encouraged.
The conditions which led to the development of a climate of silence are
discussed including hierarchical and blame cultures, and futility of voice. Further the
acquiescent and defensive silence which was found to result from these climates,
leading to serious safety incidents, are described. These incidents had a negative
affective impact on second victims, and colleagues through emotional contagion, who
then enacted positively valenced changes.
The role of second victims in moderating the hierarchical challenge is
discussed next. This includes a summary of each second victim found in the study,
their recovery trajectory, and emotional contagion of colleagues. These second
victims and their affectively charged colleagues enacted several positively valenced
practice changes. These changes were antecedents to a climate which encouraged
two types of voice, defensive and prosocial.
Presented next are the positively valenced practice changes which
established the conditions for voice, these include: 1) setting expectations for voice,
2) management engendering voice, 3) closer adherence to policies and standard
operating procedures, and 4) a reinvigorated sentiment of care. Further, the
enactment of prosocial and defensive forms of voice which arose from a voice climate
are discussed.
With hierarchically moderating factors presented from across the three cases,
the safety incident model of voice for second victims is presented. Finally, the
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conclusion to this discussion summarises all of these elements and transitions to the
final chapter of this thesis.
Conditions for Climate
Group climate was introduced in chapter 3 as consisting of group members’
shared perceptions about, and the meanings they attach to policies and procedures,
and behaviours they see supported, rewarded, or what is felt to be expected.
Building on general definitions of climate, this study has branched out to
describe climates which hinder or encourage voice. The former is described by a
climate of silence (Morrison & Milliken, 2000), while the latter is a voice climate, or
more specifically, one which is psychologically safe (Edmondson, 1999) enough to
encourage those of lower-hierarchical position to speak-up.
In reviewing the three cases, both climates of silence and voice were found.
The conditions which led to these climates were described and are summarised in
Table 9.1 Conditions for Climate. On one end, the conditions for silence are listed,
including a hierarchical and blame culture, futility of voice, and defensiveness, leading
to both acquiescent and defensive silence. Following serious safety incidents which
affectively impacted professionals, numerous conditions that supported a voice
climate arose. This led to the enactment of both defensive and prosocial forms of
voice. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate how climate in each case
changed, highlighting the different conditions which moderated the hierarchical
challenge, both organisational and psychological, to develop a climate that
encourages the enactment of voice.
The starting point for this comparative case discussion is the climate of
silence, and types of silence, which pervaded in each department and directly
contributed to the serious safety incidents. Later, the conditions for voice which arose
following each incident, supporting a shift to a climate that encourages the enactment
of voice are compared.
While climate focuses on the local level, this study also draws in the concept
of culture, specifically hierarchical and blame cultures, to describe broader shared
assumptions, values, and beliefs that guide life inside the organisation. The latter are
often taught to organisational newcomers as proper ways to think and feel, whereas
climate is shared perceptions based on what employees experience locally and
behaviours they observe (Schneider et al., 2013). Patterson et al. (2005) raise the
distinction between climate and culture, suggesting while the two are sometimes used
interchangeably, climate represents the things which happen to employees, that is,
the patterns of behaviour. While culture is thought to emerge when employees are
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asked why these behavioural patterns exist, referring to the assumptions, values, and
beliefs mentioned earlier (Patterson et al., 2005).
Table 9.1 Conditions for Climate
C
ase
Conditions for
Silence
Climate of
Silence
Affective
Event Second
Victims
Conditions for
Voice
Voice
Climate
Surgery
- Hierarchical
Culture
- Futility of
Voice
Acquiescent
Silence
- Anger
- Shame
- Compassion
- Setting
expectations for
voice
- Closer
adherence to
policy
- Management
engendering
voice
- Reinvigorated
sentiment of
care
Prosocial
Voice
M
aternity
- Defensiveness
- Blame Culture
/ Punitive
Investigations
Defensive
Silence
- Anger
- Shame/Guilt
- Compassion
- Emotional
Contagion
- Setting
expectations for
voice
- Management
engendering
voice
- Reinvigorated
sentiment of
care
Prosocial
Voice
U
rology
and
W
ard
X
- Hierarchical
Culture
- Futility of
Voice
Futility of
Voice
- Guilt
- Anger
- Emotional
Contagion
- Closer
adherence to
policy
- Defensiveness
- Setting
expectations for
voice
Defensive
Voice
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Climate of Silence
The empirical portion of this study (Chapter 5) began by piecing together the
history of each incident that occurred, building understanding of the conditions and
circumstances which contributed to the errors. The main conditions which led to a
climate of silence, as shown in Figure 9.1 Climate of Silence, were hierarchical
culture, futility of voice and blame culture. As such, the environment under which
these conditions were able to persist will be discussed, and similarities and
differences drawn out.
Figure 9.1 Climate of Silence
Hierarchical Culture
The presence of a hierarchical culture between professions was found to
restrain voice in the surgery and ward x cases. In surgery futility of voice and
acquiescent silence, the passive withholding of relevant ideas based on resignation
(Van Dyne et al., 2003) was found, while in ward x voice was simply futile. These
findings are suggestive of a link between environments which harbour a hierarchical
culture, and futility of voice by lower hierarchically positioned professionals.
It was written in the surgical never event investigative report that “due to team
hierarchy they (nurses) felt unable to raise their concerns to the surgeons”. This
manifested where nurses questioned their ability to raise concerns, that even if they
raised a concern they lacked the assurance that it would be accepted by surgeons.
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Where a senior nurse did raise a concern, it was ignored, leading other nurses to
believe further voice would be futile and stay silent. Given the power associated with
specialist doctors, viewed as higher status than generalist doctors and inter-
professionally than nurses (Abbott, 1988; Freidson, 1970, 1988), it’s not surprising
that the lead surgeon’s (Mr. K) decision to not reopen the patient to check for the
swab, even after a warning by a senior nurse, remained final. Several nurses reported
knowing the wrong imaging modality was being used yet remained silent.
Unfortunately for the patient, the presence of the hierarchical culture led to silence
and the swab was retained in her body.
The silence of nurses during surgery can be explained by the climate of the
surgical team in the operating theatre, a multi-professional action team (Edmondson,
2003; Weiss, et al.,2016), where several team members witnessed futility of voice.
The surgical action team, a multiple hierarchically organised group (Edmondson,
2003) should respond in a coordinated way to unexpected events requiring an open
and free transfer of information to support real-time reciprocal coordination of action.
However, group climate was unsafe resulting from shared beliefs at the time of the
never event that speaking up was not tolerated. Thus team members had trouble
creating shared meaning about the scenario they encountered and lacked a ‘big
picture’ about how different expertises in the group fit together (Clark & Wheelwright,
1995).
Similar to surgery, professional differences varied by hierarchical position,
between urologists and nurses in the ward x case. While hierarchical differences on
ward x did not prevent the nurse from speaking up, they did prevent her from being
heard by urologists. Unlike surgery, on the busy inpatient ward x only the staff nurse
whose voice was rendered futile knew, it was not observed by others, and she was
not aware of the futility of her efforts until much later when the tragic event had already
occurred. Further, because the ward x staff nurse was newly qualified she believed
she had completed the appropriate escalation, showing the blood results to the most
high-status person on the ward, when in fact had she followed standard operating
procedure she would have also informed the nurse caring for the patient. Evidence
clearly showed that a ‘them and us’ mentality existed on ward x with clear separation
between a medical and nursing culture.
While it was expected that a hierarchical culture would also be found among
specialist doctors in obstetrics, and midwifes, this was not prevalent. A blame culture
was instead found which pervaded the entire maternity department resulting from risk
management’s punitive investigations. This will be discussed in greater detail in the
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next section.
Returning to the literature on cultural differences between doctors and nurses,
Senot et al. (2016) describe the cultural barriers between nurses and physicians as a
‘hierarchical challenge’ that resulted in difficulty for nurses to speak-up during care
delivery and promote collaboration between professions. As written in chapter 3,
doctors tend to emphasise technical efficacy in translating abstract medical
knowledge into effective interventions (Apesoa-Varano & Varano, 2014), while nurses
traditionally employ a discourse of caring which emphasises soft skills (Nelson &
Gordon, 2006).
Although nurses, seen as information brokers (Allen, 2004), play an important
role co-ordinating patient information among multi-professional team members,
doctors are known to use this information to make diagnosis, but do so without
acknowledgment of the nursing skills involved, leaving nurses out of further diagnostic
discussions (Wicks, 1998). This is a theme which continues throughout the literature,
suggesting power imbalances make it difficult for nurses to directly influence medical
decision making.
The findings of surgery and ward x cases which describe silence and futility
of voice, are what would be expected, given several past studies, including Coomb’s
(2003) study of UK intensive care units, finding that while doctors seemed to
appreciate nurses’ detailed knowledge of a patient’s condition, they did not value this
in making decisions. Further, Savage (1995) described how nurses felt as if their
knowledge counted for nothing when shared with doctors. Anspach (1993) offers an
alternative suggestion that it is because of the nurses’ position within the social
organisation of healthcare work, and the information this makes readily available to
them, that disagreements can develop with different professional groups, whose
position might give them access to different information flows.
Futility of Voice
The poor receptivity by higher-status professionals to voice by those of lower-
status, led to futility of voice, playing out similarly in both the surgery and ward x
cases.
In surgery, a senior nurse with over 25 years of experience expressed concern
over the imaging modality (fluoroscopy) brought to theatre by a radiologist. Upon
observing this, she recalled plain film x-ray was the appropriate imaging modality for
a retained swab and proceeded to explain this to the surgeon. His response was to
dismiss the comment, “No, no, it’s alright”, to assure her it would be fine, taking no
action.
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On ward x a newly qualified nurse upon receiving abnormal blood results over
the phone from the lab, went to the most senior doctor on the ward and notified him
of the blood result. The senior doctor said ‘ok’ and carried on, dismissing the
notification.
Conversely, futility of voice was not found in the maternity case. No one
involved in that case spoke up in time to prevent patient harm. This is explained
through the presence of a blame culture resulting from punitive investigations, leading
to development of defensive silence among midwives, which saw them minimise risk
through erring on the side of caution when conveying information about safety to other
professionals, for fear of punitive repercussion. As such, there was no chance for
poor receptivity by higher-status professionals about voice because lower-status
professionals by default were more likely to keep quiet.
In search of the literature on futility of voice, organisational examples were
scarce (Brinsfield et al., 2009), as such, these examples of futility are explained
through “silent treatment”, a form of social ostracism, where individuals ignore or
exclude people (Williams, 2007). Williams, Shore, and Grahe (1998) found that ‘failing
to respond to any questions or comments’ was commonly reported by study
participants describing “the silent treatment”. Similar to the findings of this thesis,
where nurses reported negative affective experiences, the detrimental impact of the
“silent treatment” is found to include resentment, withdrawal, and poor psychological
functioning (Sommer, Williams, Ciarocco, & Baumeister, 2001). It’s a purposeful
silence, enacted with the intention to ignore or exclude another individual or group of
individuals. Thus the futility of voice found here can be explained by existing cultural
barriers between professions, and hierarchical differences, that played a role in why
surgeons and urologists ignored and excluded these nurses.
One study found employees who witnessed instances of voice futility, i.e.
supervisors taking on comments but with no discernible action being taken, led
employees to believe that further voice attempts would be perceived as low efficacy,
and futile, further galvanising a climate of silence (Detert and Treviño, 2010). These
findings are not unexpected given individuals of lower hierarchical position, and with
less formal influence, are more likely to have feelings that their voice would be futile
(Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 2008; Morrison & Rothman, 2009). As such it’s unsurprising
that the formation of shared beliefs about futility of voice developed in surgery,
preventing further voice attempts. Surgical nurses witnessed futile efforts by a
colleague to voice concerns and decided to stay silent. In ward x, as discussed later,
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these shared beliefs about futility emerged as anger towards the higher-status
occupational group, urologists, resulting in a type of defensive voice.
Blame Culture and Defensiveness
A blame culture is an environment where employees, due to long held
assumptions that they will be considered at fault, held individually responsible, and
punished, are hesitant to be transparent and honest about their experiences of error
(Waring, 2005). Further, the use of Root Cause Analysis (RCA) investigative
technique has been found to engender a culture of blame rather than promote
organisational learning (Currie et al., 2014; Nicolini et al., 2011).
Comparing the findings from the maternity case to descriptions of blame
culture from the literature finds similarities. Carroll, et al., (2002) in their study of root
cause analysis in a chemical plant found a culture of blame created fear, leading
individuals to worry about being held personally and professionally responsible for
the safety incident, hindering the organisations ability to investigate and learn from
incidents. In maternity, use of RCA by an embedded risk management team was a
punitive investigation into the practice of individuals. Midwives and obstetricians felt
that not only would the incident be investigated, but also the practice of individuals
called into question and punitive actions taken, describing the process as both a
safety and management investigation. For example, the co-ordinator in maternity was
suspended from her role for more than a year, given a 450-hour training plan, and
assigned disciplinary courses.
The risk management approach in maternity called into question the usual
focus of RCA on ‘latent’ or system factors (Reason, 2000) and instead an emphasis
was placed on individuals and human error. Further, RCA is vulnerable to ‘political
hijacking’ (Peerally et al., 2016) which was evident to a degree in maternity when the
lead midwife for quality & governance described frictions between her team’s efforts
completing investigations and the head of midwifery’s emphasis on linking RCA to
disciplinary processes.
The disciplinary and punitive measures associated with RCA in maternity,
where an ‘us vs them’ mentality existed, played a direct role in the formation of shared
beliefs among front-line staff that keeping quiet about patient safety errors was
necessary to protect themselves. Front-line staff did not want to be blamed or
punished and as a result initiated defensive behaviours which saw them keeping
silent: hiding their employee pin numbers, and withholding information based on fear.
Morrison & Milliken’s (2000) description of a climate of silence seem analogous to the
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experience of professionals in the maternity department where speaking up about
problems is dangerous or futile.
Types of Silence
Now that the main conditions which led to silence: hierarchical and blame
cultures, and futility of voice, have been described, the discussion will next explain
the variance in types of silence present in the cases. Similarities and differences will
be drawn out and links to literature established. Evidence for silence, which resulted
when individuals perceived the risk to be too great to speak-up, were found across
surgery and maternity cases. As mentioned above, futility of voice, a condition that
can lead to silence, was found in ward x rather than a complete absence of voice.
While evidence for acquiescent and defensive forms of silence were found
among the cases, there was an absence of prosocial silence, described in chapter 3,
as the withholding of information out of cooperation or for altruistic reasons (Van Dyne
et al., 2003).
Acquiescent Silence
While at least one senior surgical nurse, with over 25 years of experience, felt
powerful enough to escalate concerns to the surgeon resulting in the futility discussed
above, It’s likely an individual factor, her long tenure, played a role in her enactment
of voice. It’s known that tenure is positively correlated to voice behaviour (Milliken et
al., 2003).
The remainder of nurses on the surgical team were silenced completely. Their
behaviour, described as acquiescent silence, is the withholding of relevant ideas,
information, or opinions due to resignation (Van Dyne et al., 2003). The surgical
nurses were resigned to decisions made by the lead surgeon and radiologist
regarding fluoroscopy as the imaging modality brought to theatre, when in fact several
of them reported having learned that plain film x-ray was the correct method for
identifying a retained swab. In their belief, speaking up would be pointless and unlikely
to make a difference, having just witnessed a senior nurse’s futile efforts at voice.
This resignation to withhold further ideas and keep opinions to themselves
results from a shared perceived low self-efficacy to make a difference, thus they
disengaged and did not contribute further suggestions proactively. Resignation by
nurses and poor-receptivity by surgeons was only worsened by the fatigue which both
experienced from the long, ten-hour, and complex surgery.
Acquiescent silence also resulted from a hierarchical culture on the team,
where nurses questioned whether a concern they might raise would even be acted
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upon, they lacked assurance, viewing the situation as too risky, fearing reprisal and
kept quiet. The professional hierarchy of medical professionals was found to directly
influence this decision, with the specialist doctor being viewed as most powerful, while
junior doctors, and nurses found themselves subordinate to the surgeons decision
(Abbott, 1988; Freidson, 1988).
Defensive Silence
Analysis of the maternity department unveiled silence among the midwives.
The nature of the silence in maternity differed from surgery. Among midwives there
were signs of individuals maintaining silence to defend themselves, for example
through deliberately neglecting to report patient safety incidents, hiding employee pin
numbers, and not speaking up for fear of punitive action. These defensive behaviours,
as previously mentioned, were found to result from a departmental blame culture, in
which punitive risk management investigations were carried out.
Defensive silence, is a relatively new term in the voice literature, having
similarities to an earlier description: ‘quiescent silence’, referring to situations where,
due to fear of negative consequences, employees withhold information from those in
positions of power (Pinder & Harlos, 2001). These behaviours were later defined as
defensive silence (Van Dyne et al., 2003), which is more proactive, in that it involves
awareness, and conscious decisions to withhold opinions, information, and ideas, as
was found in maternity. These terms are consistent with definitions of organisational
silence, and psychological safety, which emphasises fear as a key motivator of
silence (Edmondson, 1999; Morrison & Milliken, 2000).
In each of the three cases, silence and/or futility of voice was found, directly
contributing to patient safety incidents. Highlighting silence and futility in each case is
important to provide a starting point to the journey that these professionals, across all
cases, went through on their way to achieving a climate where voice is encouraged.
The next area for comparison and discussion, one central to moderating the
hierarchical challenge, is how to address the second victim phenomenon.
Specifically, developing understanding of the role of second victims in making, and
influencing, positively valenced practice changes, leading to the establishment of
conditions which encourage voice. The occurrence of the incident and investigations
had a cascading effect on this process, beginning with negative affective experiences
by second victims. These experiences affectively charged individuals, either the
second victim them-self, or through emotional contagion to colleagues and
managerial level staff. This researcher believes that any discussion of patient safety
needs incorporation of this unavoidable and seeming over-looked element, the
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second victims, and how these important individuals can be supported and harnessed
for positive improvement and safety.
Second Victims
Key findings inherent to this study, which have not been addressed before,
are the role these incidents, and their resulting negative affective experiences felt by
second victims, and contagiously by colleagues, play in shaping the conditions for
voice. These relationships are discussed next.
Given our partial understanding of the phenomenon so far, the severity of any
medical error is thought to be positively correlated with the degree of affective impact
on healthcare professionals involved (Sirriyeh et al., 2010). This leads to experiencing
negative emotional states such as guilt and shame, reduced morale, confidence, and
leading to further negative occurrences such as loss of professional reputation and
substance abuse (Wu, 2000).
It’s understood these victims recover along a trajectory (Scott, et al. 2009),
and while much is known about detrimental effects, less is known about the potential
positive implications of medical error for practice (Sirriyeh et al., 2010). Evidence was
found for the enactment of positively valenced changes by a ‘thriving’ second victim,
the study also found that second victims who ‘survive’ and ‘drop out’ play a role in
positively valenced change through emotional contagion of colleagues. A list of the
second victims and emotional contagion in this study is found in Table 9.2 Recovery
Trajectory of Second Victims and Emotional Contagion.
Thriving
While understanding of ‘thriving’ following medical error is limited, the case of
Bewtra (2002), is an example of a pathologist who experienced shame after a serious
error, and arguably went on to thrive. Bewtra made amends for her mistake through
successfully researching atypical medical presentations and educating her peers.
Further, Iedema et al. (2009) found that for newly qualified anaesthetists, their
emotional and practical responses to safety incidents were far from mutually arbitrary.
Incidents were found to cause anguish, leading these anaesthetists to change their
courses of action, and in some cases their careers.
Drawing on these examples from the literature, equating Mr. K, the lead
surgeon, as having ‘thrived’ seems reasonable. Mr. K’s experience, demonstrates the
powerful influence, the so called “painful journey”, of a never event, had on his
enactment of practices, some negative to begin, then followed by positive. Mr. K was
particularly susceptible to the event, having not, in his 21-year career, been involved
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in a never event, as such the incident was a milestone moment, shaping his practice
thereafter. Of relevance was his emergent change to practice, setting expectations
for voice among multidisciplinary team members. While this first began in a negative
form, with taking over nurse swab counting duties, it later evolved into ensuring that
expectations for communication were established between all team members. This
change in practice was a key condition for improving climate, encouraging the
enactment of voice.
While several factors are evidenced as encouraging voice in surgery, Mr. K’s
top-down setting of expectations for voice was a prime factor, spurring bottom-up
change from nursing management in response to his positive behaviour. Further
evidence of Mr. K’s thriving trajectory is involvement in preventing at least one
additional never event at the Trust when he heard a surgical team was in trouble with
a missing swab, he scrubbed in, and informed of the correct way to manage the
situation, finding the missing item and avoiding harming the patient. Further, desire
to share these experiences with all surgical colleagues at the trust, speaking at
conferences, and a desire to co-publish his experiences in a peer-reviewed journal
with this researcher, show how he has gained insight and is continuously striving to
improve patient safety.
Such was the consistency among surgical team members in their affective
states, experiencing anger, shame, and compassion, across surgeons and nurses,
it’s suggestive of an influential relationship between the affective state of the team
leader, the person who admitted making a key decision that led to the never event,
and the collective affective state of the team. This is supported by studies which show
group leaders infect their group members with their affective states, a form of affective
convergence, that drives group outcomes (Barsade & Knight, 2015). In contrast to
maternity and ward x staff, the surgical team members were all directly involved in
the error, thus they were all affectively impacted by the same event, and no emotional
contagion of departmental colleagues was found. The emotional contagion of close
colleagues and managers by staff nurse 412, in ward x, and obstetrician doctor S and
midwife Z, in maternity, are described more fully in the next section
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Table 9.2 Recovery Trajectory of Second Victims and Emotional
Contagion
C
ase
Second
Victim
Affective
Experience
Recovery
Trajectory
(Scott, et
al., 2009)
Emotional Contagion
Surgery
‘Mr. K’
CS213
Surgical
Team
Leader
Anger, Shame,
and Compassion
“It was very, very
difficult.”
‘Thriving’
None found. All team
members directly involved in
error
CS211
Locum
Consultant,
Surgeon
Anger, Shame,
and Compassion
“you’ve let
yourself down,
and the surgical
team, and the
patient most
importantly”
‘Surviving’
M
aternity
‘Doctor S’
CS302
Consultant
Obstetrician
Guilt and Shame,
“ingrained in my
soul”
‘Surviving’ CS303 Clinical Director
Obstetrics (Anger, Crying)
Midwife Z “It’s still ongoing
with [midwife z]”
‘Dropping
Out’
CS304, CS306, and CS307
midwifery managers (Anger,
blaming themselves for
putting Midwife Z in
precarious position)
W
ard
X
CS412 Staff
Nurse
Guilt and Anger,
“Soul destroying”
‘Dropping
Out’
CS403 Senior Sister (Anger
directed towards urologist
involved)
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Surviving, Dropping Out, and Emotional Contagion
Similar to, Mr. K, professionals from the other cases were also classified as
second victims. Where they differ is with regards to their recovery trajectories. Both
maternity and ward x, saw examples of professionals ‘dropping out’, leaving the
organisation, while doctor S in maternity ‘survived’, performing at expected levels, but
remaining emotionally distressed about her involvement in the incident.
Evidence of emotional contagion, an implicit “automatic affective transfer
process” (Kelly & Barsade, 2001, p.101), which explains how emotions and moods of
individuals spread to those nearby, was found in maternity and ward x cases.
Negative affective experiences of second victims were transferred to their colleagues
and managers, who also became negatively affected, expressing anger, blaming
either themselves or other professionals responsible for the events.
This contagion is interesting in that even though these second victims did not
‘thrive’, they influenced others who became affectively charged, and went on to enact
positively valenced changes, in the form of emergent or recommended practice
changes, that were conditions for voice in maternity and ward x.
On the maternity unit, midwife managers who had close contact with midwife
z expressed anger, blaming themselves for having put her in a precarious position
contributing to the serious safety incident. These same individuals then went on to
enact positively valenced changes in the form of engendering voice including
coaching, ‘respectful challenge’ training, and a reinvigorated sentiment of care.
Further, the clinical director of obstetrics had close contact with doctor S, the
obstetrician, following the incident, expressing anger and crying over her subordinate
being stigmatised and traumatised. She went on to set expectations for voice in the
maternity department to prevent similar events from arising again.
Emotional contagion also played a role in the formation of defensive voice on
ward x. Staff nurse 412’s colleagues observed how “destroyed” she was by the
incident and during the investigation, where she was unable to defend herself, having
not taken defensive steps, documenting names and times, which would have
protected her. Her nursing colleagues were contagiously influenced by her negative
affective experience. They developed a self-protective attitude, including defensive
behaviours such as always informing doctors to shift focus away from nurses, and
strictly documenting who they spoke to, and when, for fear of a similar tragic incident
happening to them.
This study’s findings are suggestive of a new-found relationship between
negative affective events like medical errors influencing positively valenced practice
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changes. These changes were found to improve climate, encouraging the enactment
of voice. The relationship between affect and voice is explained through the actions
of affectively charged individuals, or emotionally infected colleagues, whose positive
practice changes were a condition leading to a voice climate.
These positively valenced changes, driven by affectively charged individuals
or directly by second victims, which improved climate, making it safer for voice, are
compared next. These include both top-down changes by higher status-professionals
including setting expectations for voice, and bottom-up changes by lower-status
professionals including defensive behaviours, engendering of voice by managers,
and closer adherence to policy and standard operating procedures. Further, a key
change which improved climate, driven by both lower and higher-status professionals,
a reinvigorated sentiment of care, is also explained. The concept of psychological
safety is drawn upon in conceptualising the formation of a voice climate.
Voice Climate
Psychological safety at a team level is when shared beliefs exist among team
members that their team is safe for risk taking. This stems from expectations that
members will not reject or punish someone for speaking up, and mutual trust and
respect (Edmondson, 1999). These beliefs are thought to converge in a team
because members are implicated by the same set of shared influences, and because
these perceptions develop out of salient shared experiences. Further, team leaders,
particularly those who are more receptive, are thought to play a role in creating
enhanced feelings of psychological safety (Detert & Burris, 2007; Edmondson, 2003).
As explained in chapter 3, psychological safety is drawn upon in this study as
synonymous with the idea of a group voice climate.
Professionals in teams where a voice climate is found are more likely to
speak-up in the event of a medical error, allowing for corrective action to be taken
(Edmondson, 1996). Further, this safe climate, where professionals embrace errors,
has a positive influence on team performance (Edmondson, 1996).
As presented in this study’s findings, individuals affectively influenced,
whether second victims, or colleagues via a process of emotional contagion, drove
several emergent and recommended positively valenced practice changes on each
unit. These positive practice changes included: setting expectations for voice,
management engendering voice, closer adherence to policies and SOP, and a
reinvigorated sentiment of care.
These practices, as shown in Figure 9.2 Voice Climate, were found to
strengthen climate, making it safer for voice, enabling the enactment of defensive and
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prosocial voice. These conditions are discussed next and comparisons made across
all cases.
Figure 9.2 Voice Climate
Setting Expectations for Voice
Affectively charged professionals in high-status positions were responsible for
the top-down establishment of expectations for voice in their departments,
contributing to voice climate. Mr. K, lead surgeon and ‘thriving’ second victim, and the
obstetrical clinical director, who was emotionally infected, set about ensuring that
professionals on their teams, whether of lower-hierarchical position, or equal,
understood what was expected in terms of inter-professional communication.
These practice changes included medical leaders establishing expectations,
from the top-down, for voice, in both surgery and maternity. This helped establish a
safer environment for lower-hierarchically positioned professionals, where it was
understood what was expected and would be supported when it came to inter-
professional communication.
The impetus for Mr. K was in broadening his perspective as a team leader, to
take a step back during complex multi-site surgeries and encourage more inclusive
communication between the multi-professional surgical site teams. His change in
approach can be summarised through his quote “no one is not important enough to
be listened to ever”. Evidence for enactment of voice that resulted from this change
in climate will be discussed in the upcoming section on prosocial voice which found
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many examples of surgical colleagues now feeling supported in raising concerns.
The obstetrical clinical director, feeling upset over the traumatic and
stigmatising incident her colleague and subordinate, doctor S, had to endure, was
contagiously influenced, becoming affectively charged as a result. As the senior
specialist doctor on the ward, she, from the top-down established informal standards
of what’s expected for inter-departmental communication with colleagues of equal
(obstetricians) and lower-hierarchical (midwives) status.
Reflecting on the role of higher-status professionals, these findings are
comparable to Senot, et al. (2016) who described ‘physician-led cross-level
collaboration’ which helped mitigate the hierarchical challenge faced by nurses. This
collaboration was described as involving frequent interactions between high level
physicians and lower level nurses, for example physicians allowing nurses to identify
or even pilot initiatives related to improving patient care, or physicians participating in
the hiring of high level nurses in their department.
Where there was lack of second victim from medical community, as was the
case on ward x, setting expectations for voice seemed to come from the lower-
hierarchically positioned professionals: nurses. This change was aligned with the
emergence of defensive behaviours which saw nurses make several changes
including checking ward computer terminals for patient blood results rather than
relying on urologists, and as such set expectations for communication around
checking patient’s blood results. While this emergent change by nurses led to the
enactment of defensive voice, discussed in the next section, it’s not certain whether
receptivity by high-status professionals, urologists in this case, has improved, with
ward x manager saying at the follow-up meeting only: “it took a while for them
(urologists)” to respond to increased voice by nurses.
As discussed in chapter 3, lower-status professionals experience a sense of
futility when it comes to voicing their concerns if the target of their voice, higher-status
professionals, are unsupportive or unapproachable. Thus within a hierarchy of
professions, both those at the top and those at the bottom, are part of an interplay
which dictates employee voice behaviour. As such this positively valenced change,
setting expectations for voice, can be viewed as part of the interplay between doctors
and nurses, explained through negotiated order, where professionals engage in
negotiations over how to treat patients, because formal policies and procedures are
too general (Strauss et al., 1963).
In both surgery and maternity, the response to this top-down behaviour was
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bottom-up emergence of changes by the managers of lower-status professionals who
wished to engender voice among front-line staff.
Management Engendering Voice
Key emergent changes from the bottom-up, across all cases, were nursing
managements’ engendering of voice among their frontline staff, in the form of
supportive coaching and respectful challenges. This was in response to medical
leads’ own setting of expectations, or independently, without medical receptivity, out
of self-protection, in the case of ward x nurses.
In response to Mr. K’s call for more inclusive communication among surgery
team members, nurse managers supported their staff in being more assertive. These
managers empower staff to challenge and escalate concerns, and advise they are
available if staff haven’t got the confidence or experience to challenge a surgeon.
Staff can contact managers to come and address the situation.
Similarly, in the maternity case, midwife management was strongly involved
in empowering front-line midwives in response to top-down setting of expectations by
the obstetrical lead. This empowerment came in the form of ‘respectful challenge’
training, intended to enable junior midwives who might not have the confidence, to
raise an issue when they have a concern. They learn how to ask higher-status
professionals, like obstetricians, about the rationale behind their decisions. Further,
midwife co-ordinators and matrons make themselves available and approachable for
junior staff, to offer advice on next steps, or assist in contacting more senior staff like
obstetricians. Coaching of junior staff was also reported, demonstrating that senior
midwives are proactively engaged with their staff, testing how they might respond in
certain situations.
These findings align with (Ashford et al., 2009) who found that supervisors
play a role in creating opportunities for voice through informal and formal mechanisms
which influence employees decision whether or not to speak up. Supervisors
influence stems from their position which places them as frequent targets of voice
and having power over controlling the outcome.
As such, it’s clear how this engendering of voice strengthens group climate
about safety and efficacy of voice. Managerial staff create and reinforce shared
beliefs about what is supported, rewarded, and expected for communication between
professionals in their department. Further reinforcing these expectations, leading to
a voice climate, were the introduction of policies and standard operating procedures.
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Closer Adherence to Policies and Standard Operating Procedures
Influencing group climate from the bottom-up in surgery and ward x was the
implementation and closer adherence to policy and standard operating procedures.
By setting expectations for the use of these policies and procedures, nurse managers
bolstered front-line nurses, demonstrated what was expected, supported, and created
shared beliefs that their departments were safe for voice.
Unlike the emergent positively valenced changes mentioned thus far, the
review and closer adherence to policy and standard operating procedure (SOP)
(Figure 6.1) in the surgery department, and implementation of SOP (figure 8.2) in
ward x, were formal recommendations stemming from the root cause analysis
investigation. These cases were similar in that lower-status professionals in both
departments were found to more closely adhere to SOP, referring to these documents
when describing assertive voice behaviour, mentioning how they had followed SOP:
referencing the policy, pulling it off the wall, or accessing it via computer terminal and
showing it to their peers. These SOP were utilised as part of nursing management’s
efforts to engender voice among their front-line staff.
The presence of, and direction from nursing management regarding SOP,
helped strengthen beliefs that it was safe to escalate concerns and challenge
hierarchy in these departments. As such, the introduction of these SOP, which
established what was expected in circumstances requiring escalation (contacting
higher status-professionals), led to a safer environment, bolstering front-line staff, and
encouraging the enactment of voice. It demands mention that although these SOP
encourage voice, it appeared to only influence voice which specifically addressed the
needs of the situation, accounting for a retained object during surgery, and taking
patients’ blood results over the phone. Thus, SOP should not be seen as a panacea
for creating a voice climate, but they did appear useful in helping establish a climate
which drove voice behaviour for the specific safety situations addressed in these
cases.
There was no recommendation to introduce SOP in maternity, the
recommendations from that RCA were rather generic, and were criticised as such by
the head midwife. However, the establishment of voice climate in maternity
developed from: top-down setting of expectations for voice, specific training from the
bottom-up that was assigned to address respectful challenge, and a reinvigorated
sentiment of caring for patients. Expressions of compassion for patients were also
found in surgery, but noticeably absent in ward x, these differences and similarities
are discussed next.
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Reinvigorated Sentiment of Care
An emergent reinvigorated sentiment of care by professionals in surgery and
maternity cases was found to contribute to a voice climate. The contribution was in
the form of witnessing what types of behaviours group peers demonstrate, particularly
leaders who set expectations of model behaviour. Doctors and nurses from both
cases were moved by the patients’ suffering and talked about wanting to prevent
further harm from happening to their patients, again demonstrating convergence of
affective experience, compassion in this instance. The development of this sentiment
of care led to a common moral grounding among team members, granting a shared
perception and meaning about how future care would be delivered, with an emphasis
on caring for patients.
In describing the sentiment of care of professionals, doctors, and nurses, in
both surgery and maternity cases, as reinvigorated, it must be mentioned that it was
first rendered latent by the hierarchical and blame cultures discussed earlier.
Following the traumatic serious safety incidents, many expressions of compassion
were expressed by second victims and their colleagues. This build-up of emotional
episodes of compassion eventually reinvigorated a sentiment of care underpinning
their professionalism which had previously been rendered dormant. This shows a re-
emergence of professional work that is characterised by a sentiment of care having
a moral or ethical imperative at its core, whereby the professionals sacrifice self-
interest and accept responsibility for the client (Brint, 2015; Carr-Saunders & Wilson,
1933; Parsons, 1951).
A desire to put the needs of patients and family first was found in both surgery
and maternity, analogously treating the patient as though they were a member their
own family. Discussion of safety incidents seemed to precede all expressions of
compassion, suggesting incidents are a catalyst for shaping how these professionals
feel distress at the suffering of their patients and enacting voice with a desire to keep
them safe. Further sustaining a sentiment of care in maternity was the practice to give
out ‘compassion cards’ to staff who are seen delivering compassionate care. The
hierarchical barriers between professions were moderated by a mutual desire to put
patients first and care for them safely, contributing to a voice climate.
In stark contrast to maternity and surgery cases, the lack of compassion by
professionals of both high and low-status on ward x are an interesting finding which
appears linked to the type of voice enacted by professionals on that ward. Rather
than prosocial voice which emphasised patient safety, nurses on ward x seemed to
emphasise protecting themselves and their colleagues. This likely was due to the
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context of the incident in which a nurse was held accountable for the death of a patient
and was unable to defend herself during the investigation because she had not taken
defensive steps. Further, higher-status professionals, urologists and their clinical
director, seemed removed from the incident itself, displaying no emotion over the
tragic event. Conversely, the emotional contagion among nurses on ward x was anger
directed towards urology, and not compassionate expressions towards patients.
In comparing these emergent and recommend positively valenced practice
changes, it’s evident that factors which strengthen climate, making it safer for voice,
are diverse, with some being driven top-down by high-status professionals, and from
the bottom-up by lower-status professionals in response. As such an interplay
between hierarchical levels is necessary to create the right environment for voice.
The cumulative output of this climate changing process is a safer environment that
encourages voice. Where people share perceptions of, and meanings attached to
group behaviours, procedures, policies, and understand what is expected of them,
and whether they will be supported.
The types of voice which emerge from this interplay however can be quite
different. As hinted at, the voice with emerged among nurses on ward x was primarily
defensive in nature, while a more constructive, prosocial form of voice was found in
surgery and maternity cases. These differences and similarities are drawn out in the
next section.
Types of Voice
The prevalence of voice behaviour in all cases is an interesting finding. The
data shows under what conditions healthcare professionals feel safe to speak-up.
The elements common to each case, which assemble as part of the “painful journey”
(Mr.K, Lead Surgeon) toward a climate which enables enactment of voice include:
the occurrence of a serious medical error, the harmful after-effects felt by second
victims, and recommended and emergent practice changes led by affectively charged
professionals. What we know from these cases is each group went through a journey,
consisting of multiple elements, resulting in a shift to a climate which encouraged the
enactment of voice.
The voice literature has grown to acknowledge that voice is a multi-
dimensional construct. As such, types of both voice and silence can vary depending
on contextual circumstances such as those found here (Van Dyne et al., 2003).
These findings add novel insight to the discussion of psychological processes
weighing on motive for voice, described in chapter 3 as cognitive and emotional
components. These contributions include the role negative events like medical errors,
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can have on the development of positively valenced changes, an area lacking
consideration specifically in patient safety (Serou et al., 2017; Sirriyeh et al., 2010)
and more generically, the positive effect of emotions in organisations (Barsade et al.,
2003).
Prosocial Voice
Definition of voice as a prosocial behaviour (Morrison, 2011) is compatible
with examples found in both surgery and maternity cases, defined as the discretionary
communication of concerns about work-related issues with the intent to improve unit
functioning. While there is nothing specific to Morrison’s (2011) definition about
protecting patients, expressions of voice in surgery and maternity were aimed at
escalating concerns to prevent further errors from occurring, thus improving patient
safety. Prosocial voice was found where a sentiment of caring was reinvigorated by
professionals at both the top and bottom of the hierarchy, moderating hierarchical and
blame cultures. The prosocial voice found in surgery and maternity was driven by a
motive of compassion towards patients, across professional groups, helping to bridge
hierarchical differences through a common moral-grounding and goal.
Exploring this idea of prosocial voice further, Van Dyne, et al. (2003) described
it as the expressing of solutions to problems based on cooperation, and suggestion
of constructive ideas for change, to benefit the unit or organisation.
In surgery, it was found nurses and surgical assistants reported being more
assertive in the operating theatre with surgeons, specifically to make sure that policies
are followed in the event of a retained object, and to avoid patient harm. In maternity,
expression of voice by midwives were directed towards supervisors and obstetrical
consultants to flag something that is potentially concerning, a safety threat. While in
both cases reinvigorated sentiment of care played a role in shifting climate, the setting
of expectations for voice by medical leaders in high-status positions also played a
strong role. This top-down behaviour triggered a response from the bottom-up to
engender voice among lower-status professionals. In surgery this was accomplished
through closer adherence to policy and standard operating procedure, while in
maternity training for ‘respectful challenge’ and coaching was provided.
This more compassionate, safety-oriented form of prosocial voice found in
surgery and maternity cases differs quite starkly with the defensively oriented voice
found on ward x.
While the voices of ward x and surgical nurses before the serious safety
incidents were similarly futile, feeling that an opinion would be brushed away, or they
would be made to feel insignificant, the outcome, their change to practice varied.
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Through the emergence of positively valenced changes, climate was strengthened,
enabling voice, however the type of voice that arose from these circumstances
differed. The nature of voice that arose by ward x nurses was defensive in nature,
described by behaviours that included informing the doctor, documenting who you
spoke to and when, and protecting the self by redirecting potential blame to doctors
in the event of an incident occurring. Among surgical nurses and midwives, a more
prosocial form of voice was found that emphasised improving unit functioning and
safety of patients, driven by a reinvigorated sentiment of care, closer adherence to
policy and management support.
A chief variance between surgery and ward x in this enactment of voice, is the
degree of engagement by higher-status professionals. The surgeons set expectations
for voice from the top-down, whereas on ward x there was very little change in
receptivity by higher-status professionals, the urologists, leaving the formation of
voice climate entirely up to the nurses. Case findings would suggest this involvement
of surgeons in positively valenced changes were due to acknowledgment of their
direct role in the safety incident and subsequent affective impact. Whereas the
urologists denied all involvement in the ward x safety incident, with members of their
profession seeming to distance themselves from the investigation and
recommendations for improvement. Thus, while evidence for prosocial voice,
supported by higher-status surgeons and enacted by lower-status nurses, is found in
surgery, defensive voice in ward x does not necessarily preclude further instances of
futility of voice because there is lack of evidence for improved top-down receptivity by
urologists.
Defensive Voice
The ward x case revealed no evidence demonstrating compassion or a
reinvigorated sentiment of caring, instead defensive behaviours and nursing
managerial efforts drove the enactment of voice on this ward.
Defensive behaviours found included tighter documentation standards with
attention to who nurses spoke to and when, and always notifying doctors of patient
test results, these steps seemed ingrained in the nurses of ward x. The traumatic
negative affective experience of the staff nurse CS412, leading to her quitting the
organisation, was contagious. These nurses witnessed the negative aftermath and
career consequences on staff nurse 412, adjusting their own behaviour on the ward
as a result, practicing defensively to avoid involvement in a similar circumstance
themselves.
The senior sister on the ward x played an overarching role in formation of this
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nursing wide defensive voice. She was contagiously influenced by staff nurse 412,
directing anger at urologists, going on to protect her staff through implementation of
training and a standard operating procedure (SOP). Staff seemed to completely
embrace the SOP and referenced it when they described how they spoke-up to
doctors on the ward and documented their results. The senior sister’s changes
bolstered the confidence of nurses, giving them something tangible to reference in
the face of a hierarchical challenge, encouraging the enactment of defensive voice.
Thus, voice on ward x was not driven by a sentiment of caring, but anger, self-
defence, and managerial support.
This defensiveness contrasted with the maternity case where individuals
wished to remain silent (defensive silence) for fear of punitive actions, while on ward
x nurses’ defensive voice was expressed out of a sense of compliance with SOP and
self-preservation, shifting focus and potential blame to others, the urologists, to
protect the self. Defensive voice was defined by Van Dyne et al. (2003) as a form of
speaking up to protect one’s own self-interests. There are few theoretical papers that
describe defensive voice, and only two papers could be found (Lee, Diefendorff, Kim,
& Bian, 2014; Maynes & Podsakoff, 2014), which tested this form of voice empirically.
Lee et al. (2014) found defensive voice was generally more negative than prosocial
voice, and extroverts and agreeable individuals were more likely to engage in the later
than the former.
The enactment of voice across all cases is a desirable outcome for patient
safety whether pro-social or defensive. Corrective actions can be taken if healthcare
professionals are alerted to errors before they arise.
As such, understanding the nuances outlined in this discussion, which led to
these enactments of voice are critical if others attempt to emulate this success in
healthcare practice. The transfer of this discussion to a more general model of how
second victims of serious safety incidents overcome the hierarchical challenge
through establishing the conditions for voice, is presented next in figure 9.3.
Introducing the Safety Incident Model of Voice for Second Victims
Figure 9.3 is the culmination of this comparative discussion, integrating all
components from this chapter. This model builds upon, and integrates, figures 9.1
Climate of Silence and 9.2 Voice Climate. This emerging model is event based,
placing a serious safety incident centrally as a catalyst.
Starting on the left-hand side (rotate figure 9.3 to landscape), the model
explains that hierarchical culture and futility of voice driven by higher-status
professionals contribute to a climate of silence, leading to acquiescent silence. Blame
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culture and defensiveness arose among lower-status professionals, leading to
defensive silence. These forms of silence directly contributed to the occurrence of
serious safety incidents which impact professionals identified as second victims.
These second victims, of both high and low status professions, infected their
colleagues through a process of emotional contagion, resulting in both second victims
and colleagues becoming affectively charged. Moving to the right-hand side of the
figure, higher-status professionals, both second victim and those emotional infected,
set expectations for voice, establishing the conditions for voice climate, in part
contributing to prosocial voice. Prosocial voice was further influenced by reinvigorated
sentiment of care by both high and low status professionals, and through lower-status
managers engendering voice and closer adherence to policy and SOP. Defensive
voice was driven by the emergence of defensive behaviours by lower-status
professionals and lower-status management engendering voice through
implementation of SOP.
This model is intentionally generalised so that its appeal and applicability
extend beyond this study’s empirical setting of healthcare. Applicability of this study’s
findings to other settings will be discussed in more detail in chapter 10 Conclusion.
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Figure 9.3 Safety Incident Model of Voice for Second Victims
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Discussion of Safety Incident Model of Voice for Second Victims
This section discusses and qualifies the emerging model presented in Figure
9.3, by explaining its boundary conditions and status. Further, factors not taken into
account are listed, and a proposal for how this model should be used in the future
included.
Figure 9.3 highlights the most coherent thematic relationships between
causal conditions leading to silence as a major contributing factors of serious safety
incidents, the affective impact leading to second victims, and the causal conditions
which emerged from second victims leading to both defensive and prosocial voice.
This emerging model reflects what has been learned from this micro-level
comparative evaluation of three cases involving serious medical error and second
victims. The model’s status as emerging reflects the desire of this researcher to
position his findings as an early exploration of the relationship between affectively
impacted second victims of serious error and the emergence of positively valenced
practices, as found in these cases, to help engender the conditions for voice.
The level of analysis for this model is intentionally micro-level, reflecting the
practices of front-line healthcare professionals that surfaced following error. The
model excludes more meso and macro level forces such as structural changes at
the trust due to financial difficulties, workforce strikes (i.e junior doctors strike), and
mandatory national changes to practice (i.e implementing duty of candour).
Excluding these later factors does not suggest they have no implication on the
emergence of voice, but a reflection of the micro-level lens, which this study applied
in analysis of data from 50 healthcare professionals across 3 cases. This model
reflects their story, and focuses narrowly on their struggles to voice safety concerns,
the affective impact of error, and the emergence of positively valenced practices.
The model is representative of findings from this single PhD study, it’s
exploratory, linking concepts, which have historically seen limited or no relationship.
As such, it is the hope of this researcher that other research will build upon this first
step in exploring what role second victims might play in the emergence of positive
practice, leading to improved safety. For example, establishing conditions for voice
might be one of potentially several positive practices arising from second victims,
there is room to grow this model to include others. Cataloguing the various positive
practices which emerge from second victims would be interesting for researchers
adopting a safety II perspective, and could set-up further research in that area.
Further, additional antecedents to both silence and voice might be identified
by other researchers and could enhance this model. It would be particularly
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interesting to include additional data on ‘thriving’ second victims given only one
(albeit with powerful implications) has been included in this model, with the rest
either having ‘survived’ or ‘dropped out’.
There are many forms of voice and silence described in the literature (i.e
Van Dyne et al., 2003) and this model is not inclusive of them all, due to their
absence in this PhD’s findings. There is room for voice researchers to consider how,
for example, prosocial silence, the withholding of information based on cooperation,
might be a causal or preventative factor in error, and consideration given to what
conditions might engender it. Additionally, acquiescent voice, where group members
due to low self-efficacy, express vocal agreement with superiors, might also be an
interesting inclusion, to look whether it could contribute to error and lead to
particular affective results (i.e guilt).
Next, a walkthrough of figure 9.3 is provided. To explain the model it is
useful to draw upon short examples from the comparative case analysis which
explain the causal arrows that link each thematic category. Arrows represent a
causal relationship, for example setting expectations for voice and a reinvigorated
sentiment of care (top right) were both antecedents to establishing the conditions for
prosocial voice by higher-status professionals. Working counter-clockwise around
the figure, first, the conditions for silence are presented.
A hierarchical culture, where there were clear power differences between
staff of varying status, was an antecedent for acquiescent silence. In both Surgery
and Ward X a hierarchical culture was found to emanate from higher-status
professionals, making lower-status professionals less likely to speak-up, and when
they did speak-up (because they had long tenure, for example) their voice was
found to be futile. When lower-status professionals saw their colleagues attempts at
voice as futile, they too decided to remain silent.
Continuing this walkthrough of the model, the factors, which led to defensive
silence, are described next. This form of silence, found only in the Maternity
department saw individuals keeping quiet out of fear of repercussions. The
conditions which engendered defensive silence in this case was a blame culture
and the emergence of defensive behaviours. The blame culture in maternity was the
result of a punitive investigative process for all medical errors, where not only were
the incidents investigated, but also the professionals involved, often resulting in
punitive measures. Staff exhibited defensive behaviours such as hiding their
employee pin number so they could not be reported, and avoiding the reporting
medical errors they observed.
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Next, focusing on the dotted-line box labelled silence, this model links these
forms of silence as a primary contributor to the three cases of medical error studied.
The box in the middle of the model indicates that a serious safety incident has
occurred. Next, several key second victims of both higher and lower hierarchical
position were affectively impacted by these incidents, this is represented by the
arrows pointing to the second victims boxes above and below, with a lead surgeon
‘thriving’, an obstetrician ‘surviving’, and a nurse and a midwife ‘dropping out’.
Tracing the trajectory of each of these second victims brings this
walkthrough to the dotted-line circles at the top and bottom. Beginning at the bottom
dotted-line circle with the Ward X case, the staff nurse from Ward X who eventually
left the organisation experienced both anger and guilt. Before she left, she had
many interactions with her nursing colleagues, particularly her senior sister. They
became affectively charged through the process of emotional contagion going on to
enact several changes that engendered defensive voice. Because of anger towards
urology, staff nurses were very defensive and seemed to practice increased
assertiveness as mean to shift potential blame away from them. Their assertiveness
was more mechanistic, driven by compliance with newly implemented policy &
standard operating procedures (SOP), and fear of being blamed, not compassion
for the patient. Thus, both closer adherence to SOP and defensive behaviours led to
defensive voice.
Next, in the top dotted-line circle is lead surgeon Mr. K who thrived following
the never event. Mr. K experienced both anger and shame. This event was a
catalyst for him to revise his practice, specifically how he communicated with his
team during complex multi-site surgeries. This is summarised, as setting
expectations for voice. In response to Mr. K’s emerging practice there was a bottom
up response by scrub nurses and their management to engendered voice and more
closely follow SOP. Further, a reinvigorated sentiment of care was found among
both nurses and surgeons in this case having previously been rendered latent due
to hierarchical culture. The top down expectation setting coupled with bottom up
changes and a reinvigorated sentiment of care led to a form of prosocial voice
among surgical team members.
Next, looking again at the dotted-line circle at the top of the model, the
higher-status second victim who ‘survived’, the obstetrician Doctor S, experienced
both guilt and shame. She made no significant improvements to practice, being
paralysed by blame and shame. However, through emotional contagion her clinical
director became affectively charged and took it upon herself to establish
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expectations for voice in the maternity unit. Again, this top-down expectation setting
for communication was followed up by emerging bottom-up changes. Midwifery
managers were very upset via emotional contagion with Midwife Z, expressing
anger at themselves for having put Midwife Z in a precarious position. They went on
engender voice through ‘respectful challenge’ and supporting compassionate care
through gifting ‘compassion cards’ to staff. This bottom-up engendering of voice
interacted with the top-down expectation setting by a higher-status clinical director
of obstetrics, setting the conditions for enactment of prosocial voice in the maternity
unit.
Conclusion
A safety incident model of voice for second victims has been presented. The
factors which allow a climate of silence to persist leading to acquiescent and
defensive silence were summarised as a hierarchical culture, blame culture, and
futility of voice. Both acquiescent and defensive silence directly contributed to serious
safety incidents in each case.
Patients were harmed or expired as a result, but they were not the only victims,
second victims, the healthcare professionals directly involved in the incidents also
experienced repercussions, in the form of negative affective experiences. These
individuals were emotional contagious, infecting their colleagues who became
affectively charged.
Second victims and their infected colleagues went on to enact positively
valenced practices, the conditions for voice, in their respective units including: setting
expectations for voice, management engendering voice, closer adherence to policies
and SOP, and a reinvigorated sentiment of care. This voice climate allowed the
enactment of defensive and prosocial voice.
The next chapter, the conclusion to this thesis, will provide a reminder of the
research gap addressed by this study, describe how these results extend the extant
literature on patient safety and employee voice, highlight what practical implications
might exist for this study’s findings, and discuss transferability, limitations, and ideas
for future research.
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Chapter 10 Conclusion
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Introduction
This concluding chapter will provide a reminder of the research gap addressed
by this study and describe how these results extend the extant literature.
Transferability is discussed, and practical implications highlighted. Study limitations,
and ideas for future research are also included.
As described in chapter 2, this study addresses the implementation gap in
patient safety which results from the hierarchical challenge and second victim
phenomenon. Second victims are placed as central actors who play a key role in
moderating the hierarchical challenge leading to the enactment of voice. Employee
voice was introduced as a sensitising concept given its relevance to improving patient
safety and consideration for it as an antecedent as well as an outcome of medical
error.
Next, this study’s claim as the first to explore the role of second victims in the
effective enactment of employee voice is described. This research gap, identified by
Sirriyeh, et al. (2010) and more recently by Serou et al. (2017), is explained.
Transferability is explained through identification of several considerations
necessary for application of this study’s findings and model to other safety sensitive
fields. This includes professional organisation in healthcare, the incident-based
nature of the model, and the range of safety contexts which exist in the healthcare
field. Further, discussion of high reliability organisations and specific examples linking
to aviation are described.
The section on practical implications sets forth three recommendations aimed
at healthcare organisations wishing to cultivate a voice climate. These include
leveraging second victims, fostering a group voice climate, and reinvigorating a
sentiment of care among professionals.
Limitations of the study, and rationale for why they persisted, are described
next. These include sampling of a single NHS hospital trust, an emphasis upon
second victims instead of patients, the first victims, and limitations of methods used
to classify the affective experiences of second victims.
Finally, ideas for future research include, first, the inclusion of patients and
their families, the first victims of medical error, and second, consideration for how this
study’s results might fit with a ‘learning from excellence’ or safety-II type approach.
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Research Gap Addressed
As described through review of four historically significant cases of medical
error in chapter 2, an implementation gap exists in patient safety, which results from
a lack of addressing the ‘hierarchical challenge’ and second victim phenomenon. This
study acknowledges that affective experiences felt by healthcare professionals are
positively correlated with the severity of any medical error they are involved in. As
such, those professionals involved in serious safety incidents, are central to the
enactment of practice changes, both negatively, which is well documented, and
positively in the form of changes with consequence for improving patient safety, such
as enabling voice.
Employee voice was introduced as a sensitising concept given its direct
relevance as both an antecedent for medical error (i.e. choosing not to speak-up, as
in the event of a hierarchical challenge), and a potential outcome of medical error (i.e.
changing practice to be more assertive). Additionally, the known ability for affective
experiences, such as fear, to influence employee voice decisions supports its
suitability to this context.
Thus, this study establishes the second victims of serious safety incidents as
key to moderating the hierarchical challenge, leading to the effective enactment of
voice.
Extending the Literature: Second Victims Giving Rise to Voice
To the best knowledge of this researcher, this study lays claim to the first
exploration of the role second victims of medical error play in the effective enactment
of employee voice. This study addresses the research gap identified by Sirriyeh, et
al's 2010 systematic review: little is understood about the possible positive outcomes
of medical error. A more recent systematic review again highlighted this gap: a need
to explore further the positive changes made by staff following error and consider
what knock-on effects might exist for patient safety (Serou et al., 2017).
Evidence for a more constructive use of medical error, specifically, second
victims enabling the effective enactment of employee voice, was found. Second
victims, and their colleagues through emotional contagion, played key roles in
establishing the conditions for voice which attenuated the hierarchical challenge.
Further, with linkage to the role of compassion and renewed sentiment of care
influencing voice, this study responds to Barsade’s, et al. (2003) acknowledgement
that very little research has explored the role of positive affective experiences in
organisations.
Further, validation and extension of Scott’s et al. (2009) recovery trajectory for
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second victims was provided in the form of evidencing the positively valenced
changes enacted by a ‘thriving’ second victim. Second victims who ‘survived’ and
‘dropped out’ were found to enact change indirectly though emotional contagion of
colleagues.
Finally, a safety incident model of voice for second victims, figure 9.1,
applicable to professional organisations in safety sensitive fields where second
victims might be found, was developed and will be discussed further in transferability
below.
Transferability
In thinking about these findings and their transferability to other settings, first
consider the empirical setting of healthcare as dominated by a form of hierarchically
arranged professional organisation. This form of organizing represents a
professionalised workforce consisting of communities of powerful actors bound
together by shared knowledge and cultures (Waring, 2013). As such, transferability
of these findings might be limited to fields which are similarly organised.
Second, a serious safety incident is placed centrally as a catalyst in figure 9.1,
thus the model is ‘incident based’ and requires one to function. Thus in generalising
beyond healthcare, other fields might view incidents as forms of organisational
deviance, which deviate from both formal organisational design goals and normative
standards or expectations, resulting in an unanticipated suboptimal outcome
(Vaughan, 1999).
Healthcare is a particularly complex environment (Baker, 2001), consisting of
many different safety sensitive areas in a single hospital. Some areas are highly
standardized and rely on information technology and automation such as pharmacy,
these are considered “islands of reliability”, or ultra-safe, within the broader, more
chaotic hospital environment (Vincent & Amalberti, 2016, p. 33). Other areas,
including ward care and scheduled surgeries, are more akin to a high-reliability
approach to safety, where professional judgement and flexibility, coupled with
standards and protocols, provide important controls on risks essential to providing
safe, high quality care. Thus, given the range of safety contexts present in healthcare,
as argued by Vincent and Amalberti (2016): healthcare is better than any other setting
to study safety because an entire range of safety approaches and strategies can be
found in one industry.
Support for this argument is found in this thesis given a range of cultural
approaches to safety, some negative and some positive, were evident across cases.
This included punitive investigations, managing risk through following standard
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operating procedures, and escalating concerns, theorised as defensive and prosocial
forms of voice.
Thus, given this study’s model, figure 9.1, was developed in a high reliability
setting that acknowledges risk as inherent to the field, it’s expected to have
application in other high reliability organisational (HRO) fields such as: marine,
shipping, oil industry, fire-fighting, policing, and military. Further, the model may offer
some usefulness to ultra-safe fields which aim to avoid risk altogether such as:
aviation and the nuclear industry. Although in these fields, second victims may be
rarer, or no longer living, following a serious safety incident, given the nature of the
field.
Catino & Patriotta's (2013) study of learning from errors in the Italian Air Force
highlights some similar themes as found in this study: safety culture, negatively
valenced emotions, and emotional contagion, suggesting a degree of transferability
to the aviation field. For example, flying with relaxed vs stressed colleagues was
found to result in emotional contagion, generating different types of responses by
pilots, similar to how emotional contagion by second victims influenced practice
changes among their healthcare colleagues. Further, as introduced in chapter 3,
silence is implicated in numerous high profile aviation disasters including United
Airlines flight 173, and friendly fire between US army black hawk helicopters and US
Air Force F-15s (Snook, 2002). This study’s model, which identifies the conditions
for voice, should have direct applicability to overcoming the forms of silence
implicated in these aviation disasters.
While transferability to other fields seems reasonable, certain characteristics
of the model may not function as they would in healthcare. For example, the affective
impact of error found in healthcare might be lessened, or play out differently in other
fields, where a patient-doctor relationship is absent, given the known affective
interplay which exists between these actors (Bell, Moorman, & Delbanco, 2010).
Practical Implications and Recommendations
Given the theoretical contribution of this research towards the field of patient
safety, it seems suitable to also suggest practical implications and recommendations.
Second victims are given prime position in this study due to their role enacting positive
changes which set the conditions for voice. The enactment of prosocial voice has
potentially powerful implications for improving patient safety. If the conditions for voice
found this study are emulated in other healthcare settings, a safer climate for voice
could follow, enabling healthcare professionals from varying hierarchical positions to
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enact prosocial voice. Three recommendations aimed at establishing the conditions
for voice are outlined below:
 First, leverage staff who ‘thrive’ following medical error. Individuals who thrive,
such as lead surgeon Mr. K, should be identified and promoted. Mr. K under
his own direction has shared his experiences with other surgeons, and
operating theatres resulting in the prevention of further never events. While
sensitivity should be given to these matters, those individuals who are
‘thriving’ post incident, should be given a platform to share their experiences
with other staff. Emotions are contagious and these individuals are passionate
about invigorating a sentiment of care (Kelly & Barsade, 2001). With greater
attention to sensitivity, staff who ‘survived’ should also be given the option to
share their experiences. While it may be impossible to harness the potential
for improvement from a professional who as ‘dropped out’, consider offering
a form of ‘exit interview’ with these individuals so that their experiences,
regardless of how negative they might have been, can contribute to improving
safety processes.
 Second, attempt to foster a group climate which is safer for voice. Remember
that climate is formed through the shared perceptions held by group members
about policies, procedures, and the behaviours they believe are expected, or
what they see supported and rewarded. Voice climate was found to develop
from several conditions including high-status professionals setting
expectations for voice from the top-down, which was responded to from the
bottom-up, where lower-status managers engendered voice, and
implemented closer adherence to policy and standard operating procedures
(SOP).
o Higher-status professionals, both specialist doctors in these cases,
played an important role in establishing group climate for each of their
respective departments. By establishing expectations for
communication among inter-disciplinary group members they
effectively opened the channel for communication and removed risk
associated with speaking up, so that “no one is not important enough
to be listened to ever”. The importance of involving higher
hierarchically positioned professionals cannot be overstated, they are
in a more powerful position than other staff and must take
responsibility for setting expectations.
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o The lower-status managers, nurses in these cases, responded to this
top-down expectation setting through training their staff how to
escalate concerns, introducing ‘respectful challenge’, and attempting
to enforce closer to adherence to policies and SOPs that directed front-
line staff to escalate. As such, consider introducing departmental
SOPs and policies that reflect work processes which promote
speaking up when things are amiss (i.e. missing swab), providing front-
line staff something useful as a tool in the event of a ‘hierarchical
challenge’. Managers must encourage and reward speaking-up
behaviour and visibly defend their staff from retaliation.
 Thirdly, while affective experiences are hard to replicate, emotions can
spread, and staff should be given opportunities to share their experiences.
This is particularly relevant for expressions of compassion which were found
to build-up, reinvigorating professional work characterized by a sentiment of
caring. Borrowing a practice from the maternity case, consider giving out
compassion cards to staff who are seen delivering compassionate care to
patients.
Limitations
This study was set within one of the United Kingdom’s National Health Service
Trusts, consisting of two hospitals. One in an ethnically diverse inner-city area, the
other in a predominately white upper-class area, as such the study covers a broad
spectrum of demographics. However, it is a relatively small sample size, consisting
of only one hospital trust, and as such could benefit from one or two additional
comparative hospitals. However, for pragmatic reasons, an in-depth micro-level
comparative analysis of several cases within one organisation was chosen by the
researcher who conducted the research on his own and within the time constraints of
a PhD programme.
Next, an emphasis upon second victims may have left a gap on potential
implications for the role first victims of medical error, the patients and their families,
might have played in influencing the practice changes of healthcare professionals.
Again, for pragmatic, legal, and ethical reasons this route was not selected. Further,
it would have been impossible in some cases where a patient had expired. Having a
previous career in hospital risk management, this researcher was aware of the fraught
sensitivities, and legal implications for contacting patients involved in medical errors,
particularly when the filing of legal claims for personal injury, as per the UK’s limitation
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act of 1980, could occur up to three years after harm was discovered.
The classification of affective experiences of second victims was assessed
qualitatively by the researcher using Lazarus’s (1991) core-relational themes. While
methodologically sound and utilized by researchers in a highly regarded journal (i.e.
Huy, Corley, and Krattz, 2014), this method is still subject to limitations. The
researcher made theoretical judgements about affective states from interviews and
observations with participants. This was challenging at times, especially when it was
not reported directly, for example a participant stating: “I was incredibly angry”. This
resulted in abstracting affect from what else the participant said, the way they acted
(for example crying), or the situational context. This limitation could be improved upon
through adopting methods involving sophisticated instruments to study physiological
reactions, for example, autonomic nervous system activity, or measuring heart rate.
Further, while Lazarus’s core-relational themes are thought to be reliable in western
nations, different appraisal-emotion relationships exist in other cultures, and as such
these findings might not transfer to other non-western nations so easily (Mesquita &
Ellsworth, 2001).
Ideas for Future Research
It’s known that healthcare professionals involved in medical errors experience
many of the same affective experiences as that of first victims, the patients and their
families (Wu & Steckelberg, 2012). Unfortunately, silence, guilt, shame, and loss of
trust fracture the patient-doctor relationship leaving both parties to suffer separately.
This human dimension of medical error acknowledges the shared range of emotions
which affect both patient and care givers. As such this researcher infers from Bell et
al. (2010) that an interplay exists between the emotional states of both first and
second victims, as seen in figure 10.1, the patient-clinician ‘wheel of emotions’.
As such, future researchers interested in extending these findings should
consider including the first victims of medical error, to see what influence their
affective experiences had on the second victims (and vice-versa), with regards to
practice change and emotional contagion. While this may present some methodical
risks, such as participant recruitment and ethical approval, it should be possible in
healthcare organisations which have a patient centred orientation, and where the
relevant limitations act would have expired (i.e. in the UK claims cannot be brought
forward after 3 years), or with appropriate legal consent.
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Figure 10.1 Patient-Clinician ‘Wheel of Emotions’ (Adapted from Bell et al.
(2010).
Further, this study treated affect primarily as an empirical antecedent for voice,
as such it’s theoretical development was secondary to voice and second victims.
Therefore, in line with Sirriyeh et al. (2010), additional consideration should be given
for how this research on second victims and patient safety relate back to the literature
on affect.
Another related application for this study’s findings is a ‘learning from
excellence’ or safety-II type approach. While second victims are the result of a safety-
I, reactive investigative approach, which emphasises finding and fixing errors
(Hollnagel, 2013). Safety-II attempts to ensure as many successful outcomes as
possible by recognising and learning from good practice (Kelly et al., 2016).
Future researchers interested in safety-II might build upon this study’s findings
to identifying a broader range of positive practices by second victims, particularly
those who ‘thrive’, to identify patterns, effective supports, and share more broadly
within a healthcare system. Accentuating the positive practice changes that arise from
negative events like medical errors, such as the enactment of practices which
establish conditions for voice, should have useful application to improving patient
safety. This is particularly relevant where emulating the conditions for voice found in
this study could help develop and sustain climates that allow prosocial forms of voice
to be enacted, preventing further safety incidents.
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Conclusion & Reflection
Evidence has been provided for what positively valenced practices can arise
from negatively valenced events like medical errors. Second victims were found to
play a key role in moderating the hierarchical challenge in healthcare, setting the
conditions for, and leading to the enactment of voice. This study has extending the
patient safety literature, specifically adding to our knowledge of the second victims of
medical error and the role they play in the enactment of positive practices.
Transferability of this study’s model seems reasonable, particularly in other
high reliability fields such as aviation. Practical implications were set forth including
leveraging second victims, establishing the conditions for voice, and instilling
compassionate care.
Limitations of this study were summarised as a lack of comparative hospital
trusts, an absence of patients, the first victims of medical error, and methodoligcal
limitations for classifying affect. Ideas for future research include sampling first victims
for a follow-up study, examining how this research might contribute back to literature
on affect, and consideration of how a safety-II approach might align with the positively
valenced practices enacted by second victims.
Reflecting on this PhD journey, this researcher feels satisfied in his decision
to leave his career as a practicing risk manager. Taking time away from a managerial
role, allowed this researcher the space to focus indepth on addressing problems in
the field of patient safety, that would not have been possible otherwise.
While numerous follow-up and feedback presentations have been held locally
with the NHS trust involved in the study, the researcher plans to disseminate these
findings more widely so that other healthcare organisations can learn from them. First,
a paper emanating from this PhD was presented at the 11th annual Organizational
Behaviour in Health Care Conference in Montreal, Canada on May 14th, 2018.
Second, publications arising from this PhD are planned, with a target to focus on
patient safety, as well as more general management journals.
It is the goal of this researcher, for this PhD, to serve as a launch pad into an
academic career. In working towards this goal, the researcher was part of a
successful research bid to the Health Foundation in London, which will see him take-
up a funded post-doctoral Research Fellow position at Warwick Business School, in
order to continue his work in related healthcare and organisational research.
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Table A.1 Impact Case Summary Pilot
Impact Case Summary: Pathology (Pilot Study) Department response to 2013
Histopathology backlog
Date of Data Collection: December 2015 Purpose: To consider evidence of
learning, and practice change, following SUI & RCA investigation
Data Sources: 10 interviews with staff, professions represented include:
Scientists, Consultant Pathologists, Assistants, and Managers. Meeting
observations (4 hrs), and documentation Review (SUI Report).
Practice Changes/Improvements following SUI & RCA Investigation
There was consistency among Biomedical Scientists, Consultant
Histopathologists and Assistants all working according to Key Performance
Indicators (daily dashboard) which help ensure that both low and high priority
samples get reported prior to six weeks.
“We have a dashboard now where you can easily see exactly which of your cases
is outstanding still and how long it’s been outstanding for … and can make sure
that I prioritise things at the right time.” - Consultant Pathologist 1
Also consistent among the different professions was a heightened sense of
situational awareness. Professionals were more aware about overall
departmental workload, the interconnectedness of each other’s work activities,
generally being active in managing workload, and proactive in dealing with
issues before a backlog occurs.
“I think one of the biggest changes is we’re trying to be proactive with work. If we
know all the breast pathologists are in or the neurology pathologists are in we’ll
try and prioritise their work because we know it’s going to go out immediately. So
we’re trying to prioritise work based on the capacity that we have consultant-
wise.” – Biomedical Scientist 1
Management described how the process of participating in the RCA investigation
enabled them to become better networked in the Trust. This increased
awareness of departmental issues with Trust management resulting in the
department’s ability to bid for and successfully access additional Trust
resources. Other departments in the trust also learned about how their work
impacts upon pathology services which has improved interdepartmental
communication.
Emotional Impact of SUI & RCA Investigation
The affect of medical error on healthcare professionals is generally well
documented. However, these incidents seemed to have a noticeable lack of affect
on pathology staff. This absence of affectivity could perhaps be due to distance
between lab services and patients, as this quote suggests:
“I mean stuff comes in and they stack it on a machine and because the patient is
a tube of blood they’re somewhat divorced from the patient on the end of that
tube of blood” – Consultant Pathologist 2
Contextual Factors:
Concerns were expressed primarily about the lack of Consultant capacity
(12/15 positions filled) to report samples in the target time frame leading to a fear
the department may end up in a similar situation to 2013.
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Staff were generally confident about the daily dashboard/KPI system installed
to stay on top of potential delays, but even with a system in place, the lack of
consultant capacity stemming from recruitment challenges and vacation time,
appeared to make the improvements fragile.
Safety Culture: The culture was said to have improved following the SUI, it was
described as one that is supportive, and promotes communication (escalation)
and learning. Culture was previously described as very reactive and slow to
change.
Learning from this SUI was shared internally with Radiology: endoscopy unit.
Table A.2 Impact Case Summary Surgery
Impact Case Summary: Surgery Department response to 2013 Never Event -
Retained Foreign Object Post-Operation
Date of Data Collection: April 2016 Purpose: To consider evidence of learning,
and practice change, following SUI & RCA investigation
Data Sources: 15 interviews with staff, professions represented include:
Surgeons, Anaesthetists, Radiologists, Nurses, Assistants, and Managers.
Meeting observations (4 hours), and documentation Review (SUI Report, Surgical
Checklist).
Practice Changes/Improvements:
Post Never Event, and RCA investigation, there was evidence of a favourable
climate for Employee Voice, the discretionary communication of ideas,
suggestions, concerns, or opinions about work-related issues with the intent to
improve organizational or unit functioning. Nurses (and healthcare assistants)
generally reported changing how they escalate concerns and challenge
hierarchy in the operating theatre. They are more assertive in their
communication style when dealing with Surgeons. Management empowers staff
to escalate concerns so that issues can be resolved before problems arise.
“… I’m not afraid to speak up now. So I’m a little bit more assertive perhaps
because of it and that’s for a safety reason” –Nurse 1
“we’re trying to empower the staff to challenge the surgeons and if they cannot do
that ring the on-call manager. Don’t be frightened to do that or ring your general
manager or your matron. Don’t be frightened to challenge if you’re not sure.” –
Nurse 2
Nurses generally reported accessing and enforcing the policy “Accounting for
Swabs, Packs, Sharps and Instruments During Sterile Procedures Policy” in the
theatre.
Surgeons described how they are more vigilant in their practice.
“After this incident, … I’m becoming more vigilant, so I’m more alert, I’m more
conscious about even if you have the system you still can have a problem, which
I didn’t have first-hand experience [before]” - Surgeon 1
Staff from across professional groups described how they were more
situationally aware and/or mindful of their surroundings following the SUI,
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suggesting they are comfortable to highlight possible safety concerns outside of
their own professional responsibility. Professionals seem to have a shared sense
of accountability with other staff in theatre, especially Surgeons, with Nurses
looking after the swab counting process. This suggests some overlapping
professional boundaries, for example Surgeons getting more actively involved in
the process of swab counts.
Emotional Consequences:
There was a general sense that professionals involved in the event were upset
(angry) including Doctors, Nurses, and Assistants.
Being devastated, traumatised, and a fear of not doing things correctly,
were all attributed to Nursing staff. A link seems to exist between the ease at
which professionals make changes to practice and the degree of emotional
impact. Both Surgeons and Nurses were emotionally affected by the Never Event
and found changing practice to be simple, part of normal evolution or progress.
Empathy (compassion) for the patient was described by professionals from
each group, to learn from this event so that future patients are not harmed.
Doctors described the event as a personal negative experience (shame),
where they internalized and contrasted the event with the quality of care they
regularly provide.
Safety Culture: Supportive, Patient Centered, and Open (Blame Free), were all
terms used to describe the department’s culture. Professionals from each group
described how the Never Event, and other incidents in the department, led to
improvements in the department’s safety culture. Professionals recalled how the
culture has progressed to proactive from bureaucratic, and one group,
reconstructive surgeons, describing a shift to generative (where safety is integral
part of everything they do)
“So the culture as people begin to be aware that these incidents are happening
on a regular basis and people are learning that you’ve got to address those
issues in terms of your behaviour and your processes... So that’s what change is
occurring as people are becoming more aware of the safety culture. And I think
it’s becoming more apparent that the organisation is unwilling to accept unsafe
practice” –Surgeon 2
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Table A.3 Impact Case Summary Maternity
Impact Case Summary: Maternity Department response to 2015 Serious
Untoward Incident unexpected death of a neonate.
Date of Data Collection: April, May 2016 Purpose: To consider evidence of
learning, and practice change, following SUI & RCA investigation
Data Sources: 13 interviews with staff, professions represented include:
Consultant Obstetricians, Anaesthetists, Midwives, and Managers. Meeting
observations (4 hours), and documentation reviews.
Practice Changes/Improvements:
Post SUI, and RCA investigation, there was evidence of a favourable climate for
Employee Voice, the discretionary communication of ideas, suggestions,
concerns, or opinions about work-related issues with the intent to improve
organizational or unit functioning. Midwives generally reported changing how
they escalate concerns and challenge hierarchy in the department. They are
more assertive in their communication style when dealing with supervisors and
Consultants. This stems from Management empowering staff to escalate
concerns.
“I’m quite happy to challenge any doctor or consultant decision and sort of justify
and go through policy or procedure and get their opinions really. But I think that’s
at my level that I’m at. I’m not sure that… You know, some of the more senior
sixes would feel happy to do that, but I think with the more junior midwives it’s
having the confidence to come to us as co-ordinators to be able to say “I’m not
happy about this. I’m not happy with this decision,” - Midwife 1
Both Obstetricians and Midwives reported they are more situationally aware
and mindful.
“I mean I would expect patient safety to be improved because now I know that if
someone comes with bleeding I’ll be more mindful of my decision and I’ll think about
abruption. Delivery will be at the top of my mind.” – Consultant 1
“I’m quite conscious as a co-ordinator as to who’s going into where and who I’m
allocating. I know my staff quite well as in their level of training and who they can
look after. I think it is that awareness of if somebody’s out of their depth or
somebody’s condition deteriorates, then you have to allocate and you have to
perhaps move your staff round and allocate accordingly” –Midwife 1
Emotional Consequences:
Empathy (compassion) for the patient was described by professionals from
each group, to learn from this event so that future patients are not harmed.
There was a general sense that professionals involved in the event, and their
departmental colleagues, were upset (angry).
“So people will be expected to come to work, continue to do their normal job no
matter how emotionally affected they may have been by the event and at the
same time in their own time they’ve somehow got to find time to access the notes
and write their statement.” –Consultant 2
A doctor involved in the incident, found the process of investigation to be rather
stigmatising , Midwives felt SUIs could be quite punitive.
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“And then the consequence of that (the error) was the stigma and I felt that all the
good that you’ve done in the last seven or eight years or whatever was just wiped
out with a brush and you were just tainted with being involved in a SUI.” –
Consultant 1
Contextual Factors:
Safety Culture: Some Midwives and Consultants reported a blame culture
which could be reactive at times and focused on individuals (punitive) rather than
addressing the system.
There’s not a positive culture towards safety and I think it’s because of the
processes, the way governance has been applied and the way the whole
investigation process has been applied. ... think there’s very much a focus on
individual practice and that’s why the culture is very negative... We miss
opportunities to learn at a systems level because there’s such focus on individual.
– Midwife 2
There was a sense of disconnect between the front line and governance (us vs
them) which can hamper improvement initiatives
“it’s a little bit about us and them as well. Generally most people on the shop floor
on the frontline feel as if governance is a little bit separated or divorced from the
rest of us and that always creates some conflict.” – Consultant 3
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Table A.4 Impact Case Summary Urology Ward X
Impact Case Summary: Urology / Ward x response to 2015 SUI – patient
discharged with elevated potassium levels
Date of Data Collection: April, May 2016 Purpose: To consider evidence of
learning, and practice change, following SUI & RCA investigation
Data Sources: 12 interviews with staff, professions represented include:
Consultant Urologists, Consultant Clinical Scientists, Nurses, and Managers.
Meeting observations (4 hours), and documentation Review (SUI Report, Surgical
Checklist).
Practice Changes/Improvements following SUI & RCA Investigation
Positive
Nursing completed implementation of RCA
recommendations, these included: a standard
operating procedure (SOP) for receiving
abnormal results by phone, a sign-up sheet
to ensure nursing staff read the new SOP,
and laminated crib cards showing normal
blood result ranges. These procedures were
reviewed at Nursing Handover meetings.
Nurses reported being more consistent in
their communication, documentation
practices, including contacting the doctor,
and writing ‘doctor [name] informed’, in the
notes, and to follow the new SOP.
“you must document the results and you
must inform the doctors. Don’t just put it in
the notes. You must ring them straightaway
and act on it and then obviously write the
doctor’s name who you spoke to. And refer to
your chart for abnormal results” – Nurse 3
Preliminary findings from other cases suggest
the importance of SUI as a catalyst for
Employee Voice, however in this case,
Nurses, already seemed to exhibit voice
behaviour, the SUI did not impact their
degree of assertiveness with others.
Some Urologists reported being more aware
to look at blood results during the ward
round.
“Yes, I think we’re more aware to look at the
blood during the ward round … If there’s no
blood result written up we check it on the
computer. We’re more aware of anything
missing and in the process we need to
Negative
A couple Nurses reported they
could no longer trust the work of
colleagues, and documentation
seemed like a form of defence.
“I suppose looking at blood results
more and stuff, isn’t it? I know
that’s the doctors job, but to cover
myself I think I need to check
because it’s not always… You
know, things happen.” – Nurse 3
“So now I can’t trust … so now I
have to document everything” –
Nurse 1
While some Urologists reported
making changes, it appears the
specialty is experiencing
challenges implementing their
RCA recommendations, perhaps
because recommendations are too
broad, and beyond the scope of a
single department.
“It strikes me that it’s a hospital-
wide thing. but as far as I know
there is no publicised mechanism
for ensuring that doctors have
written that they’ve ordered tests.
So that’s something where I’ve
probably been lacking in dealing
with this.” –Urologist 1
“I’m not sure whether they’ve been
implemented or not. I’ll be hoping
they are and I think the best way
forward to know something about
this is that we should chase it up
at the next meeting, how far have
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prevent any sort of tragedies like that.” -
Urologist 2
we gone with this
recommendation.” – Urologist 3
There were some criticisms of
the RCA root causes, suggesting
other causes of this incident are 1)
shortage of junior doctors, 2)
pressure to discharge patients
quickly, 3) continuity of doctors,
and 4) lack of computer devices
available on the ward to check
results.
Emotional Impact of SUI & RCA Investigation
This incident had an affective impact on Nursing staff who were generally angry
and upset. The Senior Sister (ward x manager) played a crucial role in supporting
staff in recovery from the medical error.
“I spoke to every single person and when there’s an incident everyone knows that
the nurse is upset.” –nurse 2
“I did find this a very traumatic experience … So whenever it is called a root cause
analysis I felt like the root of the problem and it just is soul destroying ... I’m
just really in a good situation that I had such a good line manager. You know, in
fact I don’t think if I had her I probably wouldn’t… I don’t know what I would have
done. I don’t think I’d be here today. I wouldn’t have been able to cope without that
support.” – Nurse 1
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Table A.5 Interview Guide
Date / Time:
Name:
Role:
Department:
Employee Group (select one) : Governance / Front-line
Themes / Questions
General
Tell me about your role on the unit?
Governance only: please tell me about the size of
the department you are responsible for? (eg # beds,
patients, staff, budget).
Incident Analysis
Are you aware of the MEDICAL ERROR XYZ that
occurred on DATE?
Were you involved in the investigation for this
incident? Do you know what the root cause(s) were?
Recommendations for Improvement
Do you know what the recommendation(s) for
improvement were from this incident?
Do you know whether the recommendation(s) for
improvement been implemented on your unit?
Are you confident that similar incidents will be
prevented?
Are you aware of efforts to share this learning
beyond the department?
Specific Practice Change
As a result of the recommendation(s) how have your
work practices changed?
Have you had to change some aspect of the way you
work (i.e. practice).
Describe:
263
The event and circumstance
The process
Outcomes and consequences
…how/where did this change occur? (i.e. policy,
clinical order set, computer database)
Has it been easy or difficult for you to add new
practices?
Has it been easy or difficult for you to remove
past/practices?
... what has made it easier / more difficult?
Culture
How would you describe the culture on your unit?
Show Manchester Patient Safety Framework: Levels
of Culture (National Patient Safety Agency, 2006)
What role has your unit’s culture played in learning
from this incident?
Outside Influences
Are there any outside influences (i.e. regulators,
government) which impact learning and practice on
your unit?
Do you think more deeply about how you work as a
result of learning from this incident? – did it inspire
you to challenge the way you do things?
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Table A.6 Initial First Order Codes (198).
Count Name Sources References
1 Professionals' Response to SUI and RCA 42 320
2 Affective Response 22 123
3 Anger 16 39
4 Compassion 17 39
5 Crying (Context) 3 4
6 Guilt 2 9
7 Involving the Soul (Context) 2 4
8 Shame 7 22
9 Stigmatising (Context) 2 6
10 Practical Response 37 197
11 Closer adherence to policy and SOP 14 33
12 Defensive behaviours 8 21
13 Management engendering voice among staff 11 27
14
More assertive to escalate and challenge
hierarchy
20 56
15 Setting expectations for voice 15 60
16 Context 43 611
17 Catalysts for Change 0 0
18 Employee Health & Safety Concern 3 5
19 Management Support 7 10
20 New Classifications (WHO, RCPATH) 4 8
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Count Name Sources References
21 New Knowledge 2 8
22 Own Initiative or Personal Change 7 12
23 Role Change 5 8
24 Specific SUI Investigation 17 29
25 SUIs in General 4 4
26 Team endorsement 4 4
27 The benefits of the change were visible 2 2
28 Upsetting 3 4
29 Continual Change 12 26
30 Culture, Climate, Voice 32 60
31 Proactive 17 23
32 Reactive 13 22
33 SUI Improved the Culture 9 11
34 Supportive 4 4
35 Management related to Safety & Quality 24 87
36 Governance 7 13
37 Hybrid Manager 8 10
38 Leadership 2 2
39 Limited Strategic Thinking 1 1
40 Management Investigation Involvement 4 12
41 Manager with Clinical Background 4 6
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Count Name Sources References
42 Obstetrics and Maternity Risk Management 5 9
43 Quality Management 9 12
44 Clinical Governance Meeting 3 4
45 Commission a quality review 1 1
46
Confusion over Governance structure
(board to ward)
1 4
47 Dashboard 1 2
48 Forward Accountability 3 4
49 Incident Reporting 8 21
50 Classification of SUI 4 5
51 Incident Reporting Delays 2 2
52 Lack of Follow-up 1 1
53
Real time feedback of incident
reports
1 1
54 Never Event 5 5
55 Procedures vs Policies 8 11
56 Punitive 8 11
57 Quality and Safety Committee 3 4
58 Report Writing 1 1
59 Risk Assessment 1 2
60 Risk Register 1 5
61 Safety Comparisons to other industries 6 8
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Count Name Sources References
62 Time Pressure 1 1
63 us vs them 6 11
64 RCA Investigations 0 0
65
Critical of RCA recommendations, action
plan
9 14
66 Criticisms of RCA process 7 14
67 Development of Recommendations 1 2
68 Disagreement with RCA 'root causes' 7 10
69 giving statements 6 13
70 Goodwill 2 3
71 he said she said 4 7
72
Involved in the process of RCA
Investigation
24 48
73 Monitoring Action Plans 4 4
74 Putting an RCA label on it 2 2
75 RCA Templates 1 1
76 SUIs expose weakness in the system 2 2
77 Whistleblowing 1 3
78 Recent Changes at Trust 7 12
79 Risk Management 5 7
80 Strategy 3 3
81 Roles 33 103
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Count Name Sources References
82 Assistant 1 1
83 Clinical Director 4 7
84 Clinical Lead 4 9
85 Consultant 3 3
86 Departmental Management 3 4
87 Document Management 1 1
88 Educational Lead 1 2
89 General Manager 1 3
90 Governance 3 4
91 Hybrid Manager 14 18
92 Investigator 1 6
93 Lead Midwife 1 1
94 Matron 3 4
95 Matron of clinical quality and safety 1 1
96 Midwife 2 2
97 Role Change 5 17
98 Safety 4 4
99 Scientist 2 3
100 Senior Sister 6 8
101 Staff Nurse 4 5
102 The Patient 8 17
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Count Name Sources References
103 Duty of Candour 3 3
104 Honesty 1 1
105 Litigation Process 2 2
106 Malpractice 1 1
107 Patient as an Invisible Person 1 1
108 Patient Complaints 3 8
109 Patient Consent 1 1
110 The System 9 18
111 Ways to Improve Learning 6 11
112 Access to learning from home, mobile 1 4
113 Audits 1 1
114 Constant Reminders 1 2
115 Getting the Story Across 1 1
116 Incentives 1 1
117 Real time feedback of incident reports 1 1
118 Speed up the learning 1 1
119 What caused the incident 36 145
120 a black hole 1 8
121 Backlog 1 2
122 Cognitive Dissonance 2 4
123 Complexity 10 19
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Count Name Sources References
124 Delay 7 8
125 Did not follow policy 2 2
126 directly involved 6 6
127 Discharge Checklist 5 8
128 Failure to recognize deteriorating symptoms 4 4
129 Immediate Action Required 5 5
130 Justification 1 1
131 Lack of Assertiveness 8 9
132 lack of continuity of care 2 2
133 lack of knowledge 2 2
134 lackadaisical , blasé practice 1 1
135 miscommunication 11 17
136 Mismatch between capacity and demand 6 20
137 Neglecting low priority samples 1 3
138 Proactive 1 1
139 Skill mismatch (inappropriate allocation) 9 16
140 Tired 2 3
141 uncooperative 1 1
142 Variability in Practice 1 1
143 Weekend Effect 1 1
144 Wrong Judgement 1 1
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Count Name Sources References
145 What Influences Patient Safety 32 144
146 Absenteeism 1 2
147 Accreditation 2 2
148 CCGs 2 4
149 Coroner’s Inquest 1 2
150 Cost Improvement Programme 1 3
151 CQC 4 4
152 Financial Constraints, Budgeting, Bidding 14 25
153 Immigration 2 11
154 Increasing Workload 7 10
155 Junior Doctors Strike 3 5
156 Lack of Resources, Capacity 10 14
157 Low Morale 3 4
158 NICE (Guidelines) 6 7
159 Pressure to DC patients 2 3
160 Risk Assessments 1 2
161 Royal College of Pathologists 1 2
162 Staffing Shortages 11 20
163 Targets 11 15
164 UKAS 7 9
165 Factors that impede practice change post SUI and RCA 40 179
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Count Name Sources References
166
(Management) Stalled Implementation of
Recommendations
5 35
167 Blame 4 6
168 Capacity 16 23
169 Complexity 7 9
170 Funding 7 7
171 Gossip 2 3
172 Human Factors 6 10
173 Lacking personal involvement with SUI 1 1
174
New Staff, Changing Staff, Community Staff,
Agency Staff
16 31
175 Poor Documentation 4 4
176 RCA Recommendations 7 13
177 Tick Box Exercise 3 3
178 us vs them (Management vs Frontline) 7 13
179
us vs them (Professional Group vs Professional
Group)
11 21
180 Factors that support practice change post SUI and RCA 43 372
181 Audits 8 16
182 Checklists 2 4
183 Electronic Communications 16 22
184 Framing SUI in non-threatening way 5 7
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Count Name Sources References
185 Learning Curve 5 11
186 Professional Differences 10 18
187 Professional's Proximity to Incident 13 20
188 Reflection 4 5
189 Reviewing policy 4 7
190
Round Table Meeting, Staff Meetings, Team
Meetings, Handover Meetings, Governance
Meetings
20 38
191
Safety Boards, SUI at a glance, Lesson of the
month
14 22
192 Sharing across departments 9 13
193 Sharing with other trusts 8 9
194 Sign-up Sheets for new SOP 4 9
195 The role of experienced staff 8 13
196 The role of the Manager 18 37
197 The role of the team 9 9
198 Training 23 74
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